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ART. I.—APOLLOS: OR THE WAY OF GOD.

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WE introduce our notice of Bishop Coxe's respectable work, lately put forth under the above title,* with the following characteristically Episcopalian passage in regard to it from the **CHURCHMAN**:—

"It sometimes, in the course of Divine Providence, turns out that works done out of mere self-will, serve as an occasion, in the exigency of affairs, of accomplishing much good. It also turns out that a work wrought by a devoted servant of God for the good of the Church, does, in the Divine ordering of things, meet a crisis in affairs with a surpassing adaptation for which its projector had not dared to hope. It may be well enough to note two such undesigned adaptations at the present time.

"The Evangelical Alliance met, did what was given it to do, and dispersed. A great number of godly and well-learned men, deeply impressed with the evils of the present schismatic state of Christendom, assembled in the fear of God, to devise a remedy. It would be unwise as a mere matter of prudence, if from no higher motive, to say witty or unkind things about these men. There is not so much goodness in the world as to warrant us in passing severe judgment upon a great and well-meant effort. The testimony of so large a number of men, however mistaken, who by their character would be an ornament to any age of

* **APOLLOS: OR THE WAY OF GOD.** A Plea for the Religion of Scripture. By A. Cleveland Coxe, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1873.

the Church, to the felt want of Christian union, is worth a great deal to mankind. No good Churchman could, for a moment, adopt the ideas of these men; but all can share their aspirations. Noble aspirations lift up people. A failure to realize them conveys no moral contamination, but marks an error of judgment. Such an error of judgment, we think events have already shown, was manifested by the prevailing opinion in the Alliance, that corporate union was neither possible nor desirable, but that a union in spirit and in aim was all that in any case ought to be attempted, and that this already existed to a satisfactory degree. This we believe to be not only an error, but a very mischievous, and, for the hope of the world, *deadly error*,—an error in reality not less deadly in its ultimate effects than the existence of the papacy itself. The Church has survived twelve hundred years of the papacy, but it could not survive twelve hundred years of the universal adoption of this error. We do not believe that this opinion fully gratifies the nob'e longings for Christian union which the members of the Alliance do themselves the honor of showing to the world that they entertain.

"It was necessary that something should occur to demonstrate to the world the baselessness of this idea of Christian union, and so to demonstrate it as to point with significant meaning to the true basis of Christian union, and this, too, so effectively, as to awaken general discussion of this basis. This want has been supplied; supplied in a dreadful way—in a way that can cause only sadness to any good Churchman. It must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh. The apostacy of Dr. Cummins, like the falling of a star, has filled good men with amazement. It came so soon after the adjournment of the Alliance, and so confessedly as a result of it, as to beget the apprehension that judgment had begun upon this woful travesty of Christianity that could call schism by the name of union. The way is now open for a discussion of the real question that ought to have engaged the Alliance.

"The first want was supplied by a mere act of self-will. Nothing could have occurred so effectively to stir up discussion concerning the very ground of the Church's Apostolic order. It has been the occasion of doing that which all Churchmen desired to be done,—that is to demonstrate the falsity of the ideas of Christian union entertained by the Alliance, and to open up discussion of that which the Christian world has, in all ages, held to be the one and sole external bond of organic union. Discussion having been turned to this subject, there is a felt want for a treatise on Christian union, written in these times, and for these times, by a Churchman of acknowledged genius, and of representative character. Such a treatise has been prepared. The Bishop of Western New York, in his parochial visitations, was painfully impressed with the desolating effects of sectarian divisions in his own diocese. He found hundreds of

little villages and country neighborhoods where numerous sects were represented, but none of them strong enough to sustain constant service; where the little strength that existed, would if combined, have been equal to the comfortable maintenance of religion. Grieved to the heart he felt moved to the preparation of a treatise upon the subject, conceived in a new spirit, and such as might under the blessing of God, arrest the attention of those who by their very divisions had cut themselves off from the ministrations of the Gospel. This book was originally published serially in *THE CHURCHMAN*. It awakened a good deal of interest at the time. Readers of *THE CHURCHMAN* for the last few years need not to be told that '*Apollos: or the Way of God*' is the treatise to which we refer. But they may, perhaps, need to be told that in its present form it has been largely rewritten and retouched throughout. It is the best book that the Bishop has yet written. It is wondrously effective. It is conceived and executed in an exaltation of spirit, that irradiates and glorifies the whole subject. Mistaken views never prompted so pure an enthusiasm. The exalted strain of its eloquence must captivate all readers."

There is an air of lordliness in all this which, if we understand at all the heart and mind of the Bishop of Western New York, he would hardly be willing to assume as his own. It is not in harmony at least with the professed animus of his book. The book breathes humility, Christian love and peace; the article from the *Churchman* is full of intolerant bitterness and bad humor.

We say nothing now of the temper shown toward Bishop Cummins. We notice only in brief the uncharitable judgment fulminated against the Evangelical Alliance; a judgment all the more offensive in purpose, as it is but in keeping with much spleen going before on the same subject, which might seem to have simply come to the height of its exacerbation here from the vinegar poured upon it by the "apostacy" of the quondam Bishop of Kentucky. "This came so soon after the adjournment of the Alliance," we are meekly informed, "and so confessedly as a result of it, as to beget the apprehension that judgment had begun upon this woful travesty of Christianity that could call schism by the name of union." The whole quarrel of the *Churchman* with the late Evangelical Alliance Conference proceeds on the assumption, that it came together to

declare in some way a final union of the several Protestant denominations, and yet did not at once go into the question of a general common organization by trying to settle the only true basis first of all on which the union should take place. Need we say that no such object was proposed in the calling of the Convention, and that nobody in the Convention was so insane as to speak or even dream of it as the end of its being brought together? One object of the meeting was indeed to *exhibit*, as it was said, the substantive oneness of the Evangelical Christian world, *notwithstanding* its present unhappy division into sects; and some possibly may have had the thought that this was all that the idea of Church unity required. But most assuredly no such thought as this was in the mind of the members of the Convention generally. They desired far more than this, and looked upon their fraternization as far as it went, as serving only to open the way toward such ulterior end, without being able to see or to say at all how that end should be brought to pass.

And are we to be told now that this was all wrong? Can there be in truth *no* concord of faith or life among Christians, outside of a common church organization, worth talking about, worth coming to the consciousness of, worth exhibiting and showing forth to the world, or worth making use of in the way of earnest thoughtful discussion for coming to a full solution, if possible, of the difficulties that still keep the Churches apart? So thought not the clear-minded and warm-hearted Dean of Canterbury, when he came over the Atlantic to proclaim the theme, *Unity consistent with Diversity*; not meaning thereby certainly to justify the divisions of Protestant Christendom as being absolutely right and good, but owning in them nevertheless the presence of a common actual life and power of Christianity, which all who love the kingdom of our Lord should be willing to join in helping onward to its own completion in the full ideal of the Church, wherever that may lie and however it is to be finally reached. Just here would seem to have been the true significance of the Alliance, that it was such a gathering of good men from all parts of the Protestant world, *not* to discuss a plan of union, and still less to stul-

tify themselves by declaring no farther union necessary or desirable—but to confess before the world and to one another the sad wrong of their divisions, and to do what in them might lie, through such testimony and confession and mutual brotherly provocation in love, to stir up in themselves and in others the full measure of zeal that is required to do away with the sectarian evil through earnest consultation and study of the things that make for unity and peace. The Convention may have been—no doubt was indeed—largely one-sided and defective in its constitution; and a fair proportion of crude and shallow talk may have found place in its proceedings, as how in such a body could it well have been otherwise; but for all that, the work with which it was employed was a great and noble one, and such as deserved to command, as it did while it was going forward, the respect and reverence of men generally.

But all this with the *Churchman* goes for nothing. The Convention had in it “a great number of godly and well learned men, deeply impressed with the evils of the present schismatic state of Christendom.” Their testimony too to the felt want of Christian union “is worth a great deal to mankind.” Their aspirations are entitled to regard; all *good* Episcopalians can share them, though not capable for a moment of having anything to do with any such movement as this, for getting toward the end thus breathed after in their souls. For in spite of all allowances in favor of the members of the Alliance, they labored under a grand hallucination, and their work has turned out a self-convicted failure. They met to organize unity (so the *Churchman* will have it persistently), and they did no such thing; did not even talk of it seriously, as a thing practicable there and then; and so they brought forth only wind. Worse still, there was an error in their machination, from the beginning, plain to all sound churchmanship, which in fact, though they knew it not, was “a very mischievous, and for the hope of the world *deadly* error—an error in reality not less deadly in its ultimate effects than the existence of the papacy itself.” It was in truth, for the *Churchman*’s vision, of one sort seemingly with the profane attempt to build the tower of Babel; insomuch

that as that was visited with the divine judgment of the confusion of tongues, so the late meeting of the Evangelical Alliance is considered to have been convicted of like profanity by the close sequence of a like startling judgment—not lighting directly indeed on the Alliance itself, but so related to it nevertheless on the outside as to be very much the same thing. It was necessary that something should occur to show the baselessness of the whole idea of Christian union with which these builders of Babel were impiously amusing themselves; and it came “in a dreadful way,” namely, “the apostacy of Dr. Cummins,” which “like a falling star” (the apocalyptic *Wormwood* perhaps) “has filled good men with amazement.” This dire omen speaks for itself. “It came so soon after the adjournment of the Alliance, and so confessedly as a result of it, as to beget the apprehension that JUDGMENT had begun upon this woful travesty of Christianity that could call schism by the name of union.”

And what now is the ground of all this heavy indictment against the Evangelical Alliance? In what sense was it schismatic, in pretending to deplore schism, and in trying ostensibly to bring it to an end? The *Churchman* is at no loss for an answer. The first step toward Christian union for all Protestant denominations outside of the Episcopal Church, is that they should go into the question of a *jure divino* ministry, and settle this at once in favor of Episcopalianism, as it happens to exist under non-Catholic character here in America; which of itself must imply their immediate unqualified submission to the authority of the *Church* in that would be Catholic form. That is the one only method of unity in the case. The Episcopal Church is the one true Church all ready to start with in welding Lutherans, Presbyterians, Reformed, Methodists, Congregationalists, and others into one; and all that these bodies have to do is simply to throw themselves as repentant truants into her bosom. Then all will be well. They are now dissenters, schismatics, heretics and apostates. Then they will be in the ark. Then there will be one shepherd and one fold. Here the Evangelical Alliance should have set out in its work of Church union; and because it did not do this, its work was conceived

in sin and born in iniquity. So at least runs the oracular sentence heard from the tripod of the *Churchman*.

The serene self-complacency of all this is something to be astonished at, for any one who has looked seriously into the precarious character of the foundation, historical and theological, on which these lofty pretensions in the case of our American Episcopacy are found to rest; but we have no mind here to go into any controversy on the subject. We have no wish at all to quarrel with the Episcopalian Church. We regard it with high esteem. We honor its bishops. We respect its order. We love its liturgy. We sympathize largely as is well known with its sacramental and churchly spirit; having suffered more indeed for our testimony to what are rightly known as Church principles, than most so called high churchmen in the Episcopal Church itself. We desire the prosperity of the Episcopal Church, and pray God to bless it in its appointed work and mission. But with all this, we feel bound to say that the dream of the *Churchman*, and of the school for which it is the spokesman, in regard to this mission, is utopian in the extreme. The question of Church unity as the world now stands involves immeasurably more than the government of the Church by bishops. It is theological first, and then ecclesiastical; not ecclesiastical first, and then theological. And the sooner Episcopalians come to see this, and so join themselves with the earnest friends of Christianity in other Christian bodies (without forsaking their own communion) in trying to make our common theology fairly answerable to the demands of the present age (which it now is *not*), the better it will be for our sorrowful divisions and distractions all round.

With these prolegomena, bearing directly on the general subject in hand, we pass on now to a direct consideration of the book which forms the title of our present article; reciprocating at the outset, from the bottom of our heart, the expression of the author's "particular regard" in the copy with which we have been kindly favored from his hand. We honor him for his father's sake as well as for his own, recognizing in him indeed much of his father's Presbyterian and even Quaker peculiarity,

through the superimposition, as the venerable father himself might say, of the son's later Episcopal life. The book itself is worthy of high commendation both for its matter and its spirit. It is a polemical *eirenikon*, we may say, designed to operate, like the smiting of the righteous, as an excellent oil on the head of evangelical Puritanism, not breaking it, but reconciling it softly and sweetly to the idea of episcopacy. The argument is ingenious; the method clear; the style sprightly; the intention, as all candid readers must feel, transparently honest and most earnestly sincere. In these respects, the volume is a model of Christian controversy on the principle, *Come, let us reason together!* It aims to speak what it holds to be the truth in love. We have full faith in its sincerity, as well as deep sympathy also with what may be termed the burden of its subject; and we shall try at least to meet its challenge in a temper friendly, frank, and honest as its own.

The evil state in which we are through our existing sect system is described by Bishop Coxe in scorching terms, which however are only a fair picture of the truth. "There is as really need for a great awakening," with our Christianity, he tells us, "as there was in the days of Wickliffe. The scandals of our times are different from those of the Middle Ages; but I am forced to believe that they are not less hateful to Christ. A fragmentary Christianity; 'a house divided against itself;' time, wealth, energy, zeal, immense resources and facilities wasted by Christians, in contending one with another; innumerable moral evils bred of this state of things—evils which, because of these things, cannot be rebuked, much less corrected; this is a reality which everywhere confronts us. And, correspondingly, what is the case? Missions paralyzed; infidelity rampant; and after three centuries of boasted 'reformation,' the greater part of Europe and America still enslaved to the superstitions of the feudal era, and all its demonstrated imposture!" Again: "The dissensions of the reformers stopped the progress of reform in the sixteenth century; and here, in America, they are reproduced in such countless forms of mingled truth and error, that unbelief becomes the rational resource

of millions, who argue that if truth exists, they have neither the time nor the facilities to discover it amid so many discordant sounds. Christians see and feel all this; but they take no steps to correct the gigantic evil, and are contented to see each his own sect flourish. Nobody mourns, like a Daniel or a Nehemiah, over the broken walls of the temple; over the dust and ashes of the glorious city of God."

Strongly and graphically spoken; but true, every word of it. We agree with it, of course, for it is only what *we* in our Reformed, non-Episcopal way, have been writing and preaching for many years past—a testimony starting with our two tracts, *The Anxious Bench* and *Antichrist, or, The Spirit of Sect and Schism*, and reaching down continuously to the present time.

In these circumstances, Dr. Coxe feels himself called to a sort of prophetic office in the service of his generation. His spirit, like that of Paul, is stirred in him at seeing the whole Christian world given over to ecclesiastical madness. The fire kindles, and he speaks: "Somebody," he says, "must break the stolid apathy of the times on this behalf. God grant that mightier voices may follow. I speak boldly, however, because I speak for God; and I speak nothing but what I shall draw from His Holy Word. May He save me from any mistake, and from all confidence, save that which His Holy Word inspires."

To shield himself from the charge of presumption, he takes refuge in the case of Aquila and Priscilla, mentioned in the 18th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, who, in the exercise of the common priesthood of believers as it stood at that time, undertook to instruct the great and mighty preacher Apollos, expounding unto him the way of God more perfectly than he had known it before. Apollos stands for learned, pious, gloriously gifted teachers of Christianity, outside of the Episcopal Church. The bishop, for the nonce, lays aside his episcopal dignity, and speaks as a common man. These outsiders or dissenters (men like Dr. Adams, Dr. Hodge, or Henry Ward Beecher) may know much of "the way of the Lord," may be

mighty in the Scriptures, evangelical, eloquent, and all that; but still there is wanting with them a farther something, of which they are not aware, to make them complete in their ministry; and the office of furnishing this additional something is all that the humble-minded bishop assumes under the guise of "such a one as Ananias, the tentmaker."

It so happens at the same time, that this story of Apollos admits of an easy accommodation to the service of the main question with which the argument of Dr. Coxe's book is concerned; and it is wonderful, accordingly, how glibly for his lively fancy it is made to play from all sides into the merits of that question. What Apollos needed when he came to Ephesus, we are told, was a proper knowledge of the Church constitution already established by the Apostles; he was evangelical, but not churchly; an exact case, therefore, of what the same opposition means now with our modern sectarian Christianity; and so all that Aquila and Priscilla did was to expound to him more perfectly the way of the Lord, the true outward law of God's kingdom in regard to this matter.

But we must beg leave respectfully to demur to the exegesis, which puts into the text here such a meaning as this. Our imagination is too dull to catch even a glimpse of anything of the sort. What Apollos, the Jew—coming from Alexandria, well taught in the Old Testament Scriptures, but knowing as yet only the baptism of John—needed still to make him a competent Christian teacher, was something more, certainly, than indoctrination simply in the outward order of the Church. It was a deeper insight than he had yet gained into the interior power and glory of Christianity itself, as determined by the full meaning of Christ's person and work. According to Alford: "He knew and taught accurately the *facts* respecting Jesus, but of the *consequences* of that which he taught, of all which may be summed up in the doctrine of Christian baptism, he had no idea."

Fanciful as it may be, however, to find in the case of Apollos a real historical example of what Dr. Coxe is bent on exposing as respectable evangelical Christianity of the modern type,

disjoined from the way of the Lord more perfectly expounded in the sense of apostolic order, there is of course room still for this distinction in itself considered; so that his general argument with regard to it, otherwise taken, may still hold good, or at least deserving of respectful attention. The loss of Apollos need not damage it essentially, however it may interfere here and there with its vivacity of representation, and its pleasing, rhetorical embellishment.

We cannot pretend at all to follow the argument in this general character into its particulars; we feel constrained to say, however, that viewed as a plea in favor of Episcopacy over against the reigning popular Puritanism of our land, outside of that form of church government, it is to our mind by no means satisfactory. In other words, it is not of a character to shut up outsiders of the thoughtful, conscientious sort, to the conclusion that all the miseries of the present broken and disordered state of the Church are referable wholly to *their* denominational distinctions, and that the one single panacea for the evil is to own Episcopacy for the first and great commandment of the Christian law, as if there could be no deeper or more vital question possibly than that involved in the problem of bringing our common Christianity back into right order and form. There are many outside of the Episcopal communion, we are well persuaded, who see and deplore the present evil condition of things quite as clearly as Bishop Coxe does, and sigh also just as sincerely as he does for the deliverance of the Church from the Babylonish captivity of the sect system, who yet cannot be brought to fall in with his short and easy method of ending the trouble. Not from any prejudice against Episcopacy as such; they would be glad to take refuge in it, if it could show itself truly equal to the task of the times; but just because they feel the method to be too short and easy for this. It does not reach to the true bottom of our difficulties. It is too external and mechanical, and so at the same time too superficial also, in its way of seeking to heal the hurt of the daughter of God's people. The cure it offers is too slight for the disease. The malady which

is now upon the Christian world needs deeper probing, and calls for more fundamental help.

Dr. Coxe is generous enough in his concessions to evangelical Puritanism. Sectarian Christianity, as he calls it, has in it much that is good. In its better forms, indeed, he is with it largely in his heart and mind. Its "exemplary piety and noble achievements" command his honest admiration. There is no *theological* discrepancy between him apparently and the religious theory of the self-distinguishing brotherhood of the so-called evangelical churches. They are substantially right as far as they go in doctrine and practice. But the difficulty with them is, we are told, that they do not go far enough. Like the evangelical Apollos (rather a sorry case of *Christian* experience, it must be confessed), they stop short in a mere half of Bible truth; while another half of it, just as plainly taught in the sacred volume, they fail to see altogether. It is there all the time, but their eyes are turned away from it, and it is for them as if it did not exist. This unregarded and overlooked side of Bible truth has to do with religion in its general character, as something different from individual or personal piety; to which it stands related, however, as its necessary complement. Individual piety is sufficiently provided for by the evangelical system; but to continue itself properly in the world, it must be organized into fixed general form. Without this, it is liable to grow erratic, and run itself to waste. Hence the constitution of the Christian Church, in which a scheme of law and order has been established by Christ Himself, and His Apostles, to conserve the Christian tradition, and to hand it forward from one age to another in a sure way. Let now this Apostolic order (as we see it exemplified in Episcopacy), be conjoined with the other half of the gospel as we find it with righteous Presbyterians and Puritans, and all will be well. We shall have then a whole Christianity, and sectarianism and schism will cease to torment the Church. So runs the dream of our book, *Apollos: or, The Way of God*.

"The half Christianity of our day," the author tells us, "never gets any farther than this; its bare idea is, if one can

get to heaven with such an imperfect gospel as he may possess, what need of more perfect knowledge?" "This they willingly are ignorant of: that there is another half of Christianity which has respect to other souls than one's own, and to unborn generations. The gospel has not done its work in getting *you* and *me* to heaven: there are yet millions to be saved besides us; ages to come must be provided for."—"There is something in a *whole* Christ which this generation sees not." The twofold or double character of the whole Christ is illustrated, throughout nature, in everything "whose seed is in itself." It has in it an individual end and a general end. So, for example, with a bushel of wheat. It is both "bread for the eater" (individual use), and "seed for the sower" (general use). The full idea of the gospel is the same. It must be at once both bread *and* seed, seminal as well as personally experimental. Here it was that Apollos learned the way of God more perfectly. He had an imperfect gospel before that might have sufficed to save his own soul and the souls of those that heard him; "but the divine plan for the preservation and propagation of the entire gospel, and for the ultimate evangelization of the whole world, must have been defeated, had not St. Paul and his disciples insisted on teaching him and others the way of the Lord more perfectly."

We have taken some pains to bring into view distinctly Bishop Coxe's notion of the two sides, which are required to make Christianity whole and complete; and we need not say that we agree fully with his general conception of such a necessary duality in the constitution of the gospel. But our immediate object here is to notice what seems to us to be his defective way of putting the case, in illustration of our remark already made with regard to the too mechanical and external character of his scheme in general, for the proper cure of our church difficulties. The two sides of Christianity with him stand out of each other, each separately complete for its own end, and they are only brought together by divine ordination to make sure of both purposes at the same time. There is no real intussusception of the two forms of life into each other; and

so far as this is the case, the true idea of organization is not reached in their union. Their relation is that of one thing made to fit in with another in an outward way. It is made intimate and necessary through God's wise plan. Individual Christianity is one thing; corporate Christianity is altogether another thing, thrown around the first for its protection and defence, and its proper propagation in the world.

Need we say that this wrongs the true conception of religion in the most serious manner? It flies in the face at once of the analogy brought to illustrate it from the natural world. There, wherever we have life, in animal or plant, its twofold sides, the individual and the general are joined together indissolubly, inwardly and essentially, as one life. Can less be required for the unity of life in its higher and infinitely more glorious Christian form?

Episcopalianism is fond of harping on its Apostolical Order. "There is a Way of God," we are told, "as well as a Word of God." Christianity is a rule to be obeyed as well as a doctrine to be believed. But the idea of this order, method, rule, in the book before us, never gets beyond the form of an abstract, outward scheme. We must have organization, the book says, to save us from the chaotic Christianity of sects which destroys itself. "We want a clear and candid exhibition of organic Christianity," we are told, "as opposed to the multiplication of sects." But, alas, what we get in the case after all is not an organism, but simply a mechanism. The two conceptions are totally different. A mechanism is a mere external system, a putting together of things to serve a design which is not in the things themselves. An organism implies life, and is the union of its parts as organs in the constitution of this life. There is law, necessity, order, in both cases: but in one case, the order is rigidly fixed and dead, like that of the grave; in the other, it is indefinitely flexible and free. So through the whole natural world. Animals and plants obey their fixed typical forms, which nevertheless spring forth with endless diversity from their individual lives. Even the hard shell of the lobster is the outgrowth of the animal's flesh. It comes not by accretion

from without, but by concretion from within. And just so it is also in the moral world. Virtue, righteousness, truth, good, hold for men only in the character of universal identical law; while yet they can be this only as they are born at the same time out of the inmost peculiarity of each separate human life. Good is not measurable arithmetically; truth is not to be taken into the soul automatically; virtue is not reducible to standing rules and maxims; and righteousness working in the harness of a mere outward casuistry is no righteousness at all. It would seem to be a fair presumption now, that the same order should be found to reign in the economy of Christianity, the spiritual life of the Church; that this too, out to its ultimates in ecclesiastical polity, should be a whole or entire constitution, organically, and not just systematically, joined together in all its parts. But the church polity recommended to us by Dr. Coxe, as a remedy for our chaos of sects, holds no such inward relation to the animating soul of Christianity. It is a divine contrivance rather, which is made to inclose this in an outward way; heaven's gracious machinery, we may say, superadded to the Christian life otherwise considered, to make it work right, and to protect it from heresy and schism. Is not this to degrade in fact what the argument seeks to exalt?

But this is not all. We cannot help feeling that the Word of God, in the hands of Dr. Coxe, is wronged very much in the same way with the Way of God. It is regarded as a text book simply of divine origin, from which men are to draw the truths of religion in an external rational way, each for himself as he best can, under the supposed guidance of God's Spirit. In other words, we see no difference between Dr. Coxe here and the sects he is trying to put down. We know to what such private judgment in their case comes. They can make the Scriptures mean anything they please; for the letter of the Word in them is capable of being sundered entirely from the spirit of the Word, and then it takes into it of course any sense which the spirit of the human expositor—be he Methodist, Calvinist, Unitarian, Political radical, or what not else—chooses to put into it. This Dr. Coxe sees and condemns; but

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then makes his appeal to the law and to the testimony in what seems to us to be precisely the same mechanical and arbitrary style.

Who now, however, is to assure us again that the learned Bishop may not himself go wrong in thus handling the Bible for our instruction? For he claims no infallibility for his prelatical dignity, either as belonging to him in his own office, or as flowing into him mysteriously from the general hierarchy, in which he holds so honorable a place. He is himself aware of such vulnerableness in his Bible argument, and tries to cover it as he best can; but the help, to our mind, is vain. "Why am I so sure," he asks, "that what I see in Holy Scripture is really there?" To which he answers. "I subject myself to a test which can easily be applied. I have appealed to the Bible, to nothing but the Bible. I have searched the Scriptures,* and find 'that these things are so.' But a Jesuit, for example sees, it differently. I turn to the Jesuit, then, and I say to him, Show that I am mistaken by an appeal to historic facts."—"Confidently do I throw out this challenge to the Jesuit. Scripture is all I need; but he proclaims that I misinterpret the Scriptures. Very well. I am willing to go with you to the interpretation of the first ages; I will meet you there, and will abide by the result." That is, the *nothing but the Bible* must be supplemented now by another rule, namely, the authority of antiquity or early church tradition. Here again, of course, we are out upon a sea of conflicting opinions as before. But what we have to do with just here is the hard externality once more, that oppresses us through this whole Episcopal scheme. Its use of tradition is like its use of Scripture, and like its idea of Apostolical order, an attempt to build up Christianity from mere outside elements, when it is only the presence and power of the divine life which is immanent organically in Christianity itself, which can make these elements ever to be of any account.

* As the Pharisees did too in the time of Christ, thinking to have in them eternal life (John v. 39), and yet found nothing there but their own private blindness, because they had not God's word abiding in them.

It follows necessarily, from what has been said, that we are not satisfied with the view which the scheme before us takes of Christian obedience and faith. They both suffer, we think, from the general mechanical and unfree character of the scheme. The test of obedience is made to be too much simple unquestioning submission to "ordinances," because they *are* ordinances; whereas it should be borne in mind that it is the "obedience of faith" which the Gospel requires, and the essential character of this is to be always, not darkness, but "light in the Lord." And so then, on the other hand, we are made to feel that faith itself is reduced too much here to the character of a reception of different religious truths propounded of God in an external way; in the sense commonly put upon that famous word "the faith once delivered to the saints," not only by Episcopalians, but also by Romanists, Lutherans, Baptists, Scotch Seceders, and Evangelicals generally, each body construing it in conformity with its own creed. We must get beyond every such notion of a dead mechanical *traditum*, if we are ever to do justice to the true idea of faith as the central organ of the Christian life.

We wish it to be distinctly understood that in thus criticising the Episcopalian basis of church unification presented by Bishop Coxe, we are not opposing his positions in a controversial way. Our object, on the contrary, is amicable discussion only in the prevailing spirit of his own book. We too, as already said, mourn with him over the sect system, and desire most sincerely to see it brought to an end. We agree with him also in his general view of what he regards as the egregious one-sidedness of our reigning Puritanic, non-episcopal Christianity. It sees one side of the Gospel, but overlooks entirely for the most part another side of it no less essential to its perfection. We would not call this other side exactly the seminal interest, that which regards the propagation of Christianity, God's way or *plan* for keeping the Gospel—viewed as being in itself otherwise all that it needs to be—from dying out, or losing itself, as we say, in the sand. We have been accustomed to speak of it rather as the objective side of the Gospel, that

which has to do with the historical verities of the Christian salvation going before subjective or personally experimental religion, and making room for this through faith, in the only form in which it can ever be a truly divine power, coming into men from beyond themselves, and so raising them out of themselves in the way that the idea of religion requires. Such objective Christianity is of course general or universal in its nature in difference from all simply private experience, and it draws along with it of itself—by a rationale which we need not now stop to explain—what is to be understood by a sense for the sacramental, the liturgical, the churchly, in Christian life and worship. We have it in the Apostles' Creed. We have it in the idea of the Christian Year; where all turns first, from Advent to Trinity, on the objective outwardly historical view of the world's redemption, running its course through the mystery of the Incarnation out to the full glorification of the Son in the Father; and where only then room is made for the subjective experience of this grace to run *its* course also (starting as regeneration, where the other ends, in the Holy Trinity), through the second half of the year, out to its full and proper conclusion. All this *we* hold to be the needed complement of evangelical sectarianism, its great missing *desideratum*, quite as earnestly as Dr. Coxe, and in a view, we think, that goes more into the life of the subject than his view of "seed for the sower" as well as "bread for the eater."

And therefore it is, that we have no quarrel at all, as just said, with the points he insists upon as necessary for the effectuation of true church union, in themselves considered. Most certainly, this can never be reached in a purely ideal form. It must involve objective actualities, outward historical system. In particular, there must be for it divinely appointed order, method and rule: a "way of God" as well as an outwardly spoken word of God; and there must be for it along with this also, a continuity of tradition connecting it historically with the beginning of the Church in Christ and His Apostles. We are not disputing these points as urged in this book, *Apollos, or the Way of God*, when we object to the manner in which they

are here presented. Our criticism is only to show that as thus presented they are not sufficient for their own purpose. They do not set the "way of God" before us, in a form commensurate with the exigencies of the case which it is required to meet; in a form suited to convince the deeper religious thought of the age, that English and American Episcopacy is all the Protestant Christian world now needs to bring itself right. We wish most heartily it were otherwise. But the book is not equal here to its own task. Its notion of apostolical doctrine and order, its ecclesiastical methodism we may call it, is too mechanical, too extrinsic to the only effectual principle of unity in the interior life of Christianity itself, to allow the thought. It dualistically divides in truth, and holds at arms-length apart, the very interest—life and form—which it proposes to join into one. Aiming to be systematic, it makes no account of being organic; and thus destroys on the one hand, what it industriously labors to build up on the other.

This is what we mean by our altogether friendly criticism. The question is not just how far certain elements of external authority shall enter into the constitution of the Christian Church; but this rather: In what way shall they enter it? Shall they be for it pure externalism simply—apostolical machinery, faith once delivered, cut-and-dry tradition—made to environ its internalism in mechanical fashion; or shall the last appear as the living soul of the first? There is no necessary antagonism between these seemingly opposite terms. All life, on the contrary, supposes and demands their union: objective law, namely, from beyond itself, and its own actualization of the law, nevertheless, from within itself. Of this no proper account seems to us to be made by our modern Anglo-American Episcopacy; and therefore it is, that we are sorrowfully sure that it is not of itself, as it now stands, a last answer to the great and solemn question: How shall the health of the daughter of God's people at this time be recovered? The question, we are very certain, is too deep for that. We must go farther for its sufficient answer.

Dr. Coxe, of course, includes the government of the Church

by bishops, in his scheme of things necessary to make out his idea of the Apostolical way of God. He tells us indeed at the outset, in language we like, that he desires a truce of controversy on the subject. "I am tired," he says, "of the stale word-fights of centuries; I have no taste for controversies, involving old grudges and issues of the dead past. I know nothing more distasteful than the endless changes rung upon the words 'bishops, priests and deacons,' and the discussions thereon, which have filled so many books. Not even the droning, dreary debate about the measure of water involved in the word *baptize*, is more unutterably sickening to my soul." To this our soul also groans from its inmost a hearty *amen*. We detest the whole thing—not because we hate either bishops, priests or deacons, but because we love the truth of the Gospel and the peace of Jerusalem more. "The broad subject which I would bring before my brethren," says our author, "is that of the family of Christ in its organic forms and features; and I would view it, freed entirely from all colorings of historic and controversial theology, in the simple light which is shed upon it by Holy Scripture."

With all this, however, the argument of the book, as just said, contrives to take in bishops as one of the unquestionable "first principles of the oracles of God," without which there can be no right Christianity; and it does this only the more easily, by thus tabooing beforehand the "word-fights of centuries" on the subject. Anglo-American Episcopacy, of the high church type, is accustomed to assume in this way a good deal that it cannot prove. For example: That the episcopate is the direct continuation of the apostolate; that there was anything like a regular episcopal ordering of the Church before the destruction of Jerusalem; that Timothy, Titus, Silvanus, Marcus, Clemens, Epaphras, Epaphroditus, and other such apostolical delegates and fellow-workers, were regular diocesan bishops belonging to this order; that the stars and angels of the seven churches in the symbolism of the Apocalypse mean just so many unsymbolical bishops of Asia Minor of the same empirical sort. Postulates like these transcend the measure

of our credulity. Rothe's *Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche*—the best historical argument, by the way, in favor of Episcopacy, we have ever read—makes it clear, we think, that whatever of elementary preparation there may have been for it in the previous state of Christianity, the episcopal system, as such—in the form in which we find it universally established in the second century—came in only after the destruction of Jerusalem; being a wise provision at the time, brought in by the counsel and advice of such of the Apostles as were still living—particularly St. John—and having for its object the unity of the Church in the new critical stadium on which it was then entering.*

This, however, merely by the way. Our object here is not to go into the controversy about the origin of bishops, but simply to show that here again, as in its other elements already noticed, the Episcopal cure for schism presented in Dr. Coxe's book is too much for the surface of things, and too little for the inward heart of things, to meet effectually the wants of the case as it now stands. The crisis through which the world is at present passing—in morality, learning, politics and religion—calls for far more than any such simply external application, whether human or divine. The mechanism of the papacy in such view is not what the sick world needs to make it well; but neither is it, any more than this, the high-church mechanism of episcopacy by divine right—a mechanism, which can come to its full sense and right end at last, unquestionably, only in the Roman idea of a *jure divino* infallible centre. What we mean is, that if either popery or episcopacy be essential to the being of the Christian Church, it must be under the view of their

* Of apostolical origin in such humanly historical way, the episcopate was of course an outbirth also of the life of the Church; and in this view there is force in the remark of Dr. Rothe, that we may see a divine providence in the circumstance of the obscurity—the absence of outward observation—which marks the coming in of the institution. "The Christian world," he says, "was to be guarded thereby from the temptation of regarding the episcopate as an *ex jure divino* institute, and of looking upon a temporary measure of purely human wisdom as a divine ordinance, having in itself fixed and necessary permanent force, so as to lay upon itself in this way a self-imposed yoke for all time."

being in some way, along with their outward ordination, a true concretion or outbirth from the inward life of the Church. Any other view is becoming more and more intolerable for the self-consciousness of the age in which we live. The world has got beyond *that* notion of the "obedience of faith," and can never more get back to it in its historical life, whether in Vatican or Laudean form.

As mere externalism, or supposed divine machinery, the high church Episcopalian pretension here seems to us—we are bound to say—even less rational than the Roman pretension. For what is the meaning of the regimen of bishops in either theory? Is it not that of a bond, apostolically contrived, to hold the Church together in all its parts? This of course implies unity in the episcopate itself, for how can a dismembered episcopate make the body of the Church one, any more than a dismembered presbyterate or a system of independent church synods?

Who then is to bind together the visible bond of unity represented by the bishops? The Vatican Church answers the question consistently, by providing for the visible bond a very visible and material sort of knot in the bishop of bishops who sits enthroned as the successor of St. Peter at Rome. And all ecclesiastical honesty requires us to admit, that this agrees with the idea that underlies the Episcopal institute, from the time it first comes before us in the second century under this view of a necessary bond of Christianity. We feel it in Ignatius; it comes to full blossom in Cyprian; it is Romanism out and out in Augustine. Nothing can well be more rigorously logical and consequential than the way in which it thus runs its course from the second century to the fifth. The principle of the argument is clear. A bishop can be worth nothing for unity, except as a member of the whole body of bishops; for even an Apostle could be of no apostolical authority in truth, except as he stood in conscious union with the college of the Apostles collectively taken. Hence the episcopate must be visibly one, and only in that character of organized solidarity can any part of it deserve the least respect as a defence against schism;

for outside of such solidarity, is it not seen at once to be itself the very quintessence of schism?

We have shown twenty years ago—in our articles on Cyprian, published in the *Mercersburg Review* for 1852*—how far that great church father in particular, reflecting the sense of his age, carried this idea of corporate solidarity as essential to any divine significance in the office of a bishop. The idea of a bishop outside of a true catholic or whole episcopate—a bishop, prating of his apostolic succession as a mere fractional prerogative, cut off from the succession in its entirety—was worse in his view than a puerility—it was the very sin of Korah, Dathan and Abiram. There were bishops enough of such outside apostolical succession in the early Christian times—schismatical and heretical bishops, Novatian, Arian, Donatist—representing together more than half the nominal Christian world; but that only served to show, for men like Cyprian and Augustine, of how little account the office was for its own end, in any such abstract shape. There was no magic in the thing; even as a divine institute it was worth nothing, save as an organic power joined organically with the one whole life of the Church itself.

No bishop, according to Cyprian, can be said to be the organ and representative of Christ, in virtue of what he is simply in his single and separate capacity. To be such an organ he must be comprehended, believingly and consciously, in the *whole* organism of which Christ is the Head. His office can never be of force, except in union and harmony with the entire office of which it is only a part. That is the plain meaning of the famous dictum: "*Episcopatus unus est, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur*;" which meets us again in the formula: "*Episcopatus unus, episcoporum multorum concordie numerositate diffusus*."

And so we repeat here very deliberately what we said a score

* Articles which offended many at the time by their fidelity to simple historical truth, although nobody, so far as we know, has ever pretended to meet them with even the ghost of an answer. But the world has moved considerably since then, and there is nothing so ugly about them now.

of years ago. The Cyprianic doctrine of the Church is not modern Protestantism. It is not this, of course, in Lutheran or Presbyterian form. But neither is it this in the Protestant Episcopal form, however fashionable it may be with a certain class of Episcopalians to claim a historical resting-place for the foot-sole of their faith away back on this mythological basis. Anglican Episcopalianism is not the Episcopalianism of the third and fourth centuries; and the difference is more than accidental or circumstantial. "Its theory of the Church is not that of Cyprian. Whether right or wrong, this last makes no room for the legitimate entrance of any such fact as the Reformation, owns no possibility whatever of a valid hierarchy aside from the unity of the apostolical succession as a solid whole, and asserts with unfaltering precision the presence of supernatural powers objectively at hand in the Church and to be found nowhere else."

To the question thus, *Who is to bind into one the visible bond of Church unity represented by the bishops*, the Roman Catholic answer is plain, as is also the answer of the third century. The answer is wrong, as we have taken pains to show in our article of last April, on *The Old Catholic Movement*; only, however, because the premises on which it is based are to be considered wrong. But what are we to say now of our modern high church Episcopalian answer, which starts from the same premises—all coming together in the idea of a *jure divino* visible hierarchy made necessary by Christ for the very being of His body the Church—and then for the needful unity of this hierarchy itself remands us to the purely invisible presence of Christ promised to be with the Church to the end of time? No one is more ready than our excellent and much honored Christian brother, Bishop Coxe, to exclaim against the idea of a visible centre of unity in the Vatican view. It is in his eyes a monstrous and blasphemous assumption; while yet he loses no opportunity at the same time of hammering the sects, as he calls them, for not accepting the like visible means of unity set before them in the divine institution of Episcopacy. We cannot help feeling that there is serious contradiction in this. The

Episcopalian theory, so put forward, is either too little or too much; too little, if earnest is to be made with the Cyprianic doctrine in which it professes to start; and altogether too much, if it is to be passed off upon us, in its character of a mere fraction of that doctrine, as if the fraction were the whole.

There is something in fact, well nigh ludicrous in the modern Protestant High Church Episcopalian notion of the charm there is supposed to be in the apostolical succession of bishops, to preserve sound doctrine and right order in the Church, when one brings to bear upon it the calcium light of the ancient doctrine of Cyprian and Augustine, in the view particularly of what they insist upon, as the necessary unity and solidarity of the episcopal office regarded as a whole. In our modern system, if we understand it, this idea of solidarity has slipped very much out of mind. Anglicanism has been, since the Reformation, what Cyprian graphically pictures as "a sunbeam cut off from the sun, a bough torn from a tree, a stream sundered from its fountain;" but this has not been felt by the system itself as a fatal break in its apostolical succession; the only question of account in the case being simply to establish the validity of the original English ordinations, thus fractionally considered, in their own separate form. Any rivulet of Episcopal derivation from the general succession is supposed to have been enough for that. And so it is wonderful now, how far in the judgment of many the merest minimum of such aphoristic apostolicity can go to make all things right, if only there be in it a grain of true episcopal blood. That puts all the Oriental sects in catholic position. That saves Swedish Lutheranism, while the Lutheranism of Germany is considered to be no Church at all. A single stray bishop, lighted upon in Berlin, happily gave the Moravians a right start, without which they would have been no better than Continental Protestantism generally.* The so-called Jansenist secession in Holland has been held in connection with the Apos-

* In organizing his new Church at Herrnhut, Count Zinzendorf got himself introduced into the ministry, in 1734, by Lutheran ordination. His missionary plans, however, required that other brethren with small education, should also be ordained as ministers. This was not to be expected from any Lutheran consistory;

tles similarly by a very small thread indeed down to our time, until finally through the death of Archbishop Loos of Utrecht, this also was reduced to a single precarious filament in the person of Herman Heykamp, Bishop of Deventer. That filament, however, has proved quite sufficient, as we know, to convey the magic force in full of a true apostolical succession, in spite of Rome, onward to the newly elected bishop of the Old Catholics, Joseph Hubert Reinkens—saving thus that otherwise sectarian movement from the sin and misery of egregious schism.

We quote these instances merely to set in its true light that high church Episcopalian view—not shared in by either Moravians or Old Catholics—which hangs the entire weight of a true apostolical succession in the life of Christianity, on the single peg of a supposed separate apostolical succession in the episcopate—the office of diocesan bishops; and then, nevertheless, allows that the episcopate itself may be broken into a thousand fragments, and each fragment be able still to carry away with it the full and entire life of the succession just as if no such schism had taken place! Cyprian would have scouted such a thought with derision, and it stultifies, we are very sure, the whole conception of what the office was intended to be as a bond of unity in the beginning.

And so we come back to our main thesis; namely, that the cure for the divisions of Christendom, as the world now stands, is not to be found in the outward order simply which is offered to us by the Anglo-American Episcopal Church. The crowning element of the Church, its episcopate itself, think what we may

and he was not willing, like Wesley, to take the matter into his own hands. Here was a difficulty. But it so happened that there was in Berlin an aged bishop, of previous Moravian emigration—Jablonsky by name—officiating at the time as court preacher in the service of the Lutheran Church; and now by a happy thought, it was resolved to call in his aid for the emergency. Zinzendorf commended David Nitschman to him as worthy of being consecrated to the episcopal office; Jablonsky cheerfully consented to convey to him the apostolic succession still quietly immanent in his own person; and so David Nitschman became the first Bishop of the New Moravian Church. Some time after, Zinzendorf himself was consecrated to the same office by the same obliging hands. The Church thus had its own modest prelacy now, and could make ministers and missionaries to suit itself.

of it otherwise, is no better for such purpose than its other elements, viewed in this abstract outside way. The problem calls for a deeper solution.

Bishop Coxe seems himself mournfully aware that his Church—"all glorious within" as he considers it to be for those who are in it—is not after all what he would fain have it to be as the "way of the Lord" for restoring the captivity of His people. "It has been common among us Anglicans of the Anglo-American communion," he says with a tone of pathetic sadness toward the close of his book, "to flatter ourselves that our Apostolical claims are destined to prevail, and to win over the reflecting and the educated among all Christians of other names. Far be it from us to deny or affirm any such thing, in view of the 'signs of the times.' The real issues become complicated and mysterious every day. The German immigration, the Chinese irruption, the African problem, the menaces of Jesuitism—all these and other features of the age, to say nothing of materialism, sensualism, and communism, teach us to be very humble, and to wait on the Lord in patience of hope, and in the fulness of faith. I frankly confess, and I avow it with a due sense of my accountability to my dear brethren in the episcopate, but with a deeper sense of my accountability to the Master, that I dare not boast of any such expectations as in past years many among us have ventured to adopt. I love our Church with a deeper love than ever; I believe in her more than ever; but I feel that God has chastised our proud spirit, and rebuked our too confident words."

This is a good confession, and it lies in the same direction exactly with the general object of our present article; which as we have said, is not to antagonize Episcopalianism as such, but merely to show that it is not in and of itself the power that is needed at this time to actualize in full the true idea of the Holy Catholic Church, the coming down of the New Hierosolyma from heaven.

It does not relieve the case at all, that we are not able to refer to any other existing order of church life as having in it more of promise or power for that glorious end. On the con-

trary, this only makes it so much the more a sacred duty for all who love the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ to look the whole truth solemnly in the face. Certainly, what we miss in Episcopacy here, we miss at the same time also in other denominations. Why should we try to deceive ourselves? The Shiloh to whom shall be the gathering of the nations in the Church of the Future is not in Romanism; but just as little in Presbyterianism, or Lutheranism, or Methodism, or Puritanism of whatever shape or form. His coming is not heralded even remotely as yet in any of the Oriental Churches; nor may we dare to acknowledge it in the Old Catholic Movement. These systems severally, along with Episcopalianism, are at best but partial Christianity, and not whole Christianity; and, alas, they are not organic parts, but divided, broken, reciprocally schismatic parts, each virtually pretending to be the whole, and in its particularity excluding the others. But what then? Does it follow that these systems should be for this reason all at once abandoned as a first step toward general unity, in the way the "*Churchman*" virtually assumes in taxing the Evangelical Alliance with abetting the sin of schism? Only in one view could this be rationally demanded—that which in fact underlies the *Churchman's* severe crimination of non-Episcopalian Christianity throughout; in the view, namely, that Anglo-American Episcopalianism, as a mere outward *via media* between Romanism on the one side and Sectarianism on the other, offers in itself what all the world should see to be God's ordination, carrying with it immediately whatever is needed to make the Church one and complete. But this, we have seen, is an untenable assumption. The question of Church union, to whose claims the Evangelical Alliance is trying to awaken the attention of the Christian world, is not to be met and answered in any such summary, superficial way as that. The Alliance has not yet found the right answer to it; has not indeed pretended to have done so; but neither has it been found, we feel very sure, by Episcopalianism. This may have, and we trust has, an important part to contribute toward the reintegration of the confessional divisions of Christendom; but other confes-

sions have *their* gifts to bring also, according to such a man as Döllinger, no less essential to the idea of a full and whole Christianity. The Episcopal Church—in spite of her self-distiguishing title of “*The Church*”—is in truth at last a section only, or sect, of the Church Catholic, and not by any means the wholeness of its proper life. All the Evangelical Protestant Churches are in this respect, we repeat, in like condemnation, as not having in them the true full law and power of Christian unity; and the sooner this is seen and felt by all, the better. Then we shall not have Episcopalians—because they have bishops—refusing to talk with other denominations on the subject of Church unification because these have no bishops, and saying to them in substance: ‘This question of unity is for you, and not for us; *you* are in schism; *we* are the Church; repent—believe—enter the mechanism of our communion, and all will be at once made right.’ Instead of this, the question will be seen to involve immeasurably more than any such pitiful issue as that; and the mind and heart of the whole Christian world may be expected then to flow together more and more, from all sides, under the influence of God’s Spirit, seeking the true answer to it in a deeper, more inward, and far more comprehensive form.

How that blessed end—the growing desire now of all nations, the true second coming, perhaps, of our Lord Jesus Christ—shall be ultimately accomplished, we, of course, know not and pretend not to say. We may safely mention some ways, however, in which it certainly will *not* come.

As we have already intimated, it will most assuredly not come on the platform of any existing church organization as it now stands. Among them all, no single one can be named that is broad enough, or deep enough in its foundations, to serve this purpose. What Protestant body—however it may have pleased itself with such a wild fancy in the beginning—now seriously dreams of being the very “pattern in the mount,” to which all Christendom must conform itself in order to become one? And yet, how hard it is for any of these bodies to see and own steadily the practical force of the thought

that they are, at most, parts only of the full Christian idea, and that "when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." It were an immense stride gained in the right direction, only to have this single truism clearly before the vision of the Church on all sides. It would be, of itself, the power of catholic unity already at work.

The union we speak of, will not come on the basis of any one confessional scheme of doctrine now known in the world. No such scheme, Romanist or Protestant, may, without vast presumption, pretend to be the full sense of Christianity. The full sense of Christianity indeed, the faith once delivered to the saints, is not capable of being imprisoned in any logical sarcophagus of this sort; just because it is living, and not dead; and it is no derogation from the proper worth of any one of our theological confessions, therefore, to say that it is not all that is required to set forth that faith in true universal form. Neither the Lutheran nor the Reformed symbolical books are fitted to become the end of all strife and division in this way. The ultimate unity of the Church will not be built on the Augsburg Confession, nor on the decrees of the Synod of Dort, nor on the Westminster Catechism, nor on the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. Who, from his inmost heart, can seriously believe any such thing?

Neither will this unity be brought about, however, by diplomatic inter-denominational negotiation of any sort, having for its object the bringing of the separate Churches into one, in a merely outward way. The Evangelical Alliance, if we looked upon it simply in that view, might well be set down for a failure; especially in the extremely partial and one-sided character under which it appeared at its late New York Convention; but that, we have already seen, is not the right view to be taken, either of its work or of its reigning mind. No mere confederacy of denominations in the way of concordant discord, and no counsels or plans looking simply to the reduction of differences to a common platform of doctrine and order, can ever bring to pass the end here proposed; just as little as the decrees of kings or popes. "Not by might, nor by power, but

by My Spirit, saith the Lord," applies to all such *ab extra* compulsion in either form.

It is a vain imagination again, to expect the coming of the Lord to build up Jerusalem from the repristination, simply, of any past period of Church history. As if the new here was to be nothing more than the old! As if the living were to be sought only among the dead! What is needed is something vastly greater than any mechanical return to the theology and life of the sixteenth century, whether in Lutheran or Reformed type, whether in Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland or England. Something far beyond any falling back to the piety of the Middle Ages. Something unspeakably better than a general retrogression to the Nicene period, or to any portion of the Patristic time going before. It is a delusive vision—this dream of bringing all things right by an unhistorical pilgrimage of our whole modern Christendom to the tombs of the fathers, martyrs and confessors, who fell asleep in the Lord fifteen hundred years ago; this fond conceit of putting an end to all heresy and schism by setting ourselves, as Dr. Coxe phrases it, "to work back to the precise position in which the Churches would have continued, had the Papacy never disturbed the primitive constitutions." God be praised, that the early Christian world was doomed to no such stagnation as that! And God forbid, that the Christian world now should try to work itself back to it by any such crab-like process! We cannot do it, if we would; we should not wish to do it if we could. God has "provided some better thing for us," we feel very sure, than this. If ever there was a time in the history of the world, when the deliverance and redemption of men, whether in the political or religious light, demanded progression, and not retrogression, that is the character of the present time. Our age is in a crisis like that of the Red Sea; and the voice of Jehovah-Jesus may be heard plainly sounding through it as of old to Moses: "Speak unto the children of Israel, that they GO FORWARD!" We must face the realities of our own age, as they are in their own nature. We must grapple with the world-problem of the nineteenth century, in the bosom of

the nineteenth century, and not by skulking into the dim religious light of the fifth century. Christianity must conquer the modern world in the midst of its own conditions, if it is to make good its claim to true catholicity—if it is to be a *Church* in the end, and not simply a school or sect.

The error thus rejected, is only one pole of the unhistorical spirit in religion; there is, of course, another pole of the same spirit—the seeming opposite of this, though only its obverse complement in fact—to which it is, if possible, even more vain to look for any effectual escape from the acknowledged misery of our present ecclesiastical divisions. We have it in the growing disposition which is shown with some, on all sides, to come to a full rupture with the historical past of Christianity; to get clear of its dogmas, mysteries and supernatural peculiarities, out and out, at one stroke; and thus to win at once free room, as they imagine, for a new birth of the gospel, that will leave behind forever the endless *isms*, as they say, which it is found impossible to reconcile or harmonize in any less sweeping way. This is Humanitarian Christianity; exalting itself against all that is called God, in the very temple of God; and pretending to save Christ, through the destruction of Christ.

The negatives which we have now briefly noticed, make of themselves, of course, no positive, in answer to the question before us: "When or how shall the Son of Man come, and what shall be the sign of His coming?" But they go far, we think, to bring into view what *must be* the general character of the positive, through which only the idea of this glorious advent can be realized in the end. Christianity, to be truly historical, must revert again—not just to the period of the Reformation, nor to the Nicene period, as if the stream in either case could give us the wholeness of the fountain—but back to the very fountain-head itself, so as to descend from this afresh, through all the following ecclesiastical ages, down to our modern time, freighted with a depth and wealth of meaning, such as is not to be met with either in any one age, or even in all ages together, going before.

All the signs of the present—far beyond the signs of any past time since the first coming of Christ; apocalyptic signs, we may call them, felt now by all the deep thinkers of the world; signs in the moral and political heavens, no less than in the world of Christianity itself; signs, which it is felt no extravagance now to symbolize as the “shaking of the powers of the heavens,” or as a universal giving way and breaking up of what has seemed to be, heretofore, the established order of nature; all these signs, we say, go to show that Christianity is in fact, in such a vast fundamental crisis as we have mentioned, and that it needs, therefore, nothing less than such a whole renovation as we now speak of—starting from the Lord, and taking hold upon the deep places of the earth spiritually considered—to carry it triumphantly onward in its mission.

We cannot go farther here into the question of this new dispensation of the Church; a question that is much in our heart and mind; but take leave of it at present by simply referring to our paper, *Christianity and Humanity*, read before the late Convention of the Evangelical Alliance, and published in the last number of this Review. Which itself, however, is only a synopsis, as all can see, needing a commentary for every separate thesis.

Bishop Coxe complains with good reason, as we have seen, of the one-sidedness of Evangelical Puritanism in holding itself all the time to one class of texts in the Bible, while it overlooks and ignores entirely another class of texts, just as plainly there, which go to favor Episcopalianism. It is the object of his work, we are told, to bring this neglected side of Scripture to its proper rights; which is done, however, as we have seen, in a strangely external way. “I come with half truths,” he says, “which are not thought of by many of my pious countrymen, and I propose to join them to the half truths which are almost universally accepted by them, and which are mistaken for integers.” “The two halves united, present a perfection and beauty which proves that they were not meant to be put asunder.” The charge thus preferred against Evangelical Puritanism is just; it is at best but a partial Gospel; but is

Dr. Coxe quite sure that all it needs to make it the Gospel in full is that it should be pieced out by what he proposes to add to it as another partial Gospel? What if these two "halves," as he calls them, in order to become inwardly one, demand a still more interior view of the Gospel as the proper ground of their wholeness? Then we should have yet another class of "neglected Scriptures," in the case of which both Puritanism and Episcopalianism would stand alike convicted of being in the same wrong. And just this now, it seems to us, is the actual truth of the matter, and nothing less than this. Plainly there is a whole vast order of thought and statement in the Scriptures, which as yet has found no sufficient attention from either Roman Catholic or Protestant exegesis; while at the same time the more it is considered, the more it must be felt to deserve and demand such attention. For it has to do with the inmost and deepest life of Christianity; and falls in wonderfully also with what we have just seen to be the great need of the Christian world at the present time, in the vast and mighty crisis through which it is now passing. We look upon it accordingly as one of the most significant among the "signs of the time," that there is coming to be an awakened interest in these mysterious oracles heretofore so much overlooked, and that the question *What think ye of Christ?* around which they all revolve, is beginning to be lifted up in such sort as to draw all men toward it, so that even the infidelity of the age is forced to do homage to it, more and more, no less than its faith.

The oracles we speak of are very numerous; far more so than those ecclesiastical Scriptures, "which the Continental reformers neglected," according to Dr. Coxe, and which it is the object of his book now to rescue from the hands of the Romanists, who have made it their business, he says, to "appropriate and abuse them with a malevolent triumph." For "him that hath an ear to hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches," the oracles we speak of form indeed an under-tone running through the whole Bible, so that the voice of the Lord in them is felt as "the sound of many waters." We can but notice them here in the broadest and most general way.

They include all that range of Scripture, in which the idea of *revelation*, or the simple making known of God to men—through His Word at large, and then specifically through His Son Jesus Christ—is represented as being identical with the idea of redemption and salvation. The Old Testament is full of this thought, and so also is the New Testament; all culminating in that word of our Saviour's last pontifical prayer: "This is life eternal, that they might KNOW THEE THE ONLY TRUE GOD, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." This it is that we are to understand by what has been called the "*offenbarungs-bewusstsein*" of the first centuries, in distinction from the mere "*erlösungs-bewusstsein*" of the 16th century. The two conceptions are not contradictory; each is in the other; but there is a necessary order in their reciprocal relation, and that order requires that the fact of revelation—not as a theorem, of course, but as a living power—should go before the fact of redemption, for the consciousness of faith—should underlie it—should be for it in truth nothing less than the very womb from which it is born. "God hath shined in our hearts," says St. Paul, "to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ;" and that inshining of God, we now affirm, is itself salvation.

Along with this goes necessarily the idea, that what the Scriptures mean by salvation is nothing less than true and real conjunction with the divine life itself; in the image and likeness of which man was originally made, just that he might be capable of union with God through his intelligence and will—the proper substance of his being—in such actually living and not merely notional way. And who needs to be told, what a world of "neglected Scripture," in both Testaments, is occupied with this high and holy mystery, in which the natural and carnal mind is so prone to see only its own carnality, stigmatizing it perhaps as transcendentalism or pantheism? Take only one text here: "God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is IN HIS SON." It is but a specimen of a vast armory of other texts, reiterating in every variety of way the same stupendous thought.

Then follows another class of these oracles of the living God, wherein the Scriptures themselves, and all the facts of redemption, are set forth as having their origin and full deep force only in the actual spiritual world that lies beyond the present world, and in which the whole sense of the present world is all the time comprehended as a fleeting shadow. The economy of salvation being the intensely realistic *life* we have just seen it to be, it *must* have its actuating soul everywhere in the life of eternity, and not in the life of time. So much is signified by the symbolism of the ark of the covenant, overshadowed by the cherubim, behind the veil, in the old Jewish Sanctuary. Divine powers, the very "powers of the world to come," are made to challenge our faith in every part of the Bible. Its words are "spirit and life." The *aura* of an actually present divinity stirs within it, and breathes forth upon us from its pages, if only we come to it in the spirit of little children. Simply to read the 119th Psalm, with right spiritual receptivity, is to come under the force of this strangely mysterious afflatus almost in every verse.

And so finally we have a fourth class of the much neglected Christological (more than Puritanically experimental, and more also than merely churchly) declarations of Scripture, in whose behalf we have here undertaken to speak; namely, that wide chapter, in which faith—the faith that justifies men and saves men—is made to be first of all direct correspondence with the divine life, whether in the Bible or in Christ—both being in this view the presence of the same Word, whose life is the light of men—making room thus, through its own constitution, for the entrance of that life substantively into the believer's spirit. We need not repeat here what we have said on this point in our article on *Christianity and Humanity*, but offer it as a mere corollary following necessarily from the points going before.

We owe it to the Bishop of Western New York, whom we honor in the Lord, to say in conclusion, that his position with regard to the Christian world outside of his own communion, if we understand it rightly, is by no means so ex-

clusive and intolerant as the argument of his book might appear at times to imply. "What I propose," he says, "involves no supercilious claim that my own Church needs no reformation; nor does it involve the folly of saying to others: 'Accept unity by accepting her communion in place of yours.' By no means." To a devout brother of the Lutheran or Presbyterian communion, pleading a sense of duty for staying where he has been providentially placed, his charitable answer is: "I can only say with the prophet, 'Go in peace.' The conditions of modern Catholicity do not permit me to speak as I must have done in the days of Cyprian. This is felt so deeply that the tone of a Cyprian, in these days, excites disgust. It is illogical and impertinent. The only answer is, 'Physician, heal thyself.' Till we illustrate our own principles more practically, it becomes us to be very modest." And so in the end, we feel as if the bishop's stand-point were wholly our own, and are ready to join with sympathetic heart-beat to every word he utters, when we hear him winding up as follows: "What then? The first thing is a general concession that the existing state of things is temporary, and only tolerable till a return to unity can be wrought out by the power of the Spirit, and under the guidance of His providence. Let every Christian look upon the disorganized state of Christendom with sorrow of heart, and yearn and pray and labor for restoration. Then, when the servants of God take pleasure in the stones of the old temple, and 'favor the dust thereof,' then God Himself shall arise and have mercy upon Zion; the time to favor her, yea, the set time will have come; so the heathen shall fear the name of the Lord, and all the kings of the earth His glory.' Would to God every Christian who reads these words would agree with me to pray daily in the use of this Psalm, adding, 'Thy kingdom come!' This is the end for which I write; it is much better than prose-lytism."

To which what can we do better than to add, as we do from our inmost heart, the Apocalyptic response: "Amen. Even so, come, Lord Jesus; come quickly."

ART. II.—THE BIBLE AND SCIENCE.

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THE end or aim of divine revelation, of which the Bible is the infallible record, is not to teach natural science. Revelation, in itself, is a connected series of supernatural events, of divine words and works, culminating at last in the mystery of the Word made flesh, which is the central and energizing idea of the whole process, and in the establishment of the Christian Church, as the sphere of Christ's perpetual presence in the world, by the Holy Ghost, for the salvation of men. Of this the Bible is the documentary record for all time. The design of the Bible is, therefore, not to teach philosophy or natural science, but to communicate spiritual truth, and guide men in the way to a blessed life. Beyond what may be necessary in order to the fulfilment of this design, it takes no interest in those truths which properly form the object of science, whether in the department of physics or metaphysics. Hence it touches upon matters related to scientific questions only incidentally; and it would, therefore, be manifestly impossible to construct scientific theories, of Astronomy, for example, of Geology, Physiology, Psychology or History, from the statements of the Bible.

But while this is admitted, it must be maintained nevertheless that the Bible is throughout in essential harmony with the results of true science. The Bible and science can not contradict each other. Revelation is from God, and the world of nature is from God. The Bible is one book of God, in which are manifested His gracious counsel and will towards man; and nature, the world of "things that are made," is another book of the same God, in which are manifested His eternal power

and Godhead. These two books, proceeding from the same divine mind, cannot be supposed to contradict each other. The testimony of the stars, and the testimony of the rocks, and the records of history, when correctly read and interpreted, must be in harmony with the testimony of God's word, when rightly understood. A conflict here would be possible only in case of a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of one or both of the great books of God, nature and revelation. A false interpretation of the statements of the Bible bearing upon matters related to natural science may be in conflict with a true interpretation of the facts of nature; or conversely, a false interpretation of the facts of nature may be in conflict with a true interpretation of the statements of the Bible; or finally, a false interpretation of the Bible may be in conflict with a false interpretation of nature. Other cause of opposition or contradiction we cannot conceive, if we admit that the Bible is the record of an actual revelation or communication from God, and that the world is in a real sense a creation of God, embodying the thoughts and purposes of His mind and will.

The apparent contradictions of the past, which are now happily solved, at least so far as no longer to disturb any one's mind, all resulted from one or other of these causes. A brief discussion of a few of these supposed contradictions, will serve to confirm the above propositions, and will also, besides, throw light upon the general question concerning the relation of the Bible to scientific thought. There was a time, as all know, when it was generally imagined that the Copernican system of astronomy involved a flat contradiction of the Bible. The Bible was regarded as being forever wedded to the Ptolemaic theory, which supposes the earth to be stationary in the centre of the universe, and the sun, moon and stars to be revolving around it, in what used to be called crystalline spheres. Does not the Bible say that God "laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not be removed forever?" Does it not constantly speak of the rising and setting of the sun, moon and stars? The sun "is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoices as a strong man to run a race. His coming forth is

from the end of heaven, and his circuit unto the ends of it." And did not Joshua command the sun to stand still upon Gibeon, and the moon in the valley of Aijalon? Does not that prove that the sun and moon are moving bodies in the sense of the Ptolemaic theory, and that any other view of them must involve treason to the Bible? So men actually reasoned; overlooking the fact, of course, that it is not the design of the Bible to furnish an infallible system of astronomy. However, in consequence of such reasoning, Galileo of Pisa was condemned for heresy by the Roman inquisition, and graciously offered the choice between abjuring the new theory of Copernicus and losing his head. And a century after the time of Galileo, leading orthodox theologians of the Reformed Church of Holland counted this also among the heresies of Cartesius, "that he reckoned the earth among the stars; that he ranked the sun, which hitherto had been regarded as a planet, among the fixed stars, and the earth among the wandering stars; that he changed the moon into a kind of earth, to which he attributed mountains and valleys; and finally that he transferred to the earth the motion which for so many thousand years had been regarded as belonging to the sun."

But the theory which was thus resisted at first as an enemy of revelation, was essentially true, and finally, after a long struggle, gained for itself the approbation of all the philosophers and scholars of Christendom. And what has meanwhile happened to the Bible? Has it lost any of its credit, or fallen in the estimation of believers? By no means. It was not the Bible that had to give way, but only a false interpretation of a comparatively small number of texts; and the result has been a positive gain to our knowledge of the Bible and to the cause of revealed truth. We now understand the relation of the Bible to natural science and philosophy better than it was understood three hundred years ago. The Bible is not committed to any scientific theory, or to any philosophical system, and is, therefore, above all theories and systems. It speaks no scientific language—no language formed in the schools. In speaking of the earth, with its mountains and valleys, its oceans and

rivers, or of plants, and trees, and animals, it does not employ the language of Geology, Botany and Zoology, but the language of common experience and life. And so, in speaking of the phenomena of the visible heavens, it does not use the technical terminology of any Astronomical theory, but the language of common perception or sense, so that all men, whether they are Astronomers or peasants, can understand it. To our senses the earth seems to be stationary, while the sun and stars seem to be moving through the sky; and we will, therefore, always speak of their rising and setting, in spite of our knowledge that the reality is considerably different from the sensuous experience which determines the form of our language. It would, therefore, be as easy to make out a case of opposition between sensation and science, as between the Bible and Science. Yet the eye is not convicted of falsehood by the fact, that the sun, which to our unaided vision appears to be only a few feet in diameter, is, by mathematical calculation, proved to be a body of vastly larger size than this great globe which we inhabit. For such calculation is possible only on the basis of the facts furnished to the mind by the activity of the eye; and the validity of such calculation depends, therefore, upon the validity of the perceptions of the eye. If the validity of our sense perceptions were denied, there would be an end of all science of the outward world. The activity of the eye, moreover, is not affected by any theory of the visible heavens. The Astronomer's perception of the stars, after having abandoned his instruments, is not essentially different from that of the untutored peasant. There is only this difference between the two, that the Astronomer's theory is a more rational and more consistent explanation of the facts of vision, than the crude notions of the peasant. In this view the eye, or the faculty of vision, is superior to any theory or explanation of the heavens. Theories and systems may change, but the eye changes not. And just so the Bible, using no scientific phraseology or technical terminology, but the language of common sense and experience, when referring to the phenomena of the visible heavens, is superior to all scientific theories of these phenomena. A

change of theories requires, therefore, no change of the Bible, just as it requires no change in the sense of vision, upon whose perceptions all theories must ultimately be based. The Bible might be read in the light of the Ptolemaic theory without disadvantage to the spiritual truth which it is intended to convey, and without disadvantage to the peculiar religious view of the world, which it is intended to produce in the mind of the reader. And the same Bible may be read in the light of our more enlarged and more accurate knowledge of the mechanism of the heavens, without any sense of discord between its statements and that knowledge. Nay, more. As our present science is a more rational explanation of the facts or phenomena of vision, than the crude theories of the past; so also is it a more rational explanation of the statements of the Bible. The Bible, like the perceptions of sense, not only admits, but demands such an explanation, in order to its own consistency. And it may well be made a question, whether our present Astronomical science has even yet sufficiently advanced to explain all that the Bible has to say of heaven, and the heavens, and the heaven of heavens. There may be very much here still, that science has yet to learn; and in the end the Bible will no doubt be found to have been far ahead of science all along, instead of being behind it or beneath it.

But the imaginary conflict between the Bible and Astronomy was scarcely ended, when a new enemy seemed to appear in the young science of Geology. The discoveries which Geology has made in the rocks composing the earth's crust, seemed at first to involve a contradiction of the Mosaic account of creation. How can the existence of stratified fossiliferous rocks, making a total thickness of ten miles, and containing the petrified remains of vast myriads of strange plants and animals, all of which must have lived and died long ages before the appearance of man upon the earth, be made to harmonize with the idea of a creation of the world in six literal days, not quite six thousand years ago, as the language of the Mosaic account was commonly supposed to teach? In reply to this it must be said in the first place, that the aim of that account is not to teach

the principles of Geology, but the principles of Monotheism—the eternal existence of God, and His relation to the world, as its free Creator and Preserver. In other words, the aim of that account is to teach just what the Christian professes to believe in the first article of the Creed. God alone is eternal, infinite, absolute and unconditioned. The existence of the world is temporal, finite, relative and conditioned. It has the ground of its existence, both as to matter and form, not in itself, but in the omnipotent will of the eternal God. God is the supreme and free Author of its matter as well as of its form. The present form of the world, however, was not originated simultaneously with the matter of which it is composed. The cosmos, as we know it now, is not the product of a single, instantaneous stroke of divine omnipotence, but the product of a series of creative acts, and of a series of progressive stages of development, of longer or shorter duration, arising from those creative acts. First matter is originated in a state of chaos, without form and qualitative determinations. Then there follows a series of creative fiats, each starting a new movement, or a more complicated process, in the onward progress of the world's genesis, these movements or processes being so linked together that the lower always forms the basis and necessary condition of the next higher; and the result of all this is the production, in order, of chemical, mineral, vegetable, animal and finally, human nature. These we suppose to be the fundamental ideas of the Mosaic account of creation, when divested of the sensuous and symbolical form in which they are presented, which form is due, no doubt, to the manner in which the history of the creative work was first revealed to man, or to the state of mind, namely that of ecstasy or vision, in which the revelation of that work was received. And with these ideas nothing that Geology has ever brought to light, or ever will bring to light, is in conflict.

On the theory hinted at already by Augustine, and now universally accepted, that the six demiurgic days were not literal days of twenty-four hours, but periods of indefinite extent, whose duration cannot be determined by any modern measure-

ment of time, there is no discrepancy between the Mosaic account of creation and the discoveries of modern Geology. On the contrary, the order of creation as described by Moses corresponds, at least as to its leading features or grand outlines, to the order indicated by the organic remains found imbedded in the stratified rocks of the earth; and prominent naturalists as well as theologians have shown how the successive ages of Geological formations may be parallelized with the successive days or creative periods of the sacred record. Of course, when such attempts at parallelizing or harmonizing are carried too far, so as to run them out into minute details, there arise difficulties, which with our present knowledge we may not yet be able to solve in a satisfactory way. Indeed the simple optical or phenomenological form of representation of the creative process in Genesis, seems to forbid a minute comparison with the results or conclusions of natural science. And yet a sufficient degree of correspondence can already be pointed out to convince us, that the record of the rocks and the record of Scripture are in essential harmony with each other. Indeed the very difficulties of the Scriptural narrative of creation, like the mentioning of light on the first day, and the making of the sun, moon and stars on the fourth, subsequently to the production of vegetation, are evidences of its divine or supernatural origin, and ought to inspire us with confidence in its truthfulness; for these are mostly of such a character as an uninspired writer, recounting simply his own natural impressions and reflections, would no doubt have avoided. No heathen cosmogony would have removed the formation of the sun so far from the beginning of the world, and placed it after the creation of vegetation; and yet modern science, both from the stand-point of Astronomy and of paleontological Botany, has fully justified the Biblical order in this particular.

Nor is the theory, which regards the creative days as periods of indefinite extent, as Prof. Tyndall imagines in one of his letters concerning the prayer-test, an abandonment of the Mosaic account. It is simply an abandonment of the dry and spiritless interpretation of that account, inherited by the

Church from the later lifeless Jewish theology, and the substitution of a better interpretation. This new interpretation is not felt to involve any violence to the sense intended by the words of the Mosaic account. That account, in connection with other Scriptural statements bearing upon the same subject, will not only admit such an explanation, but demands such an explanation in order to the expression of its own proper sense. Its words are not like the characters or numbers of an arithmetical problem, which must be taken strictly at their face value, but like those of a parable, or of a prophecy rather, which convey a deeper meaning than that expressed by their literal form and sound. In all languages the word *day* has a figurative as well as natural sense; and that it is the figurative sense which is intended in the first chapter of Genesis, seems to be evident from the fact that the present Astronomical relation of the earth to the sun, by which the succession of day and night is produced, was fixed only on the fourth creative day, as well as from the fact that, in the recapitulation of the second chapter, the six days are called one day: "These are the generations of the heavens and the earth when they were created, in *the day* that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens." Hence St. Augustine, long before the science of Geology was born, saw that the six days cannot be explained literally. "What kind of days these were," says this great father, "it is extremely difficult, or perhaps impossible for us to conceive, and how much more to say! We see, indeed, that our ordinary days have no evening but by the setting, and no morning but by the rising of the sun; but the first three days of all were passed without sun, since it is reported to have been made on the fourth day."* At the time of Augustine there were no philosophers who had learned to read and interpret the record of the rocks. Indeed the very existence of that record was unknown; and Augustine was, therefore, not driven to his conclusion by any extra-biblical science or speculation, with the results of which he might have endeavored to make his exegesis square. It

* Civ. Dei, xi. 6.

was the Biblical record itself which, deeply pondered, made upon him the impression that, whatever those days might mean, they could not be taken to have been ordinary solar days like those to which we are accustomed now. And now this *presentiment* of Augustine, as we may call it, has become a well settled and universally accepted theory; so that no theologian any longer apprehends damage to the Christian faith from the revelations of Geology. Geology has not overthrown the Bible. It has only occasioned Theology the trouble of reconsidering and reconstructing a few of its traditional opinions concerning the teaching of Scripture in regard to the *method* of creation; but the result, in many respects, has been worth more than all the trouble it has cost, and the labor thus expended is, therefore, not to be regretted. The Christian faith has remained unshaken; and the Bible, we believe, has lost nothing, but gained much from the very trial to which it was subjected. Here also it has turned out that the Bible was not behind science, or opposed to science, but really in advance of science. Though it tells what it has to say in regard to the method of creation, or in regard to the origin of the world, in a style and language that are intelligible to all men, of whatever degree of education or culture they may be, thereby proving its adaptation to the purpose for which it is designed; yet beneath that simple style and language there is a depth of truth, that no scientific thought has yet fathomed to the bottom.

And as the Bible has thus come forth triumphantly from the ordeal to which it was subjected in relation to Astronomy and Geology, so also will it come forth from the ordeal to which it is now subjected by the discussion, so eagerly maintained, concerning the *antiquity of man*. The Bible, indeed, is not a manual of universal history or of anthropological archæology. If it were that, it would, of course, be seriously defective; for there are large and important portions of the human race, which it passes over without so much as a single notice. It deals with matters of universal history only in as far as they come into contact with, and have a bearing upon the history of salvation. Its single aim is to declare that man was originally

created in the image of God, with a view to a blessed life in communion with God; that through the instigation of the prince of evil spirits, a fall has occurred, which has disturbed man's original relation to God, and subjected him to the punishment of death; and that after the fall, God initiated a process of salvation, a remedial economy, which after extending through many ages of preparation and waiting, was completed, in the fulness of time, in the mystery of the incarnation, by which humanity is reunited with God, and the original end of man's creation secured among them that believe. In relating the history of this soteriological process, from its first beginning in Paradise, the Bible, however, presents also historical data and chronological statements, which seem to fix the age of man upon the earth at about six thousand years. But here modern science has raised doubts. The discovery of stone implements in the drift deposits and peat bogs of Europe, and of human bones, in caves, commingled with those of extinct animals, like the mammoth, gigantic deer, woolly-haired rhinoceros, cave-bear, cave-tiger and cave-hyena,* which flourished in Europe during the early part of the post-tertiary age of Geology, seems to point to a much higher antiquity of man, than that allowed by the sacred record. The difference apparently is one, not simply of hundreds, but of many thousands of years.

How the problem here presented may at last be solved, it would now perhaps be impossible to predict. There is much that is still doubtful on both sides of the question, and that must yet be cleared up before a true solution can be given. In the first place, Biblical chronology is still in a state of confusion. There is, at the very outset, the perplexing difference between the numbers furnished by the Hebrew text, the Septuagint, and the Samaritan version; the Septuagint, for example, making the time between Adam and Abraham 1,366 years longer than the Hebrew original. Which of these versions now is to be regarded as the more genuine and reliable in a chronological view? During the patristic age the preference

* A good account of these discoveries is given in the annual report of the Smithsonian Institute for 1867.

was generally given to the Septuagint, while since the Reformation the decision has commonly been in favor of the Hebrew, though the former also has had able advocates in such scholars as Jackson of the last, and Seyffarth of the present century. But even supposing the Hebrew text to be the only genuine one, the chronologist will still encounter difficulties enough in this, to make him doubt the possibility of determining with any thing like precision the year of Adam's creation; as must be sufficiently evident from the varying, and often contradictory, results at which those have arrived, who have made the trial. But apart from all difficulties of this sort, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty also in regard to the *meaning* of the chronological numbers found in the early part of the Bible. Are they literally historical, or are they perhaps symbolical, like the days of creation? Do they signify literal solar years, or do they signify periods or cycles of time, of longer or shorter duration? "If one were lucky enough," says Roesch, "to discover the Ariadne thread through the labyrinth of Biblical chronology, and so to determine the first year of Adam according to the numbers contained in the Bible, there would be found lurking immediately behind such discovery the disturbing question, whether the time thus fixed upon is after all any thing more than an *imaginary epoch*. If it be true that traces of human labor and art have been found at a depth of thirty feet beneath the alluvial deposits of the delta of the Nile, which place the existence of human civilization 17,000 years before our era; if the age of the rock, in which Pourtales is said to have found petrified human bones, has been correctly computed by Agassiz at 10,000 years; if the flint implements found in Picardie and England are really productions of human workmanship, whose history extends beyond the present Geological period; if the age of a fisherman's hut excavated in the neighborhood of the Bothnian Gulf must be estimated at 12,000 years; if the discoveries of American Geologists in the delta of the Mississippi really prove this to have been the abode of men for at least 57,000 years; if, finally, it be true that the human race is of the same age as the Alluvial strata, the period of whose deposition

must be computed at from 80,000 to 100,000 years; then Adam, if he is to be regarded as the *protoplast* of the race, and as such he is presented in the Bible, must in reality be much *older* than the Biblical numbers would seem to make him, and these, in as far as they start from him, can therefore, to a certain extent, not be *historical* in their *present* form."*

But there is, to say the least, much also that is still doubtful on the side of science. Does the discovery of flint implements in the drift deposits of certain parts of Europe after all demonstrate that the men who made and used them, lived during, or even immediately after, the drift or glacial epoch? Might not their presence in the places where they are found, be accounted for also in a hundred other ways? So also in regard to the human bones found in the same caves with those of extinct animals. Must we necessarily assume that the men, whose skeletons have been found in the caves of Aurinag and Fontaine, or in the grottos of Valieres, and Arcy-sur-Yonne, were contemporaries of the huge animals of the post-tertiary or alluvial age whose bones are imbedded in the dust and rubbish of those same caverns? But even if these questions must be answered in the affirmative, that after all does not settle the question concerning the age of man in a chronological view. Suppose that man made his appearance upon the earth shortly after the commencement of the post-tertiary age—and no one pretends that there are evidences of his existence here at any earlier epoch; the question then immediately arises, when did this age begin? Has it really been as long as some have imagined? In regard to this point the best authorities greatly differ. While some have estimated its duration at 380,000 years, Sir Charles Lyell and others have reduced the number to about 35,000. These figures are obtained by means of calculations based upon the slow formation of river deltas, the gradual progression of cataracts, etc. The cataract of Niagara, for example, has retreated from a point near Queenston to its present position, a distance of about seven miles, *since the close of the glacial epoch*;

* Herzog's Encyclopedia, Art. *Zeitrechnung, biblische.*

and judging the rate of recession to have been on an average one foot in a year, the time required for the entire movement would be about 35,000 years, and this then would be the duration of the post-tertiary age. But now Prof. N. H. Winchell, State Geologist of Minnesota, advances a different theory, and comes to a conclusion much more favorable to the chronology of the Bible.* His theory concerning the cause of the intense cold of the glacial epoch is based upon Astronomical facts, especially the precession of the equinoxes, and the consequent occurrence of the winter solstice in aphelion at intervals of 21, 356 years; and he accordingly, calculates that the last glacial epoch, that which separated the post-tertiary from the tertiary age, occurred in the northern hemisphere in the acme of its intensity at a period 11,300 years ago. Now, if this theory be correct, and it is to say the least highly plausible, then the advent of man upon our planet can after all not be placed much earlier than the date allowed by the Hebrew chronology. And thus it may be that science will in the end, when it comes more thoroughly to understand its own facts and discoveries, be forced to cease its talk of myriads of years, and come back to the more sober dates of Scripture. Here, accordingly, the mistake may at last be found to be on the side of the interpreters of nature, as in other cases it was found to be on the side of the expounders of Scripture. But, however the problem here in question may finally be solved, of this we may be sure in advance, that the Bible will lose nothing in the conflict. Whether we shall have to modify our explanations of certain portions of the Bible, or whether science will have to take back many of the assertions which it now boldly puts forward, matters not so far as the honor of the Bible is concerned. It will maintain its place and office in the Church, and continue to point weary sinners to the land of glory above, though it may refuse to tell how many generations of such sinners have wandered in the wilderness here below.

From the cases now discussed Theology and the Church

* In a paper published in "Popular Science Monthly" for July, 1873.

ought to learn the lesson of bearing somewhat patiently with scientific theories and investigations, at least so long as they do no violence to the fundamental articles of faith, even though they may not be in full accord with traditional notions concerning the teaching of the Bible in regard to matters pertaining to the domain of science. They need not, for that reason, be necessarily in conflict with the sense and spirit of the Bible. The inevitable conclusion from all that we have said thus far is, that the true relation of science to Scripture is not one of outward subordination to the letter. If it be true that the primary aim of the Bible is to inculcate religious and moral truth, and that all its statements, whether historical, prophetic or poetical, are directed toward this aim; then there remains a vast world of being which is not covered by its teaching, and here science has a relatively independent domain in which to exercise itself. If the Bible professed to teach all truth that can be known, or that is worth knowing, the case would of course be different. But it makes no such profession or pretense. It professes to teach all that is necessary in order to the attainment of eternal life, but passes by many truths, both in the world of nature and of mind, which man is capable of discovering for himself, as soon as he has need for them. It teaches, for example, that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, and that all things exist and are governed by His almighty and everywhere present power; but it does not unfold to us the method of creation on its natural side, nor does it disclose the laws and forces by which the phenomena of nature are determined and regulated, and here science, like Mathematics and Astronomy, Chemistry and Geology, Botany and Zoology, Anatomy and Physiology, may have much to teach us. And a relation similar to that holding between the Bible and physical science, holds also between the Bible and the philosophy of mind. It has, of course, much to say of the constitution of man and of the faculties and powers of his mind, especially in their relation to sin and grace; and a "Biblical Psychology" is, therefore, not as much of an anomaly as a "Biblical Geology" would be; and yet a Psychology based

upon *purely* Scriptural data, we believe, would be an impossibility too. These departments of knowledge are all outside of the sphere of direct Biblical teaching; they are referred to only occasionally, and then only in popular style, pretending to no scientific accuracy or precision. Hence also the scientific spirit must here claim for itself the right of an independent procedure, and cannot suffer itself to be subordinated to the mere letter of Scripture; which would in the end after all amount to a subordination, not to Scripture itself, but to a simply fallible interpretation thereof. And it would manifestly be no service to the cause of Scriptural or scientific truth, if the Church were to insist on such subordination; on the contrary, it would without doubt result in much injury to both, though the Bible would probably suffer more damage in the end than the interest of science. The inquisition did not advance the cause of the Bible by compelling Galileo to recant his philosophical opinions. He was not convinced that he was wrong, by being made to undergo that humiliation; for after having abjured his scientific faith, he is said to have stamped upon the earth and to have muttered, "It does move nevertheless." And all know what capital has been made of his case by the spirit of infidelity ever since. The danger of attempting to rule science by the statements of the Bible applied in this outward way, always consists in this, that scientific minds who have inwardly broken with the spirit of the Bible already—and such minds there are in every age—are led to think that their conflict really is with the Bible itself, instead of being perhaps with a merely fallible interpretation thereof; and to imagine that, when they have achieved a victory over such interpretation, they have actually convicted the Bible itself of falsehood. This is the constant assumption of the infidel thinkers of our own time, in regard to the conflict now ended, between Theology and Astronomy, as well as Theology and Geology. It behooves Theology, therefore, to be more cautious in the future, and to determine more accurately the aim and scope of the Bible, as well as its relation to the world of truth beyond itself, with which it does not profess directly to deal. Nor ought science itself to be abandoned to

the Philistines. "All things are yours," says St. Paul. Philosophy and science belong to the Church, no less than Theology. And the only way in which the Church can hope to bring back the scientific spirit of the age from its tendency to materialism and bald unbelief, and to engage it again in her own service, is not simply to grumble at the existence of such a spirit, or to indulge in doleful lamentations, but to take earnest possession of the field of science herself, and to cultivate it thoroughly in the spirit of the Bible and of her own faith.

This we conceive to be the true relation of science to the Bible: subordination, not to the *letter*, but to the *spirit*, not to *single texts*, but to the *whole*. And where this relation exists, there all conflict, even with the letter, must cease. There is a spirit of the Bible with which the letter, in its outward form, is not strictly commensurate. The Bible presents a view of the world that is independent of all theories of inspiration and of all interpretations of single passages. No method of dealing with the first chapter of Genesis can change the faith of the Church in regard to God's relation to the world, as she daily utters it in the first article of the Creed. No explanation that may be given to the standing still of the sun upon Gibeon, or of the moon in the valley of Aijalon, can change the Church's faith in providence or in the possibility of miracles. In particular the miracle of all miracles, that of the incarnation of the Son of God, as well as the miracle of His resurrection from the dead, no amount of Biblical criticism, and no interpretation of single passages, can blot from the faith of the Church. She has the testimony to these fundamentals of her faith in her own history, and in the spiritual experience of her members. Against this "rock of ages" all the waves of criticism and doubt will forever beat in vain. And now to this faith of the Church, and to her peculiar view of the world as a whole, all true science must willingly hold itself in subordination; by this lamp it must walk, or else it must lose itself in darkness. Wherever science undertakes to emancipate itself from this dominion of faith, or in other words, from the spirit of the Bible, it misses its own end, loses itself in empty speculation or crude vagaries, and becomes simply "science falsely so called."

A single example may serve to illustrate this proposition. Take the "evolution hypothesis," which is at present making such a stir in the scientific, as well as religious world. This is not so much a theory, complete in itself, and resting upon an independent induction of facts, as the exponent of a theory wider and more comprehensive than itself. The fundamental ideas of the materialistic-pantheistic school of philosophy, from Comte to Herbert Spencer, demand such a theory in order to the explanation of the present phenomena of the world; and out of this demand, whether consciously or unconsciously, we believe the theory to have grown. It is not only consistent with, but inwardly and necessarily related to, a pantheistic mode of viewing the world as a whole; being in the sphere of the understanding and science, what Ovid's "Metamorphoses" are in the sphere of the imagination and poetry, and presupposing the same paganistic conception of the universe. Hence also Strauss has at last adopted it as the crowning summit of his philosophical thinking. The theory, therefore, violates not merely a few single texts, which might perhaps be susceptible of another than the common explanation, but the whole spirit and genius of the Bible. It does not simply deny that God created plants and animals *after their kind*, and man in His own image, but it denies that He created them at all. The philosophical school, whose outcome the theory is, knows of no creation and, indeed, of no living, personal God, as distinct from the world. God and the world are one. The evolution of the world is the evolution of God. The primordial essence of the world, whether this be regarded as matter, or force, or both, is God in possibility; and the present form of the world, with man at its head, is God in actuality or self-consciousness. God, therefore, as actual, is simply the result of the self-evolving world-process, not its cause. From this conclusion such thinkers as Strauss do not shrink. It is easy to see that such a conception of the world demands something like the evolution hypothesis to account for the existence of the present races of plants, and animals, and men. Man is the last product of the spontaneous, self-moving world-process, which, in

order to reach this height, had to pass through an infinite series of lower stages or formations. All who hold to the evolution theory may, indeed, not accept the pantheistic world-view which it presupposes, their faith being still better than their science, but whether they do so or not, the theory itself is fully consistent with no other view.

And what now is the value of the theory in a scientific view? Is it borne out by the facts of nature and history, and does it serve to explain those facts? The philosophers who advocate it admit of no source of knowledge but experience. And yet experience does not confirm it. As far as human experience or observation goes, plants are not transmuted into animals, nor animals into men. True there is a close resemblance between the highest species of the vegetable and the lowest species of the animal kingdoms, as also between the different genera and species of the same kingdom, indicating unity of plan in the constitution of the world, and thereby proving it to have proceeded from one mind. But no transition from one kingdom or one genus to another *has ever been observed*. There is as wide a distance between man and the monkey now as there was in the days of Solomon. Has the process of evolution stopped? And if so, why? According to the fundamental principles of the theory, the process of change ought to go on forever, and the successive generations of monkeys ought to show at least some signs of improvement. But as far as experience testifies, there is no such process of change or transmutation going on now, nor has there been at any time since the commencement of history. If the theory be true, there must have occurred, at a time very remote, some fatality to check the process of development, for which the theory fails to account. Some species of plants and animals, indeed, may to a certain extent be improved by means of cultivation, but when this ceases, they revert again, after a few generations, to their original state. One species cannot be transmuted into another. However closely they may be related to each other, and whatever resemblance they may bear to each other, there seems after all to be a great gulf fixed between them, which

they cannot pass. And the same impassable gulf is proved by Geology to have existed in all past Geological ages. "Species do not shade into each other," says Dana, "as if they had originated by transitions from one another. For example, the post-tertiary mastodon and elephant of North America do not pass into one another or into other earlier species; or the apes into the species man; or any mollusks or articulates, through a series of stages, into fishes; or any sea-weeds into ferns or the earliest land plants," etc. The evidence of Geology, then, supports the Biblical statement, that God created every plant and animal after its kind; and "the advocates of a development-hypothesis," as Dana says further, "do not question this evidence; but they argue that the records are very imperfect; full of long breaks; and, again, that only a small part of the world has been searched for its truths, and that part not thoroughly." The theory, then, being unsupported by facts, except perhaps such as are of the most trivial sort, is a mere *a priori* guess, and therefore violates the dictates of true science no less than the dictates of the Bible. It offends against the rules of the *novum organon*, of which the philosophers who maintain it commonly make so much account, no less than against the principles of Scripture. We have not the space, nor would it be consistent with our present purpose, to speak of its shortcomings in other respects. Its results may be valuable as showing the unity of plan in the world, but it does not account for the phenomena of the world as it is.

The case shows that a science which has broken with the spirit of revelation, must necessarily be inadequate to the world of truth with which it proposes to deal. Hence it is not only for the interest of the Church and of religion, but also for the interest of science itself, that her attitude towards the Christian faith should be one of humble subordination. Science can never hope successfully to explore and explain the mysteries of the world of matter, or the mysteries of the world of mind, unless she suffers herself to be guided by the torch of supernatural revelation. Without this the world is, and must forever remain, an inexplicable riddle. If man be the crown-

ing head of the world of nature, the centre in which all its lines and rays converge, the end towards which all its movements and processes look from the beginning, as even the development theory assumes, then it must follow also that no one can understand the world of nature without first understanding man. The study of man is the key to the philosophy of nature. But who can understand man without contemplating him in his relation to morality, to religion, to the world of spirit, to God? And how is this possible without the light which revelation sheds upon his origin, nature and destiny? Without this light man, with his moral and religious ideas and emotions, his intuitive beliefs, his hopes and fears, his longings and expectations, would himself be a perfectly inexplicable riddle. Revelation, then, is the key to the proper science of man, and, therefore, also the key to the proper science of the world, without which the science of the world would be a very narrow and crippled affair. The scientists of our own time, who have cast away the torch of faith, themselves confess that they can tell nothing about the efficient or final cause of the world, that they are only dealing with phenomena and their laws, without pretending to be able to explain the *why* and the *wherefore*; and within this narrow circle they would forever confine the intellectual activity of the human mind. But a science that stops short with simple phenomena and their so-called laws, however valuable it may be in certain regards, can never satisfy the human mind. We want to know more. We want to know what is behind those phenomena, and whence those laws proceed. We want to know the cause of the world and of ourselves. Whence is the world, and what is its destiny? Whence are we ourselves, why are we, and whither are we going? The answer to these questions science must take from faith; and if it refuses to accept them from this source, it must become cold and dry, lean and poor, and must fail to satisfy man's deepest longings and desires after truth.

It would, therefore, not be sufficient if science should occupy a position of *indifference* merely over against revealed truth, confining itself simply to laws and phenomena, without affirming

or denying anything in regard to their ultimate cause or ground. Some imagine that this is all that should be required of it, and that in this way ample justice would be done to the interests of religion and the Bible. But this presupposes an abstract separation between the natural world and the supernatural, which in the view of Christian faith does not exist. It might be consistent with the dualism of some oriental religions, but it is not consistent with the religion of the Bible. The Bible itself does not regard the world of nature as a *profane* sphere, to which the supernatural sustains no relation, and with which the religious spirit can have nothing to do. "Nature and the supernatural form one system." They are organically related to each other, and interpenetrate each other as complementary parts of one harmonious whole. The Bible, therefore, claims the natural world as testifying to the same God whom it proclaims itself. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork." "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead." This reciprocal relation between the natural and the supernatural, we believe, forms the basis of our Lord's parables. "This entire moral and visible world from first to last," says Trench, "with its kings and its subjects, its parents and its children, its sun and its moon, its sowing and its harvest, its light and its darkness, its sleeping and its waking, its birth and its death, is from beginning to end a mighty parable, a great teaching of supersensuous truth, a help at once to our faith and to our understanding." Could any science of nature, then, be complete that refuses to recognize anything in nature but phenomena and laws? Is not such science, notwithstanding its parade of experiments, and inductions and demonstrations, after all unworthy of the name? The mind which can perceive nothing in nature but matter and force, no divine ideas, no evidence of divine wisdom, or power or goodness, no intimations of an invisible supernatural world, we believe to be by the very fact unqualified for the proper pursuit of the science of nature. The man who reads in the stars

only the glory of Newton and Laplace, must be said to have studied Astronomy to little purpose. But if "the undevout Astronomer is mad," so also is the undevout Chemist or Geologist, Botanist or Zoologist. "Wisdom crieth aloud" in all places of the earth; and they who have no ear for her voice, have no right heart either for the office of interpreters and priests in the temple of nature.

The true scientist is also the true Christian. This is the conclusion of the whole matter. As it is the heart that makes the Theologian, so it is the heart also that makes the true philosopher of nature. When the world of nature is studied in the light of Christian faith, then there will be no conflict between science and the Bible, though there may be no subjection of science to the outward letter of the Bible. The bearing of these remarks upon the position that ought to be assigned to the Christian religion in literary and scientific institutions, is at once evident. It is plain that what is required in order to save the student from the snares of materialism and infidelity, while in the pursuit of natural science, is not simply an occasional compliment to the Bible, or an occasional lecture on the harmony between science and the Bible, but the whole positive power of Christianity in living, concrete form.

ART. III.—MAN'S RELATION TO NATURE AND TO THE
SUPERNATURAL.

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MAN stands in connection with two worlds. Through his bodily existence, he is closely united to the world of nature, while through his spiritual being, he is intimately allied to the world of spirits and to God. On the one hand, he is, at least to some extent, one with the insensible rock and with the sluggish clod; on the other, he bears upon himself plainly the impress of Deity. He sustains thus peculiar relations, both to the material and to the immaterial world. We propose in the present article to consider somewhat briefly the nature of these relations as they are set forth in the Sacred Scriptures. In doing so, we shall notice, first, what these relations were in man's original state, and then, how they have been affected by the two main facts in the history of time—by man's disobedience in the garden of Eden, and by the incarnation of the Son of God.

We begin with the relation which man sustains to nature. In the book of Genesis, we are informed that after God had created the heavens and the earth, the sun, moon and stars, together with the vegetable and animal kingdoms, He last of all, "formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (Gen. ii. 7); and He blessed him, saying, "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth" (Gen. i. 28).

From this simple statement, we draw a number of inferences

with reference to the relation which man really sustains to the natural world. We infer, first, that man, as to the material part of his being, is one with the earth; secondly, that in his person matter is brought into union with a higher element, towards which, from the beginning, it looked, and in which it attains its proper end; thirdly, that man stands at the head of the natural world; and, fourthly, that he should gradually make nature subject to himself.

Of the truth of the first of these inferences, science affords us ample proof. The constituent material elements of man's body, it has been abundantly demonstrated by scientific experiments, are the same as those which constitute the material substances by which he is surrounded.

With respect to the second inference, though its truth is not now acknowledged by all, yet we firmly believe that finally it will also be incontrovertibly established. That man's spiritual being is essentially different from his physical, is unquestionably taught in the Sacred Scriptures. According to them, mind, as we find it in man, is in no respect a mere flowering of matter. Whether man's physical structure was formed in the way of evolution, may be an open question. Should the Darwinian theory of man's descent be established as regards his body, it would not necessarily, we think, contradict the teaching of the Scriptures, as the especial manner in which the Almighty formed the body of man out of the dust of the earth is not stated, although it must be confessed that the representation given does not seem to favor this theory. But, as regards the origin of man's higher being, it is quite otherwise. The Sacred Scriptures clearly attribute it, as already asserted, to a different source from that of the body. It is not represented as formed of the dust of the earth, or as in any way evolved out of it, but as a direct inspiration of the triune God. And this difference as to the origin and nature of soul and body runs through the whole Scriptures. Thus, we read that "The dust shall return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it" (Eccles. xii. 7). This difference is also clearly implied in the doctrine of a conscious

existence of the soul after the dissolution of the body, which we find in both the Old and the New Testament. If mind and body were but different phases or states of one substance, if thought and the moral sense in man were only the result of certain arrangements and combinations of protoplasm, then, when the body returns to earth, conscious existence must necessarily cease.

But, though man's physical and spiritual being are essentially different, yet they are, nevertheless, most intimately allied—most closely bound together. So intimate, indeed, is the relation subsisting between them, that whatever affects the one also necessarily affects the other. The cares of the mind always weigh heavily upon the body, and the pains and disorders of the body invariably impair the powers of the mind. Their union is not simply mechanical, but organic. The body is not merely the shell of the soul,—a casket in which it is kept, and from which it might be altogether separated and placed into another, without injuring or destroying it. Body and soul are both essential to man's existence, and constitute an indissoluble unity. The Scriptures know nothing of a perfection of the one, apart from the other. Though they teach the conscious existence of the soul after the death of the body, yet they just as emphatically teach that the soul will not reach the consummation of its being until the body does also. Only when the body has become incorruptible and immortal, and is again fully united to the soul, will the soul attain to a state of complete blessedness and glory.

But if that which is physical and that which is spiritual in man, are thus closely united, then, inasmuch as the elements which go to make up the physical, or material, part of man's being, are the same as those of matter generally, it follows that there must be in matter an inherent fitness, or capacity, for such union. If there were not, no such union could have come to hold in the case of man. In the fact of such union, moreover, we have, also, the proof, that matter looks toward it as its end, since in it it reaches its highest uses. From the beginning of the creation of the material world, everything, according to

the account given in the book of Genesis, looks forward to man, and all that precedes his creation is in the way of preparation for it.

As regards our third inference, that man stands at the head of the natural world, this is not only taught in the account which is given us of man's creation, but also in various other portions of Scripture. The Psalmist declares, "Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet" (Ps. viii. 6), and the same thought underlies what St. Paul says in that sublime passage of his epistle to the Romans, in which he declares, that, "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now * * * waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body" (Rom. viii. 22, 23). Science, likewise, assigns this position to man; for her universal testimony with reference to him is, that in him all the powers of nature culminate. Now, with respect to man's headship we yet observe, that like the union between his soul and body, and indeed, we may say, in virtue of this, it is organic. As the head is related to the various members of the human body, so is man, only in a more general way, related to the whole order of nature. Whatever, therefore, seriously affects the natural world, must also necessarily affect man; but still more must what affects man affect the whole natural world. Man, the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral, are but parts of the same grand organism; and consequently when one part suffers, all suffer with it, and when one part rejoices, all rejoice with it.

But though made to be the head of the natural world, nature was not at once actually made subject to man, but only potentially. Man was, as we have stated it in our fourth inference, gradually to subject nature completely to himself. What takes place in the development of the individual, was designed to repeat itself in the development of the general organism of nature. As man first comes into the world, he is not in actual possession of all the powers which belong to him. The infant has the same bodily members that the adult has, but they are not subject to it in the same way. It has feet and limbs, but it can-

not walk ; it has the organs of speech, but it cannot converse. It is only gradually that man comes into full possession of all his bodily powers, and that his members become completely subject to his control. And so only gradually was it intended that he should subject the natural world to himself ; and this for the same reason that he comes only by slow degrees into possession of all the powers of his body. Had man maintained his integrity, all nature, in due course of time, would have become completely subservient to his will. He was made to stand at the summit of the natural world and to exercise universal lordship over it, to gather up its various powers and properties in his own person, and to raise them above the world of time and sense into a higher and more glorious state of existence.

But man sustains peculiar relations not only to the world of nature, but also to the world of spirits and to God, or to what is designated the supernatural world. With respect to his relation to the world of spirits, but comparatively little is taught us directly in the Sacred Scriptures. From what is told us in them, however, in reference to the angelic hosts, we are led to infer, that they sustain very much the same relation to man's spiritual being, as the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms do to his physical. Mentally and morally the angels are endowed, according to the statements of the Sacred Scriptures, with the same properties as man. Thus they are represented as knowing some things and not knowing others, as being able to converse with men, and as having possessed the power of choosing between good and evil. As to the constitution of their nature, the Sacred Scriptures also, appear to teach, that the angels are inferior to man. This, we think, is evident in the use which the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews makes of the words of the Psalmist : "What is man, that thou art mindful of him ? or, the son of man, that thou visitest him ? Thou madest him a little lower than the angels ; thou crownedst him with glory and honor, and didst set him over the works of thy hands ; thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet" (Heb. ii. 6, 8). With Ebrard (Com. on Hebrews) we hold that the phrase rendered "a little lower" is to be under-

stood in the sense of time, as signifying "for a while lower;" and that the object of the writer "is to prove from the passage in the Psalms, that man was indeed made lower than the angels, but only for a short time, not forever; rather, that precisely to man, and not to the angels, is the dominion over the οἰκουμένη ἢ μέλλουσα ascribed." That man in his present state is represented as being inferior to the angels does not militate against his finally occupying the higher position. Because animals generally, when only a few days old, manifest more sagacity and power than infants of the same age, we do not maintain that they are constitutionally superior to man. Why, then, should we be compelled to do so in the case of the angels in view of the same facts? There are animals whose organism in some respects is superior to that of man and yet as a whole is inferior. Why may not this be the case with the angels? We, indeed, are inclined to believe, that it is so, and that this is really implied in the statements of the Sacred Scriptures on this subject. Moreover, the Sacred Scriptures also, we think, teach that the angels look toward man as in some sense their intended lord. We infer this from the fact, that they are generally declared to be "all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister to those who are heirs of salvation" (Heb. i. 14); and from what St. Paul states when he says, "Know ye not that ye shall judge angels" (1 Cor. vi. 3); as well as from the quotation from the Psalms to which reference has already been made. In the case of the angels, as in the case of the various kingdoms of the natural world, it was designed, however, that man should only through a process of development attain to supremacy over them, and come thus actually to have all things in subjection to him.

As regards the relations which subsist between man and God, these we learn, both from the Sacred Scriptures and from the testimony of our own consciousness, to be the very reverse of those which subsist between man and nature. In other words, the relation which nature sustains to man is, in some respects, typical of that which man sustains to God. Thus, as there is a certain oneness between nature and man, so is

there also between man and God. This is taught in the account which is given us of man's creation, when we are told that God made man in His image, after His likeness, and that He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life. Moreover, as there is in nature an inherent capacity for union with spirit in man, so also is there an inherent capacity in man for union with God in the incarnate Word; and as nature looks to the former union as its end, so does man to the latter. This becomes evident in the fact of the Incarnation itself. If there were no inherent capacity in man for union with God, then could not the only begotten Son of God have assumed the nature of man. The assumption of man's nature by the Logos we hold, therefore, as a sufficient proof of the existence of such a capacity, and the existence of this capacity itself, we consider incontrovertible evidence that such union was from the beginning designed as the end towards which creation looked, and in which alone it could reach its consummation. Again, as nature looks to man as its head and was designed to become gradually completely subject to man in every respect, so does man look to God as his proper head in the Word become flesh, and so was it designed that man gradually, in a conscious and willing way, should become subject to God, and so enter into union with Him, that he could no longer entertain any thought or desire but what was in harmony with the will of God.

Such we believe the teachings of the Sacred Scriptures to be in reference to the relations which man originally sustained to nature and to the supernatural. Had man remained true to the design of his creation, he would, in the onward flow of the ages, have attained in a perfectly normal way, and without any pain or misery, to complete union with God, and to the attainment of the actual lordship of the whole creation under God. All that was necessary to this end was originally bestowed upon man by his beneficent Creator, in his natural capacities and in the supernatural supplies at hand in the fruit of the tree of life. Man need but have made a proper use of these means, as they were at first placed in his possession, and then he could not have failed to attain, in a perfectly peaceful and joyful way, to his true destiny.

But, through his disobedience in the garden of Eden, man made it impossible for him to reach the proper end of his existence in this manner. By seeking to make himself independent of God, and by making his own will, instead of the will of God, the rule of his life; and thus forcing himself from the true centre of his being, he placed himself in a false relation to God, to the angels, and to nature. He destroyed, in a great measure, his oneness with God, by sundering himself from God. He deprived himself of the supernatural means which were at hand in the tree of life for the purpose of enabling him to actualize complete union with God, and thus rendered it impossible for him to realize such union, save through grace. In consequence of thus sundering himself from God, man also necessarily arrayed against himself the hosts of heaven and the powers of nature, so that the stars even literally may be said to fight against him in their courses, and the forces of nature continually arise in hostility to him. Moreover, he brought disorder and confusion into his own being, so that all his works are more or less tainted with falsehood.

That man since the fall is by nature at variance with the Supreme Governor of the universe, is most plainly taught. "The carnal mind," we are expressly told, "is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be" (Rom. viii. 7). So too, we are taught, that "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men" (Rom. i. 18); and that "death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. v. 12). "Even over them that had not sinned, after the similitude of Adam's transgression death reigned" (Rom. v. 14). Men sometimes speak of children as innocent, but the Scriptures reckon them also as guilty before God, because they possess a fallen and sinful nature with which God is terribly displeased as well as with actual sin. The objections which are sometimes made to the justice of God's thus dealing with children, all spring out of a wrong conception of the relation which mankind universally sustain to Adam. To him who properly grasps the Scripture idea of the unity of mankind, to the truth of which the deeper life of humanity continually

testifies, there can be no difficulty on this ground. With the representations of Scripture in regard to man's relation to God since the fall, the general consciousness and experience of mankind, indeed, fully agree. All men have by nature an unaptness to good and an inclination to evil, and in consequence a dread of God, and a sense of unfitness to come into His presence, which can in no way be satisfactorily accounted for except on Scriptural principles.

By the Adamic fall man is also, the Scriptures evidently teach, brought into abnormal relation to the world of spirits. The holy angels, who originally were designed to be ministers to man for good only, through the disobedience of our first parents, became messengers of judgment and of wrath to the children of this world. Thus we are informed in Genesis that God sent angels to destroy the wicked cities of the plain (Gen. xix. 13); and in the Apocalypse angels are represented as pouring out the vials of God's wrath upon the earth (Rev. xvi). It is true, we have also accounts of angels appearing on errands of mercy, but they only appeared to those, who through repentance and faith had turned to God, and the blessings which they announced and brought to the faithful, were always, at the same time, judgments upon the ungodly. Moreover, the evil spirits, whose influence it was originally designed that men should resist, since the fall, have come to be the successful tempters and even confederates of the ungodly, to lure them on to greater guilt and misery. They are represented as taking possession of the bodies of men and making them their instruments, and as in every way seeking to destroy men. The interposition of good and evil spirits in the events of human history in this way, is, indeed, most clearly taught in the Word of God, and, therefore, we believe, though many may ridicule the thought, that, when the drama of this world is ended, it will be found, that the world of spirits had more to do in shaping the affairs of men than is ordinarily supposed.

Then, that the relation of the natural world to man has been disturbed in the way indicated is expressly declared. "Cursed," said the Lord to Adam, after he had eaten of the fruit of the

forbidden tree, "Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground" (Gen. iii. 17, 19). In full harmony with this St. Paul tells us, that "the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him who hath subjected the same in hope" (Rom. viii. 20). However we may interpret these passages, there can be no question that they teach that the primal relation subsisting between man and nature has been disturbed, and that the hostility, so to speak, which nature now manifests toward man is a result of the fall. Had man maintained the integrity of his first estate, there would have been, on his part, no struggle for existence as there is now, but the earth would have spontaneously brought forth everything necessary for him. That the earth itself should be involved in the consequences of the fall, strange and mysterious as it may seem at first thought, ceases in a great measure to be so, when we consider properly the relation subsisting between man and nature as we have found this to be set forth in the Scriptures. This relation being what it is, it could not be otherwise but that when man fell:

"Earth felt the wound: and Nature from her seat,
Sighing through all her works, gave sign of woe."

And here we would add, that just in this general harmony of Scripture, often apparently wanting, but always found on more careful investigation, we have one of the most conclusive proofs that in it we have to do with actual facts and not with myths and poetical fancies.

Man, however, in his fallen state, stands not only in an abnormal relation to external nature, but also to nature as it is present in his own person. That man's being is not in harmony with itself is most evident. The consciousness of every one may be said to testify to this. All men in some sense realize the truth of the apostle's words: "What I would that do I not; but what I hate that do I" (Rom. vii. 15); and, "I

find a law that when I would do good, evil is present with me" (Rom. vii. 21); and feel like crying out as he did, "Oh, wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Rom. vii. 24). And this internal disorder and confusion the Scriptures also refer directly to the transgression of the first man. "By one man," St. Paul tells us, "sin entered into the world, and death by sin" (Rom. v. 12). How one act of transgression could so disturb all the relations which man sustains, it is not the purpose of this paper to investigate. There is nothing in any respect unreasonable, however, in the Scripture doctrine on this subject as we understand it. That the first sin alone should involve the whole human race in guilt, and be the source of all subsequent sin and its consequent suffering, results necessarily from the relation in which he who committed it stands to mankind, and from the fact, that it was the first sin. Of all men Adam alone is related in a direct line of descent to all other men, and the first sin could not but make the sinful disposition a reality and bring with it its punishment. Subsequent sins might intensify and propagate this disposition, but could not possibly produce it anew, or have the same significance.

But if man through the fall has been brought into false relation to God and to the whole creation—to nature and to the supernatural—through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus our Lord, he is again restored to his true position with respect to all these. In Christ man attains to all that he was originally designed to attain to. He is not merely restored, as is sometimes taught, to the position which Adam occupied before the fall, but to that which Adam in the course of his gradual development would have reached in a perfectly normal way if he had not fallen. Leaving out of view the sinful disposition of which we believe the Virgin Mary partook with the rest of mankind, human nature may be said to have reached in her a higher state of development than was to be found in Adam before the fall. In that sweet lily of the valley, in that culminating flower of the whole Old Testament dispensation, humanity first reached the point when it was prepared to enter

into complete actual union with God in the Person of His Son. Only "when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth His Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. iv. 4, 5). The view that Adam before he tasted of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil was all, not only potentially but actually, that man was designed to be, we think, finds no warrant in the teachings of the Sacred Scriptures.

That in Christ man is brought again into free, loving communion with God, and made a partaker of the divine nature, the Scriptures however do proclaim. In the Person of Jesus they show us indeed all this, for they declare Him not only the Son of Man, but at the same time also the Son of God. In Him humanity and Deity are brought into the closest possible union and communion, and the gulf which separated the two is bridged over. Accordingly we hear a voice from heaven declare at His baptism, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" (Matt. iii. 17); and, on the other hand, Him saying, "As the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself" (John v. 26); "I and the Father are one" (John x. 30); "I love the Father, and as the Father gave me commandment, so I do" (John xiv. 31). Through the union of humanity with God in Christ the way is opened up for all men to enter into fullest communion with God. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them" (2 Cor. v. 19). "If we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin" (1 John i. 7). "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God" (1 Pet. iii. 18). "Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises, that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet. i. 4). To the truth of all this the consciousness of the children of God bears ample testimony to themselves. They know that they are at peace with God in Christ, and hold sweet communion

with Him. And they only can truly know these things, as the full knowledge of them can be attained only through personal experience.

But in Christ man is also made superior to the angels. This the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews proves in the second chapter of that remarkable treatise. It is also implied in what St. Paul says of believers judging angels, as well as in a few other passages to which it is not necessary specially to refer. If but little is said on this subject in the Word of God, it is yet sufficient to warrant the statement just made. That so little is revealed will not seem strange when we consider that this dominion pertains to the world to come, and that the Scriptures have been given us as a guide in this life, and therefore make known to us only what is necessary to our growth in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. What is stated in reference to this subject is, however, important as showing the high position in the universe which is assigned to man, and to which he may attain through the grace of God.

The dominion over the terrestrial world which was originally assigned to man, but which, in consequence of the fall, he in a great measure lost, is also restored in Christ. This is proved by the miracles of Jesus, which He performed not only as God but also as man, and by those which His disciples wrought in His name. It also appears in the new powers, properties, and attributes, pertaining to the glorified body of Christ, like which those of believers shall be made. This dominion, moreover, is shown by the prophets to belong to the Messiah's kingdom. "The wolf," Isaiah tells us, "shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them" (Is. xi. 6). So likewise the internal disorder and confusion which are in man, are removed in Christ. "There is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death" (Rom. viii. 1, 2). Those who are united to Christ are now potentially what they were at first created to be, and at the end of the ages will be so actually.

It is only in Christ, however, that man is thus restored to his proper relation to nature and to the supernatural, and can reach his true destiny. "There is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved" (Acts iv. 12). "I," says Jesus, "am the way, the truth, and the life; no man cometh unto the Father, but by me" (John xiv. 6). "For other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. iii. 11). To the truth of this the deepest consciousness of humanity in all ages has testified. Common-place as all this may sound, it cannot be too much emphasized in these our times. The many discoveries made in science during the present century, are leading many to believe that by means of it will be ushered in the golden age sung by poets and foretold by prophets. But science can never give man the bliss for which he sighs; it will never bring the era of universal peace and good-will, and provide deliverance from all the ills of life. The fact that some of the leading cultivators of science themselves are relapsing into a species of paganism, seems sufficient proof that only the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and that man can become complete only in Him who is the head of all principality and power.

ART. IV.—MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. From Thales to the present time. By Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, late Professor of Philosophy in the University of Königsberg. Translated from the fourth German edition, by Geo. S. Morris, A. M., Professor of Modern Languages in the University of Michigan, and associate of the Victoria Institute, London. VOL. II. History of Modern Philosophy, with additions by the translator, an appendix on English and American Philosophy, By Noah Porter, D. D., LL. D., President of Yale College, and an appendix on Italian Philosophy, by Vincenzo Botta, Ph. D., late Professor of Philosophy in the University of Turin. New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Co., 1874.

THE translation of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, which is completed in this second volume, places before the English reading public, a work of rare value. It takes its place as a standard classic work in the department to which it belongs. The general editors, Profs. H. B. Smith and Philip Schaff, deserve the thanks of the public of letters in this country for having it prepared and published, and the translator, and authors who completed it, are worthy of all praise for their share in the labor and responsibility. Nor will the lamented author, Dr. Ueberweg, fail to be remembered with gratitude by the inquiring students who shall be conducted by its pages along the line of philosophic thought from Thales to the present time. The enterprising publishers deserve thanks also for the substantial and handsome style in which the work is given to the public.

This work of Dr. Ueberweg will, no doubt, be ranked as the best we have on the subject it treats. The account of the authors is full and satisfactory, and the quotations are extensive, while the criticism is masterly. For the English mind, Morell's history has a special value, because it is written by an English scholar, and is more easily understood by English students. But his history is limited not only to the modern field, but dwells mainly on the systems of the present century. Ue-

berweg gives us the history of the whole field, and a valuable survey of the state of philosophy in Germany at the present time. What would otherwise be a serious defect in the work, the absence of a full notice of philosophy outside of Germany, is supplied by Dr. Porter's supplementary sketch of philosophy in Great Britain and America, and that on modern Italian philosophy by Dr. Vincenzo Botta, both of which are able contributions. Altogether this history will be a necessity in the libraries of those who wish to keep themselves properly posted in the history of philosophy.

According to the representation given in this second volume, it is very apparent that, in the progress of modern thought, Germany easily leads the way, and next to her must be ranked Great Britain and France. The southern nations of Europe that once stood at the head, now come up in the rear. Italy and Spain have not failed to produce fine scholars and able thinkers, but their greatest glory in this respect belongs to the past, and it will be only as they catch the new life and spirit of Germany and Great Britain, that they can come up in the modern race. In saying this we make due allowance for the fact that this is a German work, translated and published in the English language, which fact serves to explain, to some extent, why the greater portion of it is concerned with German philosophy. German scholars do not always give proper credit to other countries for the progress they have made in philosophy, literature, and science. Like their great philosopher of Königsberg they seldom travel far from home. But allowing for all this, it must still be conceded on all sides that Germany is easily in advance of all other nations in the philosophic learning of modern times.

It is equally evident that the progress of modern thought—the thought that rules history—since the Reformation, flows mainly in Protestantism. Bacon, Locke, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, if not all of them the most orthodox Christians, were not produced in Romanism. Whether the Romanist considers it any credit to Protestantism to have had in its sympathy such men and their systems or not, or whether

Protestantism ever feels complimented or not by the systems of some of them, the fact still remains. Roman Catholic learning continues to move in the old mediæval scholastic grooves. As Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are the great representatives of ancient heathen civilization and culture, so Anselm, Thomas Aquinas and other scholastics are the representatives of Roman Catholicism, while the great leaders of thought in modern times stand connected with the life and spirit of Protestantism. Such will be the estimate and record, we believe, when the epoch, shall, like the Ancient and Mediæval, be counted with the past.

This fact, with others, goes to show how universal the epoch of the Reformation in the sixteenth century was. It was a movement not only in religion and the Church, but in literature, science, politics, and philosophy as well. Although Des Cartes was a Roman Catholic, his system found its most fruitful soil in Protestantism. Romanism seeks still to hold science and philosophy in the same state of tutelage in which they were held during the Middle Ages. She counts it only a lapse into infidelity that they have attempted an independent career. And this is the reason the Roman Church sets itself so unyieldingly against the spirit of the science and civilization of the nineteenth century. Right or wrong this is her attitude, while Protestantism, itself born of the spirit of freedom, accords freedom to science and philosophy, while she nevertheless seeks to inspire them with the spirit of the Christian religion.

The preparation for this epoch is traceable in the new revival of letters and learning, as well as in the strictly religious revival of the Reformation. Here must be noticed the revival of classical studies, which was occasioned and quickened negatively by "the one-sided character, and the gradual self-dissolution of scholasticism, and positively by the remains of ancient art and literature in Italy—which were more and more appreciated as material prosperity increased—and by the closer contact of the Western world, especially of Italy, with Greece, particularly after the flight of large numbers of learned Greeks to Italy, at the time when the Turks were threatening Europe

and had taken Constantinople." Platonism was revived in antagonism with Scholastic Aristotelianism, and Mysticism asserted itself as a reaction against mere intellectualism. In this revival of classic learning, there was an outcropping of much error. The Monotheism of Judaism and Mohammedanism fell into a sort of pantheism in such systems as that of Averroes, and rank infidelity grew in the *Illuminati* of Italy, while there was no little skepticism manifested in the humanists of Germany. But the movement nevertheless went forward and wrought towards the freedom of science from the shackles that had been placed upon it. There was a going back to a deeper study of ancient classic literature in order to move forward again (a method of development which some in the Reformed Church find it so hard to comprehend).

"Side by side with this return of learned culture from scholasticism to the early Roman and Greek literature, stands, as its analogue, the return of the religious consciousness from the doctrines of the Catholic Church to the letter of the Bible." This is only a partial statement of the case. The Reformers went back to the pure Word of God, and they went back also to a purer conception of Christianity, in which the conscience could find deliverance from the legal spirit that ruled during the Middle Ages. A sympathy grew up with primitive Christianity; the early fathers and the early creeds were felt to be clothed with a fresher life than the doctrines of Romanism. Yet this sympathy with the old was only a condition for the new step of progress. The Reformation did not fall into re-pristination. It moved on in an independent course of advancement. It was the new struggling out of the old.

Thus we have the two factors, science and religion, faith and reason, started in a new era, with little thought or calculation how they were to relate themselves to each other. Protestantism at first was inclined to shut out philosophy as inimical to pure religious faith. Luther disliked Aristotle, and thought he should be set aside. But as they moved on they seemed to feel that they stood in one spirit of freedom, that their revival started in one epoch, and they began to cultivate a friendly

spirit. Thus it has come that without calculation or forecast, the great movements of modern philosophy sympathize with Protestantism.

In this a great responsibility devolves upon Protestantism. She must be the light to guide modern science. Romanism has cast it away as a rebellious child. She says to it—put yourself under our tutelage and you are safe. Protestantism says—enjoy your freedom, but use it wisely and well. We recognize your peculiar sphere of labor. But reject not the only true light that alone can illumine all things.

After this opening or preparatory period comes the epoch of Empiricism, Dogmatism, and Skepticism, and last the epoch of the Kantian Criticism and of the systems issuing from it, from Kant till the present time. This division is very general, and of itself would not be sufficient for the treatment of systems that have arisen especially since Kant. Empiricism, Dogmatism, and Skepticism prevailed until Kant cleared the atmosphere and prepared the way for a new start. Bacon imagined he had found the only true method for science in his *Novum Organon*. It certainly was like entering a new world to pass from the treadmill of scholasticism into the field of investigation and discovery. The facts of nature had been little observed and examined, science had made little progress, and philosophy, by feeding upon itself, had become shrivelled and inane. The theory of induction gave new inspiration to scientific pursuits, and its value and importance have been acknowledged ever since the time of Bacon. But as a philosophical principle it hardly deserves the name. The investigation of facts in itself can give us no principle, but it can furnish material for philosophic thought, and this was one thing greatly needed. Hence while we refuse to the Baconian System, as it is called, the wonderful merit often attributed to it, we nevertheless give it due credit for what it has done.

Through Locke, who employed it in investigating the nature of the human understanding and the ideas generated by experience, the system soon ran into Deism and skepticism in England, and rank infidelity and Atheism in France.

Meantime, another line of thought was starting on its course from Des Cartes. As it widened out in Spinoza and Leibnitz we have what are called the dogmatic systems, systems based upon speculation and asserted with great assurance, systems that aim at explaining God and the universe. Excepting Spinoza's pantheism, these systems stand in marked contrast with the systems of England by Locke and his followers. These latter were in the direction of sensationalism, materialism, Deism, while the German speculation was inward, spiritual, and having profound respect for Christianity, with the exception above made. Hume in England represents the skeptical school that warred upon Christianity and all truth. The dogmatists asserted that man can know everything, the skeptics denied that he could know anything. The time has come for a new departure. This we find in Kant.

Kant saw that a criticism of man's intellectual and moral powers was necessary in order that philosophy might go forward on solid ground. Such criticism was necessary in order to show the unreasonableness of skepticism as well as to rebuke the boastful pride of dogmatism. His criticism was made with such ability that it has furnished material for all the philosophers that followed him. No such an investigation of the reason, will, and judgment, had ever been made before, and none to take its place has been made since. Some of Kant's conclusions must be rejected. These do not all follow from his criticism. The criticism itself has value for all time.

Fichte, carrying out Kant's subjectivism developed his system of pure subjective idealism. Schelling produced a system of objective idealism, and Hegel, what is called absolute idealism.

With Kant the question was brought forward with new interest whether man can know the absolute. Is his cognitive faculty limited in its power of investigation to the finite? And is God, therefore, unknowable? Kant had answered these questions in the affirmative. Yet Schelling and Hegel started in their systems with the idea of the absolute. Among more recent metaphysical writers Sir William Hamilton argues that

man cannot know the absolute, and that what he says of it is only negative, as for instance, the infinite is the not-finite. This is stating what the infinite is not, but not what it is, which he says is impossible.

We draw a different conclusion from Kant's Critique, viz. : this, that we have in the *reason* the idea of the absolute, but that idea cannot be measured by the *understanding*. The understanding has to do with conceptions, things measured and defined, and therefore finite. But this is only saying that we can know the absolute by the reason—that is, we have the idea, but we cannot define it, just because it is absolute. To be able to say what the absolute *is* not implies certainly some knowledge of it, otherwise no assertion could be made in regard to it at all, nay, we would not have the name itself. God can be known, yet no definition can be given of Him. We can only say, God is God, which is the same that He says of Himself in those sublime words, "I am that I am."

The following is the summary statement given by Dr. Ueberweg, of the present condition of philosophy in Germany. "During the last decennia in Germany, the Hegelian, among all the philosophical schools, has counted the largest number of adherents. Next to it has stood the Herbertian school. More recently the modification of systems through a return to Aristotle or Kant, and the study of philosophy upon its historic side, have occupied the larger number of minds. Schleiermacher's influence has been greater in theology than philosophy; still the direction of recent philosophical inquiry has been materially influenced by influences originating from him. The teachings of Schopenhauer and Beneke, as also of Krause, Baader, Günther, and others, have been reproduced and modified by individual disciples. Materialism has representatives in Vogt, Moleschott, and Büchner, and Sensualism in Czolbe, and others. While resting in part upon the basis of doctrines of earlier thinkers, Trendelenburg, Fechner, Lotze, von Kirchmann, von Hartmann, and others, have advanced in new and peculiar paths."

And of philosophy outside of Germany the following sum-

mary statement is made. "Since the beginning of this century no philosophical systems of such importance and of so powerful influence as those of the 17th and 18th centuries have sprung up outside of Germany; still, the philosophical tradition has everywhere been preserved, and philosophical investigation has, in part, been carried further on. In England and North America philosophical interest has remained chiefly confined to investigations in empirical psychology, methodology, morals, and politics. In France two philosophical tendencies opposed the sensualism and materialism which reigned at the beginning of the century. Of these the one found expression in the eclectic and spiritualistic school, which was founded by Royer-Collard as the disciple of Reid, which was further built up by Cousin, who incorporated into its body of doctrines a number of German philosophemes, and in which the Cartesian tradition was renewed. The other tendency was a theosophical one. More recently, Hegelianism has found occasional disciples in France. A doctrine of "positivism," which refuses, in principle, to make affirmations respecting anything that is not a subject of exact investigation, but which yet, for the most part, makes common cause with materialism, was founded by Comte. A modified scholasticism, mostly Thomism, prevails in the Catholic seminaries of France, Spain, and Italy. In Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, Russia, Poland, and Hungary, the various schools of German philosophy have exerted successively a not inconsiderable influence. In Italy, the philosophy favored by the Church is Thomism; the doctrines of Antonio Rosmini and of Vincenzo Gioberti, in particular, have also found numerous disciples, and in the last years the Hegelian doctrine has been defended by zealous adherents."

With this brief notice of this second volume of Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, for a fuller knowledge of which we must refer the reader to the book itself, we proceed to present some thoughts suggested by the general subject.

I. The path along which this volume leads the reader reveals an amount of earnest thought quite worthy of this latest age of the

world's history. This will be acknowledged by all. Never before did human minds struggle more earnestly and with greater power to know the truth so far as it may be known by human reason. There is revealed here no falling off in vigor of intellect. These modern thinkers can stand in the company of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, without suffering by the comparison, and still less would they need fear a comparison with the great Mediæval doctors. The power of thought they exercised goes beyond any such power exercised by men of science merely. These latter have exhibited talent also. The results of modern scientific inquiry attest the power of thought. Take the case of such a scientist as Newton. There is something grand in the manner his mind reaches out in the illimitable expanse of creation, studying its laws and discovering its secrets, or poring over the intricate processes of mathematics until he discovers the Differential Calculus. The power of thought displayed in the progress of science during the last three hundred years leads us to bow in reverence before this faculty divine. But the philosopher stands above the scientist. His mission is greater. His thoughts move forward in realms grander than the physical universe. He goes on explorations where no material star sheds its light, where no rocky strata leave marks to guide the way. He must advance where no mathematical signs assist him in his course. His survey must extend over those hidden depths of being and of thought where the mere scientist would shrink back in dismay. To discover the hidden unities of all sciences, to penetrate to the depths of all being, to trace the lines of all human knowledge—this is his mission and work.

This requires genius of the highest order. The scientific man requires genius too, and the poet who brings forth for admiration his wonderful ideals, but the philosopher must penetrate the trackless depths where the real and the ideal find their unity in the vision of being itself. And when he has found his starting-point, what knowledge he must command to reduce his system to order in all its departments! We bow in reverence before such mighty thoughts as those of Spinoza, of

Leibnitz, of Kant, and we confess their calling to instruct and lead the race. Beside these great thinkers even a Newton, a Kepler, and an Agassiz, worthy of all admiration and honor as they are, must rank as mere journeymen compared with master workmen.

Such a worker in the mines of thought was Spinoza, a mystery to his times, a man as *Saisset* tells us, who was called a Jew and Atheist, a mystic drunk with God, a saint, a Persian sophi, a disguised Cabbalist, as he worked at making glasses for telescopes in the house of Van der Spyck on the Pavilioengragt at the Hague. Such a man was Kant, the modern Aristotle, the philosopher of Königsberg, who never traveled but once, we believe, more than twenty miles from his native city, but who employed his life in exploring the realms of thought, until he fairly consumed away the frail body that encased so great a mind. These were giant men. What though they did not always find the truth. Science, too, must often confess that it fails. But we are not now speaking of this. We are not considering the truth of their systems. We are considering their thought power. And in this they represent the strength of the modern era worthily as Plato and Aristotle represented the ancient.

It follows from this that it requires power of thought to appreciate and study them. It is not without meaning that the study of philosophy is placed at the end of the College Curriculum. The drill in the languages, mathematics, natural science, is to prepare the mind for this. A College without a philosophy is like the play of Hamlet with Hamlet left out. It educates, but with no aim. It can have no true unity. It may make a noise in the world with its boasted attention to science, but it sends forth its students with no power to unify the knowledge they have acquired. Their education has not come to its bloom and fruit-bearing.

And in saying thus much for philosophy we are not forgetting that even its light pales before the light of the Christian religion. We would not deify thought. We would not worship reason. But Christianity no more undervalues philosophy

than she undervalues science. That would, indeed, be a strange revelation and a strange religion which ignored or undervalued reason and its activities.

Just upon this point we deem it not out of place to make reference to an institution in this country in which earnest regard has been had to this elevated calling of philosophy. We refer to Marshall College, now Franklin and Marshall College, at Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Its first President was an eminent Christian philosopher, Dr. F. A. Rauch, a disciple of Daub, who was called away by death just as he was fairly entering upon the work upon which he had set his heart. His successor, the present President of the College, Rev. J. Williamson Nevin, D. D., LL.D., most worthily represents the high interest of Christian philosophy, although he has been widely known both in this country and in Europe rather as a theologian than in the department of philosophy. We were somewhat amused, recently, at a dinner party, to hear him remark to the Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. Charles P. Krauth, that the older he became the more he doubted and distrusted all philosophy. The reply of the Vice-Provost was—"I would like to know how you have arrived at that conclusion, for it requires a great deal of philosophy to set aside philosophy." This same Dr. Nevin teaches a system of *Æsthetics* and *Ethics* to his students in original lectures which shows the very highest order of philosophic ability, and ranks him among the greatest philosophic thinkers of this age. And yet, compared with Him who is the light of the world, Dr. Nevin counts all philosophy as nothing! In that he shows himself the *Christian philosopher*.

II. *The result.* It might seem at first that the result which philosophy has reached in its present state in Germany is not worthy of the history through which it has passed in the modern age. As system after system passes in review on to Hegel we naturally expect a last and best which will gather up into itself the truth of those that have gone before, while their errors are left behind. But there seems to be no such outcome. Philosophers there are, men of great philosophic talent, if not

genius. Schopenhauer, Beneke, Trendelenberg, Lotze, I. H. Fichte, Ulrici, and many others that might be named, have shown masterly ability in this department. With a full acquaintance with the great systems of the past, they have occupied each his own independent stand-point, from which they have traced the strong points, and the weak ones as well, of the philosophers that have passed away. But still the fact remains that the present age has produced no Kant or Hegel, and no system which exerts a controlling influence now as theirs did in their day. It would seem that with all the light of the past the present ought to show greater results.

But such intervals in which the labors of the past come under criticism and review, and new material is gathered for the future, are found in all departments of history. Not every age produces a Shakspeare, a Milton, a Newton, or a Kepler. The work of the present age in philosophy is mainly that of criticism and review. The works already produced must be first exhaustively studied, and their application to new questions which history is bringing forward must be understood before the line of march is taken up again. "More recently," says Ueberweg, "the modification of systems through a return to Aristotle or Kant, and the study of philosophy upon its historic side, have occupied the larger number of minds." This is going back (which some thinkers imagine contradicts the conception of development!) to examine over again all the lines of progress, and to prepare for a new departure. The Germans especially have this historical sense highly cultivated. They must know thoroughly all that has been accomplished in any department before they venture in new paths.

There are also certain features in the present state of philosophy in Germany, and in other countries also, which awaken still greater disappointment at what has been accomplished. When we read such conclusions as this in the teachings of Schopenhauer, "The world is not the best, it is the worst of all possible worlds; sympathy alleviates suffering, while asceticism destroys it by destroying the will to live, in the midst of life"—bringing back something like the Buddhis-

tic doctrine of Nirvana, it seems as though philosophy were running into a pitiable nihilism. So also in the Philosophie des Unbewussten, philosophy of the unconscious, by K. R. E. von Hartmann, 1869 and 1871, in which the doleful, hopeless view of the world is given, that there is and must be in it the preponderance of pain, that life is rendered endurable only by the artifices of nature, in virtue of which all is interesting to childhood and youth by reason of its novelty; the partial interruption of individual consciousness by sleep, and of the historic consciousness of humanity by death and birth preserves nature from atomy,—that the end of development is the turning back of volition into non-volition, &c., the process to end at last in the painless joylessness of Nirvana. With these must be classed also the evolution theory of Herbert Spencer, the development theory of Darwin, down to the low and vulgar materialism and sensualism of such men as Buchner (whose work on Man in the past, present, and future, has been recently published in this country, and who has been lecturing in our Eastern cities). But we get here rather into the sphere of Science, which must account for its own results. We are not now considering them. That the age can produce such systems, in which despair seems to be the inspiring genius, shows that unbelief has made terrible progress, that there is a want of strong Christian faith to hold up the general consciousness. But this is only the one side, the dark side of the picture, and must not be taken as indicating the whole life of the age. Philosophy when it moves away from the light of Christian faith falls under the shadow of death, and ends in despair. The better philosophy of Germany looks hopefully to greater results in the future, as it seeks to come into closer sympathy with the Christian religion.

III. *The close relation between philosophy and religion in a historical point of view.* The remarks at the close of the last paragraph, imply a very close relation between modern philosophy and Christianity. This point needs to be more fully considered. The history of Protestant theology when taken in connection with the history of modern philosophy shows this.

We may notice here first the inner sympathy and correspondence between the aim of the Reformation and that of philosophy in its beginning, after that movement in the Church had commenced. One object of the Reformation was, as we know, to bring out for faith the more direct and immediate relation of the individual believer to Christ, and the immediate certitude of faith as carrying in it the self-authentication of the object of faith. Mediæval Christianity had erected an ecclesiasticism between the believer and Christ in such a manner as to distort the true relation. The Church was put in the place of Christ, and an external, mechanical, Church authority was made the basis of all religious certitude. In breaking away from this, the Reformers did not, indeed, design to set aside the Church and its functions. Over against the fanaticism of the Anabaptist they held to the necessity of the written Word, and to the office of the Christian ministry and the holy sacraments. The Holy Spirit is present through media. But still the testimony of the Spirit to the heart of the believer was the main thing, and He brought Christ to the faith of the believer. This gave a new idea of faith. According to Romanism, faith had come to be looked upon as mere submission to the authority of the Church. According to Protestantism, it was the spiritual organ for communion with Christ, the organ for receiving the supernatural grace offered and given to every believer.

Now, the aim of philosophy in its start in the modern age sought, likewise, immediate and direct certitude in knowledge. It sought to find what we can know without presupposing anything given on authority outside of ourselves. The question had not been raised during the Middle Ages in the same earnest way. Now that a new age was come, men began to examine and sift the superstructures that reason had reared. You see the principle working in Bacon and Des Cartes. And when a weak point was discovered in one system it was sought to eradicate it. Here falls in the critical method as applied by Kant, and the severity with which his own criticism was criticised where it seemed inconsequent or inconsistent. We in-

quire not just here as to the merit of this principle, whether it was not carried too far, whether reason can ever be sufficient for itself, or whether and how far these philosophers thought it was. The point is that they were seeking to find certitude in the sphere of reason, as the Reformers were seeking certitude in the sphere of faith.

And then as we follow on the course of subsequent development, we find the same close sympathy. The scholastic age in theology and the dogmatic philosophy in the seventeenth century went hand in hand. The mechanical supernaturalism and the one-sided view of the evidences in England went forward with a Deistic philosophy. The decay of religion in France, and French materialism, wrought together towards the catastrophe of the Revolution. And the same was the case in the rationalistic age in Germany. It might be inquired how far a weak form of Christianity was the cause of false forms of philosophy and *vice versa*. We do not make this inquiry now. We only state a fact. And from the fact we deduce the inference that modern philosophy and Protestant theology, must be studied in their history together. The one cannot be fully understood without the other.

This thought must be kept in mind in any estimate in regard to the course of philosophy in the future. We have referred to the evidences of a want of unity and confidence in the state of philosophy in the present time, especially in Germany. Its future will be largely influenced by the future of Christianity. There is a general sense of a decadence of faith among Christians. The Church is passing through a severe trial. Its endless divisions rise up to witness against it. This feature paralyzes its efforts. The conversion of the heathen nations is retarded largely by this fact. There is need of a reformation in the Church, at any rate of a coming together of its *disjecta membra*. What principle is to exert the power to effect this no one can as yet point out. But with the revival of faith, and the working of a principle of unity, and a new step of progress on the part of the Church, will come also a corresponding movement in philosophy. The quickened Christian conscious-

ness will react on the general consciousness of the age, and pessimism, nihilism, and skepticism, will be swept away, and new confidence and faith will be infused into the departments of philosophy and science. For these too also are in close sympathy, as we shall presently see.

What we have said on this point in a very general way, will indicate what we conceive to be the relation between Christianity and philosophy. There is some danger here of falling into the error of mediæval times, in attempting to bring philosophy into a mechanical subserviency to theology. Christianity is not designed to give the world a philosophy, any more than it is designed to teach science. Their different spheres must be recognized in order to reach their free union. We must not seek to derive our psychology or logic directly from the Bible in order to make it Christian, any more than we would seek in the same way to Christianize arithmetic or chemistry. And neither can we find in the Bible a system of *Æsthetics*, *Ethics*, or *Metaphysics*. These have their relatively independent spheres. Their relation to Christianity must be sought rather in the general relation of the natural to the supernatural. When this general relation is properly understood, it will serve as a guide in regard to the particular. We know the mistake the Church made in former ages in attempting to rule over the State, without recognizing its relatively independent sphere. The Hildebrandian idea of a theocracy, as pressed to its ultimate consequences in the pontificate of Boniface in his bull *Unam Sanctam*, was a mistake. It contradicted the words of our Lord, "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's." The idea of the relation of Church and State in the modern age, is likely to lead to better results, even though Romanism regards it as all wrong.

While philosophy works out its own problem in a free way, it should accept the light of revelation, but accept it freely. There is a strictly Christian Ethics, for instance, and a philosophical Ethics. We are not, now at least, to merge the one into the other, in order to make it Christian. That would be

to lose the one in the other, while the natural is not yet merged in the supernatural. Philosophic Ethics, or the metaphysics of Ethics has its own sphere, and Christian Ethics, as a department of theology has its place. The true relation is to be found in properly acknowledging their difference, while at the same time it is seen that the completion of the one is to be found in the other. Nature must look to the supernatural for its completion. Natural morality completes itself in Christian morality. In this way we may make room for freedom and autonomy.

What is true of the departments of philosophy, is true of philosophy as a whole. It cannot become Christian by destroying its relative independency and autonomy. Philosophy is not theology. But philosophy should follow the light of Christianity in working out its problem, for *Christ is the light of the world*. A philosophy is Christian in proportion as it recognizes this light, while at the same time it holds itself to its own problem, and does not seek to lose itself or its own proper work.

IV. *Philosophy and Science*. In order to understand more fully the posture of philosophy in the present age, it is necessary to consider its relation to science. The present claims to be pre-eminently an age of science, and science, it is claimed, has to do with a real world, not an imaginary world of speculation. The reaction against scholasticism which set in at the Reformation, still continues to assert its power. The scholastic philosophy exhausted its strength with what was merely formal, moving in a circle, with no power to get beyond its formulas, and wasting itself upon itself, until the world grew weary of the process. Meanwhile no attention was given to research and discovery. The domain of facts was neglected. Men sought not to ascertain what *is*, but what according to their preconceived theories and speculations *ought* to be. The attempt to explain why a vessel of water with a fish in it weighed no more than when the fish was not in the vessel, without first inquiring whether it was a fact, illustrates the fruitlessness of their work. Let us leave the fruitless task of speculation and turn our attention to facts. Let us work, explore, discover, in

the domain of science. Here there is solid ground. Here we are in a real world, no longer dreaming but awake, no longer studying mere phantoms but realities. Such was the tendency which asserted itself, and which has wrought through the modern age, and which is the prevailing tendency at the present time.

Under the influence of a materialistic and utilitarian tendency, the zeal for the study of natural science is especially in the ascendant now. It sweeps away all barriers that would impede its course. It remodels the curriculum of the old and staid colleges. It drives the study of the ancient languages, mental and moral science, and to some extent mathematics, into the back-ground. It erects chemical laboratories, astronomical observatories, and work-shops for the practical study of minerals and mines. Zoölogy, geology, metallurgy, chemistry, botany, etc., these are the subjects of study. Even man, morality, religion, are to be studied in the light of nature. The earth is to testify of his origin, and his physical organization is to rule his morality and religion. Such is in part the scientific spirit of the age.

There is another and a better side. There are noble men who work in the sphere of science with zeal only for the truth, who are free from a mere utilitarian spirit; men who can say, as Agassiz said, "I have no time for making money." There are those who claim for science only its proper rights, who recognize the claims of philosophy, art, and religion. Even the utilitarian spirit has its proper place. The inventions and discoveries that minister to material prosperity are not to be undervalued. Material prosperity prepares the way for the prosecution of study and attention to education for its own sake. In any case, the facts sustain the assertion that the present is prevailingly a scientific age.

At such a time philosophy must rest content to remain somewhat in the back-ground. It waits for science to prepare new material to aid it in its work. This is also a necessity. Philosophy without science is like theory without facts. For a while science rules the spirit of the age. Then comes a reaction

again, and the world seeks to unify and generalize its knowledge. It seeks to penetrate the forms of knowledge as furnished in science to their inmost depths, to trace facts to their principles, and find a common end. And then philosophy finds its vocation again. The prevalence of a scientific spirit in the present age is not really inimical to philosophy,—it only arrests the philosophic spirit for a time, in order that it may move onward then with greater advantage.

It is true, these two do often antagonize each other. There is a utopian philosophy which runs wild in speculation, and affects to despise mere science. It professes to soar in the realms of pure truth, and would not be encumbered in its lofty flight by the facts of science. It merits the ridicule which it receives. There is also a narrow spirit with some in the pursuit of science. They lack breadth of spirit, and very often depth of knowledge even in their own departments. They affect to despise any higher light than nature can give. They would walk by that. The light of reason is a mere illusion, and that of revelation a vain dream. But these are not the true philosophers nor the true scientists. True philosophy and true science are necessary the one to the other. Let us examine this fact a little further.

The facts of science lead us into mysterious depths, no less than the speculations of philosophy. We follow the researches of the astronomer, as he takes us through the starry heavens. We are in the world of solid facts. We pass from world to world, admiring the greatness and grandeur of creation. We scan the fleecy milky way, and study the nebulae, and we have arrived at the outskirts of creation. But the telescope has taken us far beyond the limits reached by the natural eye, and all that we have seen convinces us by a fair induction that there are innumerable worlds beyond the power of our telescope. The vast expanse opened to our view is only intended to enlarge our conception of what is still beyond, for no astronomer will pretend that creation stops where the power of his telescope ceases to measure it. And now we begin to ask whether there are limits to the creation, and if so, what is beyond these limits.

Is it a blank space, which in its boundless extent as much exceeds the creation we can see, as the ocean exceeds a single drop of water? May it not be infinite? But no, for that would give us another infinite besides Him who alone possesses that attribute. And here we are speculating on one of Kant's celebrated *Antinomies*. How soon we pass from science into philosophy!

Shall we take the other way towards the infinitely small? We follow the scientist in his examination of matter, which he defines as that which has extension. We divide and subdivide, until we arrive at the ultimate atoms of the Atomists. But modern science has ruled all that out, for it is a contradiction to say that an atom is an ultimate particle that cannot be divided, while at the same time we are taught that it is a characteristic of all matter that it is divisible. These ultimate atoms then are not something material. They are only mathematical points. But how can mathematical points give us extension? No, says Leibnitz, they are not physical, nor mathematical points, but metaphysical points, *monads*. Modern science says they are forces, forces localized, and that all matter is force only, and that all its qualities beyond that are subjective. And so we go on philosophizing until we land in Berkeley's *idealism*. Take what direction you please, and science leads you into mysteries. The infinite ever meets us in the finite. The Positive school of Comte orders us to stop when we touch mysteries. Assert nothing beyond known facts. Resolve to know only where facts and experience lead the way.

But what are we to do with the mysteries of experience? We have ideas in the reason that lead us into the realms of metaphysics, and we have religious instincts that reach out after God. Shall we pass these by, and attend only to the experience of sense? Comte comes to our aid. Man passes through three stages, or states; the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The first two are past, we are in the third. Lo, Comte is among the philosophers, calling in a theory or speculation to support his facts. But let this suffice.

Philosophy is a necessity and a reality no less than science. The one needs the other. What the case requires is that each should acknowledge the rights and prerogatives of the other, and so mutually aid each other. Science investigates and discovers what is placed before us in the world of matter and of mind. It has to do with principles, too, and these it seeks continually to discover. It has a noble mission, for its aim is truth, and truth for its own sake. How worthy of all honor such a worker in science as Agassiz! How unselfish, and how devoted to truth! But science as it comes before us in its various departments cannot remain separated, each department ending in itself. There must be unity in the whole. Hence we must have a science of sciences, and this is philosophy. The more science accomplishes, the better will philosophy be supplied with material to aid it in its work. Science will be for philosophy, what facts are for science.

Shall science proceed in the interest of materialism? or shall it explain all things in the light of idealism? or shall it recognize the truth, and avoid the errors of both? Shall a utilitarian principle of morality rule our education? The answer to these questions requires that science shall not reject the light of philosophy, nor philosophy that of the true religion. These should seek to move in harmony. Here our limits require us for the present to stop.

ART. V.—A REVIEW OF DR. HODGE'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION OF INFANT BAPTISM AND INFANT SALVATION, IN THE CALVINISTIC SYSTEM.*

§ 1. OUTLINE AND GENERAL ESTIMATE OF DR. HODGE'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE work opens with an Introduction, which treats of Method; Theology; Rationalism; Mysticism; the Rule of Faith in the Roman Catholic and Protestant view.

The First Part embraces Theology proper; under which are treated: Origin of the idea of God; Theism; Antitheistic Theories; Knowledge of God; His Nature and Attributes; the Trinity; Divinity of Christ; the Holy Spirit; the Decree of God; Creation; Providence; Miracles; Angels.

The Second Part is occupied with Anthropology: Man, his Origin and Nature; Origin of the Soul; Unity of the Human Race; Original State of Man; Covenant of Works; the Fall; Sin; Free Agency.

The Third Part presents Soteriology: the Plan of Salvation; Covenant of Grace; the Person of Christ; His Mediatorial Work; Prophetic and Priestly Offices; Satisfaction; for Whom did Christ Die? Theories of the Atonement; Christ's Intercession; Kingly Office; Humiliation; Exaltation; Vocation; Regeneration; Faith; Justification; Sanctification; the Law, with a Particular Commentary on each Commandment; the Means of Grace; the Word of God; the Sacraments; Baptism; the Lord's Supper; Prayer.

The Fourth Part is Eschatology: The State of the Soul after Death; Resurrection; Second Advent; Concomitants of the Second Advent.

*Systematic Theology. By Charles Hodge, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 8vo. Vol. I., 1872, xiii., 648. Vol. II., xi., 732. Vol. III., 1873, viii., 580. Vol. IV. Index.

Of the general fullness and logical order of this arrangement there can be no question. The discussion of the Divinity of Christ as distinct from the Trinity might perhaps better have been given under Soteriology, so as not to separate the "Divinity of Christ" from the "Person of Christ." The most important defect in the plan is that it does not embrace a distinct and full treatment of the doctrine concerning the Church. The omission has been made for some reason which satisfies Dr. Hodge. We hope that it means that he proposes to give to the Church a monograph on this subject, one of the most vitally important and interesting doctrines at all times, but especially in our own day. We know of no man more competent than Dr. Hodge to rebuke, with the effectual weapons of fact and logic, the insane pretences of the rampant pseudo-ecclesiasticism of our time, and the yet insaner radicalism, which frightens many into the ecclesiasticism.

The first thing which strikes us in reading Dr. Hodge's book is the style. Whether we shall accept or reject what he maintains may sometimes involve a question, or a pause; but his simple, luminous mode of statement rarely leaves us in any embarrassment as to *what* it is on which we are to decide. The sentences are never involved. The language is a model of clearness. There is a plain solid sense, the result of a sound judgment thoroughly matured, which is delightful beyond expression in this day and land of fine writing. This, of course, will expose Dr. Hodge to the charge of shallowness, from those who think that nothing is deep but what is unintelligible, and that the art of good writing is the art of putting words to things in the proportion of Falstaff's sack to Falstaff's bread, and that the measure of words is like the measure of Falstaff in the girth.

Another great feature of Dr. Hodge's book is, its value to our common Christianity—nay, in a wide sense, to religion on that broader definition in which the believing Jew has a common interest with the Christian. To the gratitude of Jew and Christian, Dr. Hodge is entitled by the able vindication of Revelation against the assaults which would bring the faith of

Jew and Christian alike to the dust. To Roman Catholic and Protestant, Dr. Hodge comes with a defense of the common creeds of Christendom; to Calvinist and Lutheran, with the able argument on the distinctive elements of Protestantism and the precious truths reasserted by the original Churches of the Reformation. Even in its relative isolation as distinctively Calvinistic, Dr. Hodge's book is invaluable. It is the gauge of the type of Calvinism which is considered by its ablest living representatives as tenable; a Calvinism so gentle in its spirit toward other forms of evangelical Christianity, and so full of the disposition to mitigate its own harder points, as to furnish irenical elements of the most hopeful kind.

The general mildness, fairness, and clearness of the book are beyond dispute. It treats Polemics in the spirit of Irenics, for the most part, but with here and there a delightful little dash of merited sarcasm, a suspicion of irony, a playful contempt for small presumption, and a quiet smile at the absurd, which humanize the argument, and, with those touches which make the whole world kin, bring the author nearer to the reader. Nor are there wanting earnest and eloquent passages, which deal with sin in a manner in keeping with its exceeding sinfulness, and with conscious perversions after their evil deserts. There is no amiable inanity in the book. It is not done in water-colors, as some people would think it must be, because it is not executed with a red-hot poker on an oak-board. Yet its prevailing character is mild, quiet, firm, judicial. If it is often pleading, it is still more frequently the decision of a judge, who sums up evidence, interprets the law, and pronounces the sentence.

The evidences of enormous, yet reflective, reading everywhere present themselves, reading of the most varied kind, among the best books and the worst books. There is a gathering of honey for stores, and of poisons for the study of antidotes. The range stretches over the ages, takes in largely the German theology, and reaches apparently almost to the days in which the volumes have come from the press. The result of this anxiety to bring things down to the hour has neces-

sarily been that some of the latest reading has been hasty and has involved Dr. Hodge in mistakes. But the Doctor's greatest weakness, in this immensity of reading, is where it might least have been suspected—it is in Calvinistic theology. He seems to have neglected a part of the Calvinistic theologians of no inconsiderable number and bulk. On his own confession, so far as his memory can recall, he has failed to have seen a single one of a very large and influential portion of those divines, so large in fact that for some two centuries it is hard to find one who does not belong to it. But we account for this on the principles of a latent elective affinity. Like seeks only its like and holds it. There rise up in history the grim and grisly features of those old divines who liked election but who loved reprobation; who conceived of the human race as created chiefly as fuel for Tophet,—divines who would have thought nothing of the perdition of a universe or two, and, if necessary, of throwing themselves in, if their logic proved that it was all for God's greater glory—those inexorable Jonahs on whom a wilderness of gourds would have been lost in the attempt to reconcile them to the sparing of Nineveh. If Dr. Hodge long ago encountered these divines, he quietly turned away into his own brighter path, with other visions of the divine glory. He did not plunge into the Sahara, in the possibility of finding an oasis. Penetrated, as all his works show, with the completest recognition which is possible to Calvinism, that God is love, Calvinism itself is hardly in sharper contrast with Lutheranism than, within Calvinism, Dr. Hodge himself is with Gomarus and his pitiless school. The only apology which can be made for that school is that which they constantly make for themselves—that the logic of the system is with them, and that they are with the logic of the system. They did not create the horrors, they only told of them.

The general tone of the book is profoundly devout. Though Dr. Hodge has moved largely and freely in the living world, his most marked affinities are yet with the old. He saith “the old is better.” He has not put enough of the new wine into the old bottles to rend them—except perhaps in a spot or

two. In spite of recent reading, and of the space devoted to the callow heresies of the hour, the conception and organism of the book is prevailingly scholastic, of the old Protestant type. It is old-fashioned theology in the main; and, like the best old-fashioned theology, it has the heart of living piety beating through it. It is not satisfied with teaching *about* theology: it teaches theology, it is theology—a true “*theologia regenitorum*.” Its solid judgment and learning will mark it to scholars as one of the classics of Calvinistic Dogmatics, the ablest work in its specific department in English literature. But it is more than this, better than this. The graces of Christian life are not repressed in it, as they have often been in the arid formulating of systems. Moliere’s Mock Doctor claimed no more than that the medical profession had changed the place of the heart from the left side to the right; some of the doctors in theology have left the heart out altogether. But in Dr. Hodge’s Body of Divinity there is a heart whose beat is that of the fullest health—and you can touch the system nowhere without feeling a pulse. It is a book for the affections. No man could obtrude himself less in his books than Dr. Hodge does; yet all the more for this very reason do we see the man himself in his books. His life has been shaped upon the advice of old Sir John Davies:

“Study the best and highest things that are;
But of these, a humble thought retain.”

Dr. Hodge’s system furnishes a general landmark for Christian thinking in one of its most influential shapes; it also furnishes a revelation of the spirit of Christian science, a picture of the Christian scholar, a miniature of the Christian life. Dr. Hodge constitutes in himself a distinct evidence of Christianity, and alike in what he writes and what he is, vindicates the supremacy of Protestant culture.

§2. INFANTS, INFANT BAPTISM, AND INFANT SALVATION IN THE CALVINISTIC SYSTEM.

It is a marked feature in Dr. Hodge’s book that it does unusual justice to the relative importance of Lutheran theology.

There are but two developed systems in the world that claim with any show of probability to be purely Biblical. These systems are the Lutheran and the Calvinistic. They possess a common basis in their recognition of the same rule of faith; their profession of the Old Catholic faith as set forth in the three General Creeds; in their acknowledgment of the doctrine of justification by faith and of its great associated doctrines; and they have vast interests, great stakes, mighty bonds of sympathy in common. No two bodies of Christians have more reason for thoroughly understanding each other than Calvinists and Lutherans have, and no two parts of Christendom are closer together in some vital respects than consistent Calvinism and consistent Lutheranism. It is well worth their while to compare views.

But Dr. Hodge is not only full in his notices of Lutheran theology—he is also fair. Mistakes he has made, and very important ones; but designed misrepresentations he has never made. Next to having Dr. Hodge on one's side is the pleasure of having him as an antagonist; for where conscientious men must discuss a subject, who can express the comfort of honorable, magnanimous dealing on both sides—the feeling that in battling with each other they are also battling for each other, in that grand warfare whose final issue will be what all good men desire, the establishment of truth?

§ 3. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION AND ELECT INFANTS.

On various points Dr. Hodge argues against the Lutheran doctrine, or what he believes to be such. One of these points is Baptism. On the "necessity" of Baptism, Dr. Hodge thinks the Lutheran divines have "softened down." On this point he is mistaken. Our divines, beginning with Luther and Melancthon, have held, and hold to this hour, that Baptism is ordinarily, but not absolutely, necessary. (See *Conservative Reformation*, pp. 427, seq., 557, seq.) In a note (Vol. III. 605), Dr. Hodge says: "We are sorry to see that Dr. Krauth labors to prove that the Westminster Confession teaches that only a certain part, or some of those, who die in

infancy are saved ; this he does by putting his own construction on the language of that Confession. We can only say that we never saw a Calvinistic theologian who held that doctrine. We are not learned enough to venture the assertion that no Calvinist ever held it ; but if all Calvinists are responsible for what every Calvinist has ever said, and all Lutherans are responsible for everything Luther or Lutherans have ever said, then Dr. Krauth, as well as ourselves, will have a heavy burden to carry."

We say in all sincerity that we should prefer that Dr. Hodge should be right on the question here involved. We wish that the Westminster Confession could be harmonized with the view, that all who die in infancy are certainly saved. We wish we could be brought even fairly to doubt that its teachings are irreconcilable with such a view. We should be glad to have it shown that it is merely our mistaken construction of the Confession which is at fault, and that the meaning of its words, on the principles of correct interpretation, is not what we have supposed. But we have seen what Dr. Hodge "never saw." We have seen more than one Calvinistic theologian who does hold that doctrine. We humbly and utterly deprecate the position in which Dr. Hodge would seem to insist on putting us, if we venture to assert that some Calvinists do hold it, as if it were between him and us a question of sufficient learning, as if the question were, do we know more about Calvinistic theology than Dr. Hodge does? Dr. Hodge has gone over the world of theological literature as few men have done. We acknowledge and reverence in him one of the greatest and ripest scholars of our age ; but Apelles acknowledges that a cobbler may be authority on a sandal. And what we shall offer in this effort to show that we are not mistaken in our judgment of Calvinistic teaching, shall be offered with the desire not fairly to offend against the canon : "*Ne sutor ultra.*"

§4. HOW ARE CONFESSIONS TO BE INTERPRETED ?

We have certainly said nothing to justify the imputation that we think that every Calvinist is responsible for what every

other Calvinist says. The caveat of Dr. Hodge must have reference to what he supposes we would say in defending our position—to wit, that it is supported by the opinion of Calvinistic theologians whom we may have seen, though he has not. But we do not intend to take any line of defense open to the very just objection which Dr. Hodge makes. Our line of defense is this: The Confession has one sense only; this sense is to be fixed by the acknowledged principles of interpretation; the natural sense of the words, as they impress the minds of readers, is, *cæteris paribus*, to be accepted in preference to any other; in case of dispute as to their meaning, the different parts of the Confession are to be compared with reference to the light they shed on each other; if opinions still differ as to the sense, the usage of the authors of the Confession, of the great divines of the Church, and of their successors, the official and sworn teachers and defenders of its faith, are to be appealed to, to show how the words were understood by those who used them, by those who subscribed them, and by the Church in general—and what is the sense most in harmony with the logical necessities and completeness of the system, as its defenders themselves have understood them. A sense fixed by these processes carries with it a moral probability which throws the whole burden of proof on those who deny this sense; they must admit this sense, or demonstrate its incorrectness. We acknowledge that a Church is to be judged by its standards, and not by its divines, as they add to, take from, or change the standards. The Confessions of Churches ought to be guardians of its liberties as well as protectors of its purity. But we cannot judge a Church by its standards unless we have right modes of interpreting the standards. The standards can neither conserve the freedom nor the purity of the Church unless we can settle their true sense, over against the severity which puts into them what they do not mean, and the laxity which takes out of them what they do mean.

Such indeed is the moral force of the utterances of the authors and representative men of Church Confessions, that

it is sometimes urged as more than counterbalancing what would be, apart from it, a natural sense of the Confession. On this principle the great Calvinistic Synod of Dort,* after conceding that "the words of the third Article of the Arminians, as they outwardly sound and lie before us, seem to be good and orthodox," goes on to say: "but inasmuch as—thus Chrysostom long ago said—the heresy is wont to be in the *meaning* of the word, the meaning of these words is to be determined, and that from the writings and books of the Remonstrants themselves." With its proper restriction this principle holds good. A confession that punishments are "*eternal*," if those who make it are avowed Universalists, has its sense fixed by that fact. A confession that Christ is "*divine*" means little if Socinians make it. There is hardly a page of Dr. Hodge's three volumes which does not assume the correctness of this principle, alike in determining the views held by other Churches, and in establishing his own. It is on the basis of the moral probability of concurrent testimony that he constantly and properly assumes that he has the ability to present a correct interpretation of the Calvinistic system. Throughout he takes the very means, and the only means, we propose to employ, in settling in disputed cases the precise meaning of the Confession of his own Church, and of other Churches. We propose no test for Calvinism which we are not willing to apply to Lutheranism. If we put a sense on our Confession which Dr. Hodge can prove to be in conflict with the views held at the time of its framing by its authors, and out of harmony with the other parts of the system, if we shall define words in it in a sense in which he can show its authors did not use them, and in which they were not received by the line of witnesses who are acknowledged to have been loyal to the faith of the Church, then shall we justify Dr. Hodge in asserting that we have reached that sense by putting our own construction on its language. But, on the other hand, if we shall fix, on these principles, a certain sense

* Actor. Part 2, dog. ad Artic. III., p. 261. Ed. Dort.

on the familiar terms of Calvinistic Confessions and systems, we shall feel that Dr. Hodge in denying that sense is thrown completely on the defensive, and is bound to show that his denial does not rest on his own construction, a construction reached without the natural aids which history brings to grammar in the interpretation of language.

We rejoice that for himself Dr. Hodge so unequivocally takes ground against the whole dark theory of infant damnation. If he be right in asserting that it never follows from the Calvinistic system, we are glad that the system itself is relieved from the blot; if he be mistaken in this assertion, we rejoice still that the Calvinism of the present is yielding; we rejoice the more because we believe that in yielding this, the old historically defined system yields itself; for we believe, and propose to show, that logical Calvinism is involved in a hopeless entanglement in the whole matter of infant salvation and infant Baptism.

§ 5. THE SALVATION OF INFANTS DEPENDENT ON ABSOLUTE PERSONAL ELECTION.

The Calvinistic system places the salvation of infants on the ground of a divine election of individuals.

HEIDEGGER.*—"To those (the elect), who die in infancy, Baptism seals the grace of regeneration. . . It cannot be doubted, that the souls of *elect infants* dying in infancy, are inserted by the Spirit, into Christ, either before Baptism or at least in Baptism. . . The Baptism of *elect infants*, is not an empty figure. . . The *elect infants* receive the seal."

WITSIUS †—"Christ hath not made satisfaction for any sin which He has not taken on Himself. He has taken no sins on Himself except those of the elect. The remission of original sin by the blood of Christ has been obtained for none except for him who is elect." "To the Orthodox, disputing of the efficacy of Baptism, the main, if not the sole inquiry, is, what does it confer on *elect infants, who alone*, according to the strictness of the Divine judgment, *have a right to it (quibus solis ad eum jus est)?*" "By Baptism the good things of the covenant are signed and sealed to *elect infants* as things belonging to them."

* Corpus Theologicæ: II. 449.

† Of the Efficacy of Baptism in *Infants*. Mis. Sacr., II. 621.

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION.*—"The grace promised" (in Baptism) is conferred by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as *that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will.*"

§ 6. INFANTS ELECT AND REPROBATE.

For the Calvinistic system distinctly recognizes "*elect infants*," and thus always virtually, and often in terms, the existence of "*reprobate infants*."

CALVIN.†—"If those, therefore, to whom the Lord hath vouchsafed His election, having received the sign of regeneration, *depart this life before they grow up*, He reneweth them by the power of His Spirit."

MUSCULUS‡—"Since, therefore, this discrimination of *elect* and *reprobate*, in *new-born infants* (*recens natis infantibus*), is hidden from our judgment, it is not fitting that we should inquire into it, lest by ignorance we reject vessels of grace."

MARTYR.§—"What is to be judged of the soul of a child so killed, having as yet not received the sacrament (of circumcision)? I answer that we, either as touching his salvation or condemnation, can affirm nothing on either side. For if he pertained to the number of the elect so that he was predestinate to eternal life, there is no cause but that he may be saved. But if he were a vessel to *that end made* of God, to *show forth in him His wrath*, and so to be condemned, what can we complain of the severity of God, especially seeing we are all born the children of wrath and of condemnation?"

ALSTED John Henry (1588-1638) says of Baptism—"The children of unbelievers are not to be baptized—the children, both of whose parents are believers or one of whom is a believer, are to be baptized—for the infants of believers are in the covenant. If the covenant, which is the greater thing, belongs to them, much more does the seal, which is the less. The faith of parents benefits infants."|| "The mode of federation, with respect to infants (we mean the infants of believers, who die before they reach the years of discretion) is almost hidden to us. Yet this is certain, that in the foundation of the covenant of grace, they are justified, and blessed, and hence are endowed with true faith. *Elect* infants are falsely called unbelievers, for though elect infants who die in infancy, for of these we speak, be destitute of what is called actual faith, they are not on that account destitute of all faith. For as they have the Holy Ghost, it is impossible that there should be no operation of the Holy Ghost in them; though it be secret and unknown to us.

* XXVIII. VI. † Institutes, IV., XVI., 21. ‡ Loc. Communes, 336.

§ Common Places, IV. 110. || Theologia, Scholastica Didactica, Hanoviae. 1618, 4to. pp. 815, 816. The copy we use is in the Library of the University of Pennsylvania.

Nor can they be called unbelievers. For as Christ is received by faith only, and Christ is given to elect infants, as having union and communion with Him; we cannot deny that they have faith. Faith in principle and seed, and virtually, is to be attributed to elect infants." *

The SWISS THEOLOGIANS at Dort † say: "That there is an *election and reprobation of infants, no less than of adults*, we cannot deny, in the face of God who loves, * and hates, unborn children (*nondum natos amat, et odit*)."

CHAMIER, ‡—"In the case of these (*infants*) Paul has most expressly established by testimonies of Scripture, that there is not only a *predestination* unto *salvation*, but also a *reprobation*. And indeed it must either be asserted that *no infants* are destined to punishment, or it must be confessed that some are destined without respect to co-operation or repugnance. Since the *former is absurd*, the second is to be held as true." "There are two classes of mankind who perish, some utterly deserted in natural corruption, and ignorance of Divine Truth, as the *most part of infants* outside the Church." §

MARK FREDERIC WENDELIN (1584—1652) was one of the greatest of the German Reformed dogmaticians, and polemics of the Seventeenth Century. His *Theologia Christiana* (the smaller work—the larger one was posthumous 1656) first appeared 1634, and was reviewed by John Gerhard, to whom Wendelin refers in his *Theological Exercitations*, 1652. In this very elaborate defence of Calvinism, he shows at large, that

"Baptism does not change infants spiritually," "that none are to be admitted to Baptism, but those who are in God's covenant," and the "arguments are answered by which Lutherans prove that all infants are regenerated in the Act of Baptism. || "That Baptism, as a laver of regeneration, is applied for the remission of sins, all the Reformed Churches teach. But it is one thing to say, that infants are baptized for the remission of sins, it is another thing to say, that they are baptized, that they may be regenerated." ¶ Gerhard had urged that if "the hypothesis of the absolute decree of reprobation stands, this affirmation can be made, not of all infants, but of the *elect* only, as in truth, the Calvinistic doctors in various passages, actually explain it." Wendelin with perfect frankness replies: "There is no need here of inferences or of citations, to convince me. Of my own accord, and freely and expressly I confess, with *Ursinus* and our other teachers, that not all who are

* Do. 785. † Acta Synod. Dordr. Judic. 40. ‡ Panstrat. Cathol. III., viii., 8, 11, 14, 117. § Panstrat. Cathol. VII., i., 18, 99. || Exercitationes Theologicæ, Casselæ. 1652, 4to. See the very copious Index: Baptismus. ¶ Exercitatio. xxxvii. § 18.

baptized, whether adults or *infants*, become participants of the grace of Christ, for the election of God is most free: it is therefore a *prerogative of the elect alone*, which Baptism seals.”*

“With one mouth, all the Reformed Churches teach that all the infants of Christians, draw from their nativity original sin, and through it are obnoxious to eternal death.” “*All infants* of Christians, even before Baptism are holy, with a federal and external holiness, on account of which they ought to be reputed a part of the visible Church and people of God, and as federates be admitted to the seal of the covenant. *Some infants* of Christians, even before Baptism, nay even in their mothers’ womb, not indeed by nature, but by grace, are holy with an internal sanctity, and *these infants are believers and regenerate*. *Charity presumes* this sanctity in regard to each one, no less before Baptism, than after it.” “The internal sanctity is not necessarily conjoined with the federal, but in *many infants* and adults is separated from it. This we learn from the event; for those who were once sanctified never wholly lose their sanctity.”† “The case of infants born of those not federate is different, to whom that grace is not promised. Hence they are not federate, and, still less regenerated by the Spirit”‡ “In general it is very truly said, of a Christian is born, not a heathen but a Christian, as a Jew is born of a Jew, a citizen of a citizen.”§ “The Word of God has no efficacy unless it be understood. The Spirit of God operates without the word, not only on infants born, but on infants unborn.”||

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION X. iii.—“Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated.”

§ 7. INFANTS WORTHY OF PERDITION.

For Calvinism holds that all infants are bound over to God’s wrath and made subject to eternal misery; that is, that God might justly condemn forever every infant.

HEIDEGGER: ¶ (1633—1698).—For original sin the penalty is eternal; it is the penalty both of loss and of sense, the sense both of the worm, and of the fire, though in some, as for example in *infants* it is milder, in others it is severer.”

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION, XI., vi.—“*Every sin both original and actual*, * * * doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal.”**

§ 8. ACTUAL PERDITION OF INFANTS ACCORDING TO CALVINISM.

Holding that all infants deserve damnation, that the elec-

* Exercitatio. xxxvii. 19. † Do. I. ‡ Do. 15. § Do. 3. || Do. 8. ¶ Do. 10.

** Corpus Theologiæ, Tigur, 1700. Fol. I. 361.

tion of God alone can save them from it, and that this election does not extend to all infants, Calvinism of necessity teaches that some infants perish.

CALVIN.*—"As to infants they seem to perish not by their own fault but by the fault of another; but there is a double solution. Though sin does not yet appear in them, yet it is latent; for they bear corruption shut up in the soul, so that before God they are damnable."

"That infants who are to be saved (as certainly out of that age some are saved) must be before regenerated by the Lord is clear."†

Holding that infants must be regenerated in order to be saved, Calvinism teaches that some infants die *unregenerated*, and are lost.

MARTYR.‡—"Augustine adjudgeth young infants to hell fire, if they die *not regenerated*. And the Holy Scriptures do seem to favor his part; for in the last judgment, there shall be but only a double sentence pronounced. There is no third place appointed between the saved and condemned * * * We will say, therefore, with Augustine, and with the Holy Scripture, that they *must be punished*."

SPANHEIM, the elder, in arguing against the universality of the Divine will, that men should be saved, says: "Either God wills to have mercy unto the salvation of the Gentiles outside of the covenant, whether deprived of *life in the cradle*, in the *earliest infancy*, or attaining to some age, or He does not. If He does not, the universality of His pity goes to the ground. If He does, it follows that to numberless ones to whom not a word concerning Christ and the Gospel was ever made known, *there exists a way to salvation, outside of Christ and the covenant of God*." "The universal pity overthrows the decree of election and reprobation.§"

MOLINAEUS.||—"Of the infants of unbelievers." "We dare not promise salvation to any (infant) remaining outside Christ's covenant. They are indeed by nature 'children of wrath' (Eph. ii. 3), and 'strangers from the covenant of promise,' (Verse 12). They are pronounced (1 Corinth. vii. 14) 'unclean,' while that they are contrasted with the 'holy.' From which curse, inasmuch as no one is freed except through Christ, I do not find that the benefit of Christ pertains to them."

COCCEIUS.¶—"Elect Infants" * * "are not conceived and born as are the children of the Gentiles, concerning whom the *presumption is certain*, that they, with their mother's milk, drink in godlessness unto destruction."

* Ezekiel XVIII, Op ra iv. 167. † Institut. iv. xvi. 17. ‡ Common Place, I., 234.

§ Exercit. de Grat., universali, 4. || Thesaurus Disputat. Theolog. in Sedan.

Acad. Genev. 1661. I. 212. ¶ Cateches. Palat. Quæst. LXXIV.

DR. TWISS, *Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly*.—WILLIAM TWISS (1575—1646) was renowned for his learning, his piety, and his rigid Calvinism. He was a strong Supralapsarian. He nobly represents the firmness and internal consistency of the true old Calvinist. He was worthy the honor conferred on him by both Houses of Parliament, in electing him Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. "He was universally allowed to be the ablest opponent of Arminianism in that age." His greatest work is his *Vindiciæ Gratiae*,* his Vindication of the Grace, Power and Providence of God. It was written in reply to the Criticism of Arminius (1560—1609) on Perkins, (1558—1602).

Twiss says: "*Many infants depart from this life in original sin, and consequently are condemned to eternal death, on account of original sin alone: therefore from the sole transgression of Adam condemnation to eternal death has followed upon many infants.*"†

(WESTMINSTER CONFESSION: X., iii., iv.): "*Elect infants* * * are saved. * * So too are all other elect persons. Others not elected * * cannot be saved."

The doctrine of genuine Calvinism then is that there are reprobate infants who are left to the total penalty which original sin brings and merits.

What that is, the Larger Catechism defines (Q. 27): "The fall brought upon mankind the loss of communion with God, his displeasure and curse; so that we are by nature children of wrath, bound slaves to Satan, and justly liable to *all* punishments in this world and that which is to come." The punishments of sin in the world to come "are everlasting separation from the comfortable presence of God, and most grievous torments in soul and body, without intermission, in hell-fire forever." (Q. 29). In this state of sin and misery God *leaves* all men, except his elect. (Q. 30). "*Every sin, both original and actual, * * * doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with ALL the miseries, spiritual, temporal, and ETERNAL.*" (Westminster Confess. VI., 6). It is from this the "elect infants" are delivered, it is to this the "reprobate infants" are abandoned.

* The first Edition was published 1632, Folio. The one from which we quote is the Second. Amsterdam, 1632. 4to. It is in the Library of the University of Pennsylvania. † *Vindiciæ*, I. 48.

§ 9. PRESUMPTION AND ASSURANCE IN REGARD TO INFANTS.

Calvinism has the "certain presumption" that the children of unbelievers are lost, but Calvinism has no *assurance* that the infants of believers are saved.

MARTYR.*—Neither must it be thought that I would promise salvation unto all the children of the faithful, which depart without the sacrament (baptism): for if I should do so I might be counted rash. I leave them to be judged of the mercy of God, seeing I have no knowledge of the secret election and predestination. "I *dare not promise* certain salvation, particularly unto *any* that departeth hence. For there be some children of the saints which belong not unto predestination."†

"The children of the godly, departing without baptism, *may* be saved * * * if they appertain to the number of such as be predestinate. Also, I do except all others, *if any there be*, which by the secret council of God belong unto perdition."‡

CHAMIER.§—"We deny that sins are really forgiven them who do not belong to the eternal election: as Esau was never forgiven, *though he was circumcised*, for he was hateful to God before he was born."

MASSON (BECMAN)||—"Not all baptized children are true regenerate Christians, who shall be saved; for God the Lord hath reserved to Himself His *secret foreknowledge* toward children, also, yet *unborn*."

PAREUS¶—"Neither Zwingli, nor Calvin, nor any one of us, places, without distinction in heaven with the saints, *all infants who die without baptism, whether unborn or in birth, or while they are carried to baptism*, but they pronounce this, by the law of charity, of the infants alone of the Church, born in the covenant if they be prevented by death * * * nevertheless, without *interference with the election* of God, which as of old in the family of Abraham and Isaac, so in after time *often hath made, and doth make a discrimination between the children of believers*, a discrimination which we are neither to search into nor to scoff at, but to adore. (Rom. ix. 11). This is the constant judgment of ourselves, and of our divines concerning this question."

BODIUS.**—"Nor yet, meanwhile, do we so bind to the faith of believing parents the grace and pity of God toward infants, as to do any prejudice to His free and *secret* election; who knoweth *His own*, whether of *infants* or adult professors of faith, and hath them sealed with a seal *known to Himself alone*."

WITSIUS ††—"These (the prerogatives of the federated infants) are not

* Common Places. Trans. by Marten, 1583. IV., 120.

† Common Places., I., 233. ‡ Common Places, IV., 187. He uses nearly the same words in his Comm. on Rom. V., 304. § L., XIII., de Fid. Cap. XXI., 34, p. 224. || VI., 90. ¶ Castigat. in. Bellarmin. de amissione gratiæ. 1613. L. VI., 871.

** On Ephes. quoted by Witsius. Misc. Sacr. II., 617. †† Miscel. Sacr. II., 613.

to be stretched to the point of supposing that *all the children* of pious parents are *ordained* to salvation. For Holy Scripture and daily experience prove that the offspring of the best, mature into the very worst condition of soul, and are persistent to their own destruction."

Hence a doubt that the parent was elect, cast doubt on the presumption that the infant was elect, and the overthrow of the proof that the parent was elect destroyed the presumption that the child was elect.

SIBEL.*—"We admonish parents that they should enter into themselves, and should search themselves whether they are partakers of the covenant, endowed with saving faith, armed with the purpose of new obedience. *If they discern this in themselves*, there is no reason why they should doubt of the election and salvation of the children whom God has called out of this life in infancy."

§ 10. THE ELECTION OF CHILDREN AND THEIR DEATH.—

Calvinism cannot consistently allow that the infantile age, or the *time of the child's death*, is in any way connected with the moral probabilities of its election.

THE THEOLOGIAN OF GREAT BRITAIN, at the Synod of Dort, argue against the Remonstrant proposition that "all infants dying before the use of reason are saved," the Arminian position then, the Calvinistic opinion according to Dr. Hodge now. In their argument they declare as their official judgment:† "As regards the Divine election, the circumstance of *age* is a thing that does not belong thereto (*impertinens*), and has no effect whatever, (*nihil prorsus operatur*.)"

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION, Chap. III., v.—"Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, * * according to the *secret counsel* * * of His will * * hath chosen * * out of His mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith * * or any other thing in the creature, as condition or causes moving Him thereunto."

Either the foreseen something in the creature, to wit, its early death, moves God, or it does not. If it moves Him, the doctrine of absolute predestination is annihilated; if it does not move Him, the whole moral presumption in regard to any difference in favor of dying infants is of no force whatever. And yet it is obviously this moral presumption which has overcome the stern demands of the system, has made Calvinists deny what even Arminians under the stress created by Calvinism

* In Ep. Jud., Vol. IV., 138.
Judic., p. 10.

† Acta Synod. Dordrechtii habit. Dordr. 1620.

were at first compelled to admit, and has led them not only to reject the doctrine of infant damnation, but has made them unwilling to believe that it was ever implied in their Confession, and maintained by their divines. Nor have there been wanting Calvinistic divines of the highest order, who have abandoned entirely this part of the Calvinistic doctrine, and have accepted in substance the Lutheran view. Such were Le Blanc, and Jurieu.* Nor can we wonder at this. The Calvinistic system furnishes no ground of *positive assurance* that any infant whatever dying in infancy is saved. As Lutherans, we have a clear faith resting on a specific covenant in the case of a baptized child, and a well grounded hope resting on an all-embracing mercy in the case of an unbaptized child.

To Calvinism the baptism authenticates nothing. What it is in any case, even as a sign, is a secret bound up with another secret. The most that Calvinism can do in the most hopeful case is to cherish a *presumption* in charity, that the child's parents may be elect, and a presumption on that presumption that the child may be elect, and therefore saved—while in the darkest case the presumption is that the class of children it embraces is lost. The same element in Calvinism, which on the basis of a *secret* council forbids it to affirm of any one particular child that that child is lost, forbids it equally to affirm of any one particular child that that child is certainly lost: and the sort of presumption on which Calvinism argues that a few children *may* be saved, is overwhelming in fixing the conclusion that the great masses of children are lost.

§ 11. HEREDITARY RIGHTS OF INFANTS.

Calvinism holds that the rights of infants in the Church are *hereditary* rights, bound up with their natural descent.

CALVIN.†—"Unless God transmit His grace from the fathers to the sons, to receive new-born infants into the Church, would be a mere profanation of Baptism." "The children of *believers*, who are born in the Church, we say are of the household of the kingdom of God. * * Inasmuch as God hath adopted the children of believers, before they were

* Witsius, Miscell. Sacr. II. Exc. XIX. LXII. LXIV.

† II. Defens. de

Sacrament. Opera VIII. 693.

born, we draw the inference that they are not to be defrauded of the outward sign."*

ZANCHIUS.†—"All are to be baptized who, on account of the piety of the parents are believed to belong to the covenant."

WITSIUS.‡—"It is a thing confessed by all the orthodox (the Calvinists), that, although it be not safe curiously to search into the secrets of the divine counsels, and to determine many things concerning the lot of infants, dying in infancy; yet that the *prerogative* is great, of those infants, whose *parents* are in the *saving communion* of God's covenant."

WESTMINSTER CONFESSIO, xxvii.: "The visible Church . . . consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, *together with their children.*" So Larger Catechism, Q. 62.

§ 12. HEREDITARY EXEMPTION FROM THE COMMON LOT.

Hence in the Calvinistic system the children of believers seem to be exempt from the common lot in some sense.

CALVIN.§—"The propagation of sin and damnation in the seed of Adam is universal; all, therefore, not one excepted, are included within this curse, whether they spring from believers or from the godless. . . . The condition of nature is therefore equal in all, so that they are subject alike to sin and eternal death. That the Apostle here attributes a *special privilege* to the children of believers, flows from the blessing of the covenant, by the supervention of which the curse of nature is removed. The *children of believers* are exempted from the *common lot of the human race*, as they are separated unto the Lord." "Those that were without (the church), were not to be admitted to baptism till they had made a profession of faith. But the *infant children of believers*, as they were adopted from the womb, and by right of the promise, pertained to the body of the Church, were baptized."

§ 13. JUDAIZING VIEW.

The logical Calvinism runs out in fact into a *Judaizing* construction of the covenant, and of the relation of infants to it.

PAREUS.||—"The children of Christians are born Christians, as the children of Jews were born Jews." "They are born in the covenant and are citizens of the Church." "The infants of Christians are citizens of the Church, are born in the covenant, with federal grace, and saints of saints: as citizens are born of citizens, the free are born of the free, slaves are born of slaves."¶

* On Acts X. 47. † Opera, VIII. 516. ‡ De Efficac. Bapt. in Infantib. Miscell. Sacr. II. 615. § 1 Corinth. vii. 14. Hebrews vi. 2. || Irenicon, 262.

¶ Comm. in Rom. XI. 1143.

GURTLE.*—"Christian infants are federates of God, partakers of the good things promised in the covenant, citizens of the kingdom of heaven, defended by angels, and heirs of eternal life, *therefore* not to be deprived of the sign of the covenant."

All this they are (if elect) born to in their natural birth of believers, and having all this already, the sign is to be given them.

§ 14. CUTTING OFF OF INFANTS FROM THE COVENANT.

The Calvinistic system holds that the parental neglect to have a child baptized cuts off the child from the covenant, as in the Jewish nation.

CALVIN.†—"Inasmuch as it is not in man's good pleasure to sunder what God has joined together: no one can spurn or neglect the sign, without casting away the Word itself, and depriving himself of the blessing therein offered. Whosoever, Baptism neglected, pretends that he is content with the bare promise, treads under foot, as far as in him lies, the blood of Christ, or at least *permits it not to flow to his children*, who are to be washed. Therefore *the contempt* of the sign is followed by the just penalty, *the privation of grace*, inasmuch as by the godless divorce, or rather the tearing asunder of the sign and of the Word, the covenant of God is violated."

COCCEIUS.‡—"If they be not baptized, there would be an *abnegation of the covenant of God*, as if believers had not a promise concerning their children, but as if they were in the same lot in which the children of unbelievers are."

§ 15. ELECT PARENTS AND ELECT INFANTS.

The *presumption* that infants are *elect* is based upon the *presumption* that the parents are *elect*. It is not enough that the parents are members of the visible Church, nor that before men they sustain a good character for piety—they must be elect.

GOMARUS.§—"We piously believe that the *infants of those who are in God's covenant through Christ, and true believers*, are also elect."

In the various passages we have cited, it is always the presumption that the parents are elect and therefore believers; that is the basis of the presumption that their children are elect. The Church membership of the parent, in itself has no bearing on the election of the child, except that when people

* Instit. Theolog. 844. † On Genes. XVII. 14. Opera, Amstelod. 1671, p. 91.

‡ Catechesis. Rel. Christ. Q. LXIV. § Acta Synod, Dord. III. 24.

profess religion, we charitably presume they have it, and presuming that they are elect, we presume that their children may be elect.

§ 16. A PIOUS FICTION.

But this presumption is but a presumption in any case. In the best case the faith of elect parents that their children are certainly sanctified, rests after all on a *pious fiction*. No parent can, according to logical Calvinism, have any real assurance in regard to any particular child, that it is elect, sanctified, and in the covenant.

BEZA, at the Colloquy at MONTBELIARD:* "The Holy Spirit exercises His power in the elect alone. . . the other, who are condemned, and not elect, being left. . . The adoption is *offered* in circumcision, to all who are circumcised; but the *elect* alone receive it, whose eyes God has opened, that they may see and be saved. The rest, to whom God hath not vouchsafed this grace, are left to His righteous judgment: and yet God remains true. The same takes place in Baptism, which *many thousand infants receive*, who yet are never regenerated, but *perish forever*."

Beza's words, as they were generally understood, were so often quoted against the Calvinistic system, that Christian Beermann (under the assumed name of Masson) insists that they have been perverted, and that Beza meant that "many thousands of baptized children become godless and are lost, after they reach the age of adults." Masson could hardly have read the Acts of the Colloquy, or he would have seen that in Andreæ's reply to Beza, are these words: "It is a very dreadful thing to hear you say that many thousand infants are baptized, who are never regenerated, but perish forever; nor do I think there is a single person in this body of hearers who will agree with you in this." To this Beza replied not a word. Andreæ further said: "It is a bad thing on your part that you leave pious parents in perpetual doubt whether their children have been adopted as sons of God through the Baptism they have received. For according to your answers. . . it cannot and ought not to be certainly pronounced that a baptized infant is adopted as God's child or regenerated, but that it should only be *thought probable* that they will be endowed with the fruit of adoption, God's secret judgment being left to Himself."

To this Beza replied: 'Each of us can judge and pronounce concerning ourselves, whether we be regenerate or not; but a judgment concerning others may be doubtful and false.'

* Acta Colloq. Montis Belligartensis. Anno C. 1586. Tubingæ, 1591. p. 479. Do aus dem Latein verteutsch't: Tubingen, 1597, p. 837.

MOMMA,* who boasts that it was his "supremest solicitude not to depart a nail's breadth from the faith and Confession of the Reformed Church," is more candid than Masson, and stamps Andreæ with the epithet "crude," for his counter judgment to Beza.

BEZA,†—"If it be objected that not *all born* of faithful parents are *elect*, and consequently not all sanctified, since God did not elect all the children of Abraham and Isaac, we are not without an answer. *For though we do not in the least deny that these things are so*; yet we say this secret judgment is to be left to God, and in *general* (unless there be something in the way, from which the opposite can be gathered), we presume from the formula of promise, that they who are born of faithful parents, or of one faithful parent, are sanctified."

ZANCHIUS:‡ "We believe that *elect infants*, when they are baptized, are not baptized with water alone, but are endowed also with the Spirit of Regeneration."

BUCAN.§—"Children (born of believing parents, or of one believing parent,) the Apostle calls 'holy' (1 Cor. vii. 14): that is pure and separated to the Lord. * Nor is it in the way of this, *that not all born of faithful parents are elect*, for it is not for us to search into the secret judgments of God; but we with good reason suppose all born of Christians *probably elect*."

GUERTLER.||—"Many sprinkled with water both *infants* and adults, do not obtain salvation, beyond doubt because they do not receive *Baptism entire*, but only its first and most common part."

WITS:US.¶—"Baptism does not signify nor seal, still less does it confer on *all infants* of those who are in the covenant, any common justification, regeneration and sanctification. * * or remission of original sin, either a revocable or irrevocable remission. But all efficacy of Baptism, which involves a state of salvation, even in respect of *their age*, is confined to *elect infants* alone (*solis electis infantibus proprium*)."

LEYDECKER.**—"The faith demanded of parents in the formula of Baptism is *indefinite*: This, to wit that godly persons' infants are *sanctified* in Christ. And that faith is true, although there should be here and there an *exception*. . . That divine promise has a *common* truth, though God *reserve to Himself*, according to His own power and liberty, *the exclusion of some infants*. Faith . . . performs its office when it lays hold of the promise *as it is given*, and reverently leaves to God *liberty of application*. The believer is bound . . . to acquiesce in the promise given . . . and to trust in it, or, in the judgment of charity to hope

* De Varia Conditione, sub Oeconom., etc. Basileæ 1718, II. 207. † De Spirit. Sac. IV. 29. ‡ Opera, VII. 48. § Institut. Theolog. Loc. XLVII. 29. || Institut. Theolog. Amstelod. 1694. Ch. XXXIII. 173. ¶ De Effic. Baptism, Misc. Sac. II. 622. ** De Verita. Fid. Ref. siv. Comm. in Catech. Palat. Ultraj. 1694, p. 327.

well concerning this infant which is to be baptized—nay, to believe that *this* infant belongs to Christ, *unless* God, by a singular decision, *wills its* exclusion. The faith demanded of parents is not vain. . . though *here and there one* (of the infants) *does not belong to the election* . . . although there is not an internal baptizing of exactly all infants.”

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION X. M. IV. “*Elect* infants dying in infancy are regenerated. So, also, are *all other elect* persons. Others not elected . . . cannot be saved.”

§ 17. RESERVE.

Hence logical Calvinism speaks with *reserve* even of the cases of infants, which are most hopeful. “If the infants of *believers* die in infancy before the years of discretion, we have good *hopes* concerning them,” say the Swiss theologians at Dort.* “By the law of *charity*,” says Pareus,† and so through the whole. Millions of the children of pagans and of other reprobates are certainly lost, and some, *if* their parents be elect, *may* be saved. We reach again the point to which we came before. Calvinism has no ground on which it can affirm positively and unerringly, on *its own premises*, that any one particular child dying in infancy is certainly saved. In place of a distinct Christian assurance based on a positive covenant, it has assumption based on assumption, presumption built on presumption, hopes resting on hopes, Charity confessing that ignorance of a terrible secret is its mother. The worst position in which a brighter faith can suppose a child to be, is the best which Calvinism can assign it.

§ 18. BAPTISM AND ANABAPTISM.

CALVINISM rests the validity of Baptism not on what it brings, but on what it finds:

LATTER CONFESSIO OF HELVETIA. (1566)—Why should not they be consecrated by holy Baptism, who *are* God’s peculiar people, and *in* the Church of God?‡

MOLINAEUS.§—“The Baptism of water is not, therefore, absolutely necessary to the reconciliation of the infant and its reception into grace: inasmuch as the *reconciliation precedes* the Baptism.”

VOETIUS.||—“The opinion of the Reformed theologians is known,

* *Judicia*. 40. † *Castigat. in quatuor Lib. Bellam. de amissione grat’æ et Statu Peccat.* Heidelberg, 1613. L. vi. 891.

‡ Ch. xx. Ed. Augusti, 72. Niemeyer, 518. Beck, I. 158. Hall’s Harm. of Conf. 302.

§ Quoted by Witsius, M. S. II. 627. || Quoted by Witsius. M. S. II. 633.

that the efficacy of Baptism is not in *producing* regeneration, but in sealing regeneration *already* produced."

WITSIUS.*—"God is not only free to confer the grace of regeneration on *elect infants before* the use of *Baptism*, but it is credible that He *ordinarily does so*." The margin applies this "to those who die in infancy," but the text shows conclusively that Witsius does not limit the principle to them.

THE LITURGY OF THE CHURCH OF HOLLAND required parents, presenting their children for Baptism, to confess that they "acknowledged them as *sanctifi-d* in *Christ*, and, on *that account*, as *members* of His Church, to be Baptized."

§ 19. GRACE BEFORE BAPTISM.

Grace in no sense waits on Baptism, but Baptism waits on Grace: Baptism is not a means of Grace, but Grace is a means of real Baptism; in the Calvinistic System we are baptized not in order to obtain Grace, but because we are supposed already to have it.

CALVIN.—"They are embraced in the covenant *from the womb*." "By what right could we admit them to Baptism, except that they are heirs of the promise? For unless already *before it* (*jam ante*) the promise of life pertained to them, he would profane Baptism who would give it to them."

MARTYR.†—"Little ones, who truly belong to this election, are endowed with the Holy Spirit *before* they are baptized." "Nor would we baptize little children, unless we supposed that they *already* belong to the Church and to Christ."

FORMER CONFESSION OF HELVETIA (1530-32).—"Baptism is the font of regeneration, the which the Lord doth give to *his elect* (*electis suis*). In which holy font we baptize our infants. Especially seeing that we ought godly to *presume* of their election.‡"

RIVETUS.§—"True Baptism requires that they *shall be in* the covenant, to whom it is administered."

AMES.||—"Unless they are to be esteemed as members of the Church, they ought not to be baptized. For Baptism is, in its own nature, the seal of an ingrafting *already made* into Christ, and, consequently, into His Church."

§ 20. BAPTISM WITHOUT OBJECTIVE FORCE.

According to Calvinism, Baptism has no objective force even to elect infants.

* Mi c. Sac. II. 63'.

† Loc. Com. IV. viii. ‡ 15 in Rom. VI. § Art xxi. Ed. Augusti, 99, Ed. Niemeyer, 112, 120. Beck, I. 55. Hal's Harmony, 303. || Ad G-nes. Exerc. 88, p. 429.

ZURICH CONSENSUS,* between Calvin and the Zurich ministers 1549: "Whatever good is conferred on us by (the Sacraments) is not by their own virtue, even though you comprehend in it the promises. The Sacraments are *called* seals, but the Spirit alone is properly the seal."

HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.†—"Is the outward Baptism of water that washing away of sin? It is not, for the blood of Christ (and the Holy Ghost) alone, purges us from all sin."

BODIUS, ‡ arguing against the view that children are not members of Christ *before* Baptism, says: "If this opinion were true, it would follow that the children of Christians, no less than of Turks, Jews, and heathen, should be prohibited from Baptism until they are of a fitting age to make a profession of faith for themselves; for there is *no reason* why the seal of the covenant should be impressed on those who have nothing to do with the covenant itself."

WITSIUS.§—"Communion with Christ, and with His mystic body, seems to *precede* Baptism in elect infants; at least in the judgment of charity. For as an argument for infant Baptism, the orthodox (Calvinists) constantly say: They to whom belong the covenant of grace, the fellowship of Christ and of the Church, and whose is the kingdom of heaven, ought to be baptized. But all these things belong to *elect and federate* infants."

§ 21. DEFINITION OF BAPTISM.

DR. HEPPE, in his *Dogmatic of the Evangelical Reformed Church*, (1861), presents the doctrines of the Calvinistic Churches, and illustrates his text with citations from their *standard theologians*.

THE definitions of Baptism which Heppe gives as purely Calvinistic and Reformed, are as follows: "Baptism is a sacrament, in which those to *whom the covenant of God's grace pertains*, are washed with water in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that is, that to those who are baptized, it is *signified and sealed*, that they are received into the *communion* of the covenant of grace, *are inserted into Christ*, and His mystic body, the Church, are justified by God, for the sake of Christ's blood shed for us, and *regenerated* by Christ's Spirit." This definition he gives from POLANUS. Another and shorter one he furnishes from WOLLEBIUS as follows: "Baptism is the first sacrament of the new covenant, in which to the *elect* received into the family of God, by the outward application of water, *the remission of sins and regeneration by the blood of Christ and by the Holy Spirit are sealed*." He gives only one other, which is from HEIDEGGER, thus: Baptism is

* Enerv Bellarm. II. 49. † NIEMEYER, Coll. Conf. ‡ Qu. LXXII. Augusti, 556. Niemeyer, 408, 445. § Quoted by Witsius, 194.

the sacrament of regeneration, in which to each and to every one embraced in the covenant of God, the inward washing from sins through the blood and Spirit of Christ, is declared and sealed.

§ 22. BAPTISM OF NON-ELECT INFANTS.

Calvinism particularly gives prominence to the idea that non-elect infants receiving Baptism, receive no benefit.

ZURICH CONSENSUS, between Calvin and the Zurich ministers.—“We zealously teach that God does not promiscuously exercise His power on all who receive the Sacraments, but *only on the elect*. He enlightens unto faith none but those whom *He has foreordained unto life*. By the *secret power* (arcana virtute) of His Spirit, he effects that *the elect* receive those things which the sacraments offer.” * “To the *reprobate* equally with the *elect* the signs are administered, but the truth of the signs reaches only the *latter*.” †

ZANCHIUS.‡—“The power of Baptism has place in the elect alone. They only are baptized, not with water merely but with the Spirit also. Though all these things (enumerated previously) are affirmed of Baptism, and are truly attributed to it as the organ of the Holy Spirit, and all who are baptized are truly said to become and be such *Sacramental-ly*; yet we believe that these things are fulfilled *in fact*, only in the elect. All are baptized with water, but the *elect only*, with the Spirit; all receive the sign, but the *elect only* are made partakers of the thing signified and offered through Baptism.”

BUCAN.§—“Incorporation into Christ, and the benefits which follow it, are in no wise really conferred on the reprobate, though he be baptized with water. For God efficaciously calls, justifies, regenerates, and glorifies those *only* whom He has *chosen* and *predestinated* to these things. The *elect*, whether *infants* or adults, whether in Baptism or before Baptism, are equally incorporated in Christ.”

WITSIUS.||—“On such Baptism confers *nothing* truly good; it signifies or seals *no* grace, *no* salvation; no more than a piece of wax, with a beautiful stamp on it, attached to a blank sheet of paper—or, if you prefer, attached to a sheet so defiled with blots that nothing good can be written on it. Well has Robert, Bishop of Salisbury, said: ‘Sacraments, as they are seals of grace, and of God’s promise, exert their power spiritually in *those only* who are sons of the promise and heirs of grace.’”

§ 23. INFANTS OUTSIDE OF THE CHURCH.

Calvinism therefore holds, that as infants who are born of

* De Efficac. Baptis. in Inf. Misc. Sac. II. 725. † Niemeyer, Collect. Conf. 195.

‡ Opera, VIII. 516.

§ Institutiones Theol. Genev. 1025. Lec. XLVII. p. 54.

|| Miscell. Sacr. II. 618.

parents who are outside of the Church, are not of the Church, they are not to be baptized.

BUCAN.*—"Infants descended from believing and baptized parents are to be baptized—but the children of unbelievers, who are not in the Church, and the children of the unbaptized, are *not* to be baptized." "Are not the little ones of the unbelievers, neglected by them, and taken into the care of Christians, to be baptized? No, not till they become adults"

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION, XXVIII. iv.—"The infants of ONE or BOTH *believing parents* are to be baptized."

LARGER CATECHISM. (QU. 166).—"Baptism is *not* to be administered to *any that are out of the visible Church* . . but infants descended from parents, either, both, or but one of them professing faith in Christ, and obedience to Him, are . . to be baptized."

§ 24. CALVINISM AND ANABAPTISM.

Hence Calvinism narrows to the last degree any real difference between its own views and those of *Anabaptists*, or Baptists. In stating the points of controversy between Calvinists and Mennonites and other *Anabaptists*, the Calvinist divines constantly represent themselves and the *Anabaptists* as perfectly agreed, so far as the Baptism of the children of unbelievers is concerned.

The Calvinistic argument against the *Anabaptist* objection to infant Baptism, constantly rests on the theory, that infants have a right to Baptism only as they possess certain spiritual qualifications. Where those qualifications are not to be presumed the *Anabaptist* objection stands, and Calvinism concedes it.

Thus BULLINGER.†—"The kingdom of heaven is of infants. No man is received into the kingdom of heaven unless he be the friend of God: and these are not destitute of the Spirit of God. Children are God's, therefore they have the Spirit of God! Therefore, if they have received the Holy Ghost as well as we; if they be accounted among the people of God as well as we that be grown of age, who can forbid these to be baptized with water in the name of the Lord?"

VAN HOEKE.‡—"There is *no question* between us and the Mennonites as to whether the infants of unbelievers, or of those who are outside of the covenant of God, are to be baptized? For *to these*, both WE and THEY deny Baptism. But the question is, whether the infants of those

* *Institutiones Theologicæ*. Genev. 1625, 624. † *Sermons on the Sacraments*. Cambridge, 1840, 183. ‡ *Lucubrations in Cateches*. Palat. Lugduni. 1711, p. 210.

who are in the covenant, or one of whose parents is in the covenant, are to be baptized?"

THE CONFESSION OF SCOTLAND (1560).—"Baptism appertaineth to the infants of the faithful. And so we condemn the error of the Anabaptists."*

THE LATTER HELVETIC CONFESSION (CHAP. XX).—"We condemn the Anabaptists who deny that the *new-born children of the faithful* are to be baptized. For of *these* . . . is the kingdom of God, and they are in the covenant of God. Why, therefore, should not the sign of God's covenant be given *them*? Why shall not they be initiated by holy Baptism, who are *God's own*, and in the Church of God?"†

CONFESSION OF FRANCE (1559).—"Seeing that together with the parents, God doth account their posterity also to be of the Church, we affirm, that infants being born of holy parents [Lat. Sanctis. Fr. fideles], are . . . to be baptized."‡

THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM (Qu. 74) rests on the same view.—"Young children . . . by Baptism are separated from the *children of unbelievers*." In explaining the answer URSINUS § says: "All they, and *they alone* are to be baptized, who are disciples of Christ, that is, who are, and who ought to be considered members of the *visible Church*, whether they be adults professing faith and repentance, or be *infants* born in the Church: for all the *children of the faithful* are in the covenant, and in the Church of God, unless they exclude themselves. Hence, also, they are disciples of Christ, because they are born in the Church, which is the school of Christ."

THE CONFESSION OF BELGIA (1566).—"We do detest the error of the Anabaptists, who . . . do also condemn the Baptism of infants, yea, of those that be born of *faithful parents*."||

THE CANONS OF THE SYNOD OF DORT (Art. I. xvii.).—"Inasmuch as we are to judge of the will of God from His Word, which testifies that the children of the *faithful* are holy, not indeed by nature, but by the benefit of the gracious covenant in which they are comprehended with their parents; *godly* parents ought not to doubt of the election and salvation of *their* children, whom God calls out of this life in their infancy."

DICKSON (Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh) d. 1662.—"Do not the Anabaptists err, who maintain, That no infants, though born of *believing parents* ought to be baptized? Yes, . . . To some infants of *believers*, as well as to others come to age, the Spirit of Christ hath been given."¶

* Art. XXIII. Ed. Augusti, 166. Niemeyer, 354. Hall's Harm. of Conf. 297.

† Ed. Augusti, 72. Niemeyer, 518. ‡ Art. xxxv. Ed. Augusti, 123. Niemeyer, 325, 338. Hall's Harm. of Conf. 307. § Corpus Doctrinæ, 1612, 441. || Art. xxxiv. Ed. Augusti, 193. Niemeyer, 384. Beck, I. 326. Hall's Harm. of Conf. 308.

¶ Truth's Victory. Glasgow, 1772, p. 253.

In regard to the overwhelming majority of the children not only of the race, but of nominal Christendom, Calvinism holds, therefore, that they are not proper subjects of Baptism, and so far concedes much to the Anabaptists practically, and in regard to each particular case of those to whom it grants Baptism, concedes that it cannot prove, that before God this Baptism is valid, or that it is attended with any value whatever. Calvinism grants, that it does not know, in any one case, that the Baptism of an infant is more than a form, and grants that in no case does Baptism, even as an ordinary means, condition or bear upon the salvation of a child. What more could it grant to Anabaptism without granting everything?

§ 25. CHILDREN OF UNBELIEVERS—REPROBATE INFANTS.

Calvinism not only excludes the children of unbelievers from Baptism, but excludes them as a body from salvation.

CALVIN.*—"When the Lord rejects him (the godless man) *with his offspring*, there is certainly no expostulation which we can make with God. . . . If He therefore rejects any one, is it not of *necessity* that such an *one's seed should also be accursed*? . . . This therefore is to be held *for certain*, that all who are deprived of the grace of God, are included under the *sentence of eternal death*, whence it follows, that *the children of the reprobate*, whom the curse of God follows, are subject to the same sentence."

THE BREMEN THEOLOGIANS AT DORT.†—"Believers' infants *alone*, who die before they reach the age in which they can receive instruction, do we suppose, to be *loved* of God, and *saved*, of His . . . good pleasure."

THE THREE BELGIC PROFESSORS, Polyander, Thyseus, and Walæus, at Dort.‡—"Infants born of *parents not in the covenant*, the Scripture pronounces impure and aliens from the covenant of grace."

SIBRAND LUBBERT, at the same Synod, gives his decision in these words.—"There is an election of infants, there is a reprobation of infants . . . To the infants of the *Church* belongs the promise . . . To the others (infants), who are out of the Church, no promise is made." To this judgment the three Belgic Professors attach their names as approvers.§

FRANCIS GOMAR, at the same Synod, treating of "the Special Reprobation of men to damnation," lays down, as *false*, the thesis that "no one is reprobated, no one is damned, on account of original sin alone:

* On Isaiah xiv. 21, Opera, III.

† Acta Synod. Dordr. Judic. 63.

‡ Acta Syn. Dordr. 10.

§ Do. 20.

consequently there is no reprobation of infants." To this GOMARUS replies: "On account of original sin alone, there is also damnation, which is the wages of every sin, even of sin which is not actual. Therefore also the infants unregenerate, the infants of unbelievers, who are aliens from the covenant of God, are by nature children of wrath, without Christ, without *hope*, without God, as also the infants of the world of the ungodly, in the flood, and the infants of the impious Sodomites, in the burning, perished, and were justly subjected to the wrath of God with their parents."

MARCKIUS,*—"Nor is it to be doubted that among these *reprobated* are to be referred . . . the *infants of unbelievers*. For though of *individual persons* . . . of infants born of unbelievers, we cannot and do not wish particularly to determine, because of God's liberty, and the often secret ways of His Spirit, yet all these are by nature children of wrath, impure, alien, and remote from God, without hope, and left to themselves. God has revealed nothing as decreed or to be done for their salvation, and they are destitute of the ordinary means of grace. So that we ought *utterly to reject*, not *only their salvation* of which Pelagians dream, but also the Remonstrant (Arminian) theory *that their penalty is one of privation, without sensation*. The terminus to which these are predestined is *eternal death, destruction, damnation*. Hence it is fitting to style this the end or terminus, alike of the reprobation and of the creation in time, of the reprobate."

§ 26. THE SECRET IMPEDIMENT.

The Calvinistic system holds that there is a *secret* impediment to the grace of Baptism, in the case of non-elect infants.

MUSCULUS,†—"There are impediments which prohibit the grace of Baptism from having place. They are of two kinds: one *secret*, the other open. The *secret* impediment is, if any one belong not to the number of the *elect*, but is of the reprobate, *this impediment* forever prevents participation of the grace of Christ."

Hence the Baptism of *elect*, and of reprobate infants, is made indiscriminate to keep the *secret* from us.

MUSCULUS,‡—"In the Church of Christ it cannot be observed that only the elect should be baptized. It is as in the Old Testament, in which God Himself so instituted the initial sacrament, as unwilling that in its administration a *discrimination* should be made by *human presumption* between the elect and the reprobate. Nay, He hath so *preserved to Himself* the knowledge of *this dis-*

* Comp. Theol. Christianæ. Amst'æd. 1722, VII. xxxiii. xxxiv.

† Loc. Communes. Basiliæ. 1599, 336.

‡ L. ci.

crimination that He commanded the sacrament of His grace to be administered to all *infants*, the *reprobate* as well as the elect, to Esau, whom He hated in his mother's womb, as well as to Jacob, whom He loved before he was born."

§ 27. NON-ELECT INFANTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO BAPTISM.

Hence non-elect infants have not strictly a right to be baptized, and if they could be known it would be wrong to baptize them.

CALVIN.*—"God, by the secret grace of His Spirit, causes that they (sacraments) shall not be without effect in the *elect*. To the *reprobate* they are merely dead and useless figures."

GRYNÆUS.—"They who have been baptized with water only, not also with the Holy Spirit and fire, ought to be regarded as *not baptized*."

ZANCHIUS.†—"In the Confession of the Church of Strasbourg, 1539, in Article XVIII., the preachers are admonished, that they baptize no one, except this sentence be either *expressed* or *understood*: 'I baptize this person, O God, in accordance with Thy election, and the purpose of Thy Will.'"

WITSIUS.‡—"If the *most strict* right of Baptism be considered, it *belongs only* to the elect in the verity of the thing, and in the judgment of God, which is ever in conformity with the truth. For inasmuch as Baptism is a sign and seal of that covenant in which He makes over to those who are in His covenant, the goods of saving grace, which have also a sure connection with eternal life, it follows that they who have no right to the goods of the covenant, and never are to have any, have no right before the tribunal of God to the seal of the covenant. The administrators of sacred things, who are to act in the individual cases, from the sole judgment of charity, *know not to distinguish the elect from the non-elect*; and thus far sin not, if also perchance they confer baptism on those to whom in strict right it is not due."

GERDES.§—"The legitimate subjects of baptism are the *elect* and believing alone, since the good things of the covenant can be sealed to those only for whom they are designed, and to whom they actually come."

It is evident, then, that on the Calvinistic hypothesis, in Baptism the great name of the adorable Trinity is invoked upon what is always uncertain and sometimes false. Zanchius, to avoid so shocking a possibility, favored the idea that infants should always be baptized *conditionally*, the condition expressed or implied in Baptism being that it was according to the election and purpose of God.||

* On Rom. IV. 11. *Opera*, VII. † *Opera*, vii. 286.

‡ De effic. Baptismi in infantib. *Misc. Sacr.* II. 617. § *Doctrina Gratin.* Duisburg. 1744, 342. || Quot. in Limboreh Th. Chr. III. V., probably the passage we have quoted: *Opera*, vii. 286.

§ 28. CALVINISM WITHOUT A LOGICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST
ANABAPTISM.

Calvinism has therefore no logical ground against the *Anabaptist* rejection of infant Baptism.

CALVIN.*—"If an *Anabaptist* were disputing with you, I think *no* other defence would avail you, than this, that they, with justice are received to Baptism whom God has adopted *before they were born*, and to whom He has promised to be a Father. For *unless* God transmit His grace from fathers to sons, to receive new-born infants into the Church would be a mere *profanation of Baptism*."

BEZA.†—"No one is to be adorned with the symbol of the family of the Lord, except we suppose that he is *probably* to be counted in that family."

TREMELLIUS AND BEZA'S New Testament ‡—"Children of believers are indeed, by virtue of the covenant, holy before Baptism, but Baptism comes in, as it were, a seal of holiness."

CLAUBURG.§—"The principle is constantly to be maintained, that Baptism *does not confer* on infants the becoming *sons and heirs* of God; but because they are *already* esteemed in that place and in that rank, before God, the grace of adoption is sealed in their flesh by Baptism. *Otherwise* the *Anabaptists* would *rightly* forbid their Baptism. Unless the *verity* of the outward sign belongs to them, to call them to a participation of the sign itself would be a mere profanation."

BURMANN.||—"The power of sacraments is *not to effect* and *produce* a thing, but to signify and seal it." "God is wont to bestow His grace *before* the sacraments are received—of which grace, when they are received, they are but the signs and tokens."

To the *Anabaptists* the Calvinist says: We agree with you that the great mass of infants are not entitled to Baptism; we agree with you that Baptism in no case confers anything objective on the child; the only question between us is, whether the hypothetical sign of a hypothetical condition shall be given them? As God, according to the illustration of Witsius, sometimes sets his seal to blank paper, or paper so scribbled upon that nothing intelligible can be written upon it, and hides from us all of the paper except the place of the seal, and as the value of the seal as a seal all turns upon the contents of the

* Contra Westphal. p. 792. Col. 2. † Vol. I ad defens et Respons Castillonis, 502.

‡ On I Cor. VII. 14. § Quoted by Witsius. Mis. Sac. II. 633. || Synops. VII. IV. XXVIII.

paper, a Calvinistic seal amounts to little more than an engraver's specimen; and, inasmuch as the paper with the true covenant written on it, is just as valid, according to Calvinism, without the seal as with it, the seal seems to be of very little account in any case. Baptism is no more than a seal at most; the seal of empty or blotted paper, in many cases; the seal, at best, of a covenant, to whose force it contributes nothing; a covenant which in no sense is made by it; a covenant which stands in equal force without it. It is hardly worth while for Calvinism, on such a basis, to hold out against Anabaptism. It is therefore not without internal reason that the Calvinistic tendency so often ran out, originally into Anabaptism, that it became a proverb, "a young Calvinist, an old Anabaptist;" that the Anabaptist theories so largely prevail on Calvinistic soils; that the immense growth of the Baptist Church in modern times has taken place where Calvinism has been in the ascendant; that so many Calvinists have become Baptists; that so many Baptists are Calvinists, and that in the Calvinistic churches there is so great and growing a neglect of infant Baptism.

§ 29. THE MEANS OF GRACE IN THEIR RELATION TO INFANTS.

Calvinism acknowledges that there are no *ordinary* means for the salvation of infants.

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION XIV. 1: "The grace of faith . . . is *ordinarily* wrought by the ministry of the *Word*: by which also, and by the administration of the sacraments and prayer, it is increased and strengthened." Here it is implied that the Word, read or heard, is the sole means by which grace is *ordinarily* wrought.

Calvinism allows of no potency of the Word except a didactic one (XIV. 2): the sacraments "*and prayer*" *increase* faith but they do not *produce* it.

There is, then, no *ordinary* means for working that faith in infants, without which grace of faith it is acknowledged by Calvinists they cannot be saved. All infants' salvation comes, therefore, into the sphere of the extraordinary, is without means, and requires unmediated divine operations.

THE POSITION OF CHILDREN AN AFTER-THOUGHT. This is largely connected with and solved by the more general fact,

that Calvinism makes no proper position for infants in its system, but brings them in by after-thought.

WESTMINSTER CONFESSIO, XXV. 2: "*The visible Church . . . consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children.*"

This seems to assert that children of professors are *ipso facto* members of the visible Church—and this the Calvinistic theologians constantly maintain. *Profession* of the true religion puts one set of its members into the visible Church—natural birth of these professors puts another set into it—but no unregenerate human being is introduced by God into His visible Church—the sower of the *tares* is always the devil. Those who are in the visible Church in real conformity with God's appointment are also *ipso facto* part of the invisible Church. But in Calvinism the law of natural descent sows tares continually in the visible Church, bringing into it non-elect children, the children of unworthy professors as a class, and often the children of the elect themselves, non-elect children of the elect.

WESTMINSTER CONFESSIO XXVIII. 1: "Baptism is ordained . . . for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible Church." *

The contradiction here seems palpable. The Confession XXV. 2, asserts that the Church consists, in part, of the *children* of professors, and again asserts, XXVIII. 1, that Baptism solemnly *admits* them into the visible Church—that is, the Church in part *consists* of those who have not been admitted into it—and those are admitted into it of whom it already consists—or are there two admissions, one solemn, the other not solemn? The conflict is too palpable to have escaped the notice of Calvinistic divines. BOSTON* quoted and endorsed by Dr. Shaw † harmonizes the two thus: Baptism "does not *make* them members of the visible Church, but *admits* them solemnly thereto . . . for the infants of believing parents . . . are Christians and visible Church members"—that is *after* the Church consists of them, *after* they are Christians and *after* they are members, they are solemnly *admitted* to the

* Complete Body of Divinity, III. 307.
Edinburgh, 1855.

† Exposition of the Confession 7th,

Church. The real solution seems to us to be this, that infants were not thought of at this point. The writer had adults alone in his eye. But this belief, if it be accepted, confirms our view, that infants are with difficulty brought into the Calvinistic system—as indeed they are into any system which on the one side denies Palagianism and on the other the objective force of Baptism. It shows that baptism in the case of infants, and in that of adults rests on exactly opposite constructions: You baptize adults because Baptism admits them to the Church; you baptize infants because they are already in the Church.

"It tends greatly," says CUNNINGHAM, "to introduce obscurity and confusion into our whole conceptions upon the subject of Baptism, that we see it ordinarily administered to infants, and very seldom to adults. This leads us insensibly to form very defective and erroneous conceptions of its design and effect, or rather to live with our minds very much in the state of blanks, so far as concerns any distinct and definite views upon the subject. There is a difficulty felt . . . in laying down any very distinct and definite doctrine as to the precise bearing and efficacy of Baptism in the case of infants, to whom alone ordinarily we see it administered. And hence it becomes practically, as well as theoretically important to remember, that we ought to form our primary and fundamental conceptions of Baptism from the Baptism of *adults* It is manifest, that the general doctrine or theory with respect to the design and effect of Baptism, . . . must undergo some modification in its application to the case of infants. One fundamental position concerning the sacraments is, that they are intended for believers, and, of course, for believers only, unless some *special exceptional case can be made out*, as we are persuaded can be done in the case of infants of believers." "Baptism is described in our Confession (XXVIII. 1), as 'ordained . . . to be *unto him* a sign and seal' . . . It applies primarily and fully only to the case of adult Baptism." "The fundamental, spiritual blessings on which the salvation of man universally depends,—justification and regeneration by faith—are not conveyed through the instrumentality of the sacraments, but . . . on the contrary, they must *already* exist before even Baptism can be lawfully or safely received." *

Dr. Cunningham, was not unconscious of the nature of the ground on which he was treading, and acknowledges, to meet the fact, that "these statements may, at first view, appear to be large concessions to those who oppose the lawfulness of the Baptism of infants." †

* (See Cunningham; *Histor. Theology*, 1864. II. 25, 127, 144). † Do. do. 145.

WESTMINSTER CONFESSION VIII. 8: "To *all* those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, He doth certainly and effectually apply and communicate the same; . . . revealing unto them, in and by the Word, the mysteries of salvation; effectually persuading them . . . to believe and obey; and governing their hearts by this Word." . .

Here in spite of the sweeping "all," there is no consideration of children whatever.

WESTMINSTER CONFESSION X. 1: "*All* those whom God hath predestinated unto life . . . He is pleased, . . . to call by His Word and Spirit . . . enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God."

Here again, in spite of the sweeping "all," infants are not embraced.

Calvinism holds, that elect infants are *justified* infants; and yet defines justification so as to make it impossible to infants. Westminster Confession XI. 1: "Those whom God effectually calleth He also freely justifieth." (Do. vi.) "God did from *all* eternity decree to justify *all* the elect. Nevertheless, they are not justified until the Holy Spirit doth in due time actually apply Christ unto them."

ELECT infants *may* be in any case justified while they are infants: they *must* be justified while they are infants if they die in infancy. So Calvinism allows. But the whole confessional conception of justification is one which excludes infants.

"They (the justified) receiving and resting on him . . . by faith . . . Faith *thus* receiving . . . is the alone instrument of justification."

The Calvinistic answer is that adults are spoken of, but the answer is the accusation. The accusation is that the conception is one which embraces none but adults, and that conception *alone* is constantly presented.

Calvinism maintains not only the possibility, but the absolute necessity of the *regeneration* of infants, but knows of no means for that regeneration and no assurance of faith that any particular child is regenerate. "Elect infants, dying in infancy are *regenerated*," (Westminster Confession x. x.) but the conception of regeneration as presented in the Confession makes it inapplicable to infants.

§ 30. CALVINISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH IN ITS BEARING ON INFANT SALVATION.

Calvinism holds that out of the invisible Church there is no

salvation whatever, and that out of the visible Church there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.

MARTYR.*—"It is necessary that they (children) belong unto Christ and the Church, seeing, out of it, there is no salvation."

URSINUS.†—"It is required, of necessity, that in this life they (the elect) be brought unto the Church, though it be sometimes even at the very point of death." "No man can be saved out of the Church. Whomsoever God hath chosen and elected to the end, which is eternal life, them hath He chosen to the means; which is the inward and outward calling."

VOSSIUS.‡—"Nor do we exclude the children of unbelievers alone, but the children of those who are open heretics: to whom Baptism should be refused even though it be asked by the parents."

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION X. 4.—"Others not elected . . cannot be saved: much less can men not professing the Christian religion be saved in any other way whatever . . and to assert . . . that they may, is very pernicious, and to be detested." Larger Catechism, Q. 60: "They who, having never heard the Gospel, know not Jesus Christ and believe not in Him, cannot be saved. Christ is the Saviour only of His body, the Church." Q. 61: "They only (are saved) who are true members of the Church invisible."

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION XXV. 1.—"The . . church . . invisible consists of the whole number of the elect." (Do. ii.)—"The visible Church . . is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation."

These principles in their connections,

1. Clearly exclude the entire heathen, Mohammedan and Jewish world from salvation. It is a Calvinistic article of faith that men not professing the *Christian faith* cannot be saved.

2. Connecting with this the doctrine that as is the state of the parents so is the *presumed* state of the children *individually*, and the *certain* state of the children as a *class*, it follows that the moral *presumption* is that each child of the non-Christian world is lost, and the moral *certainly* is that they are lost as a class. It is certain that not one of them is of the visible church, "out of which there is no ordinary possibility of sal-

* Common Places. † Sum of Christian Religion, Lond. 1633, 359, 352. Corpus Doctrinae, 1612. 350, 361, 362. ‡ De Baptism. Di p. xv. p. 190.

vation," and there is no evidence, no reason even, for hope that a single one of them is of the Church invisible.

3. This looks gloomy enough, but there is still another dark point. "The visible Church . . . consists of all those that *profess the true religion* (Westminster Confession XXVI. i.) "*The True Religion*," what is that? Strictly construed, Calvinism—which claims—and must for consistency's sake claim to be "the true religion." Confessions are meant to define "the true religion," in the sense in which those who make and adhere to them define "the true religion." We understand the Westminster Confession to furnish the Presbyterian answer to the question, What is the true religion? Does this then mean to exclude a large part of the children of nominal Christendom, as it does their parents, from the visible Church, from all presumption of election, and all probability of salvation? We are afraid that it does. It has never been so logically pressed as to exclude from hope *all* that are not professed Calvinists, but it has been pressed to the exclusion of Papists, Arminians, and the various bodies of nominally Christian errorists. "The true religion" seems to be synonymous with what is called, XXIV. iii., "the true reformed religion," by which is meant in the Westminster Confession, as the usage and controversies of the time will show, the Calvinistic religion, as over against Romanism, Lutheranism, and the then dominant doctrinal tendency of the Church of England. It is there said: "It is the duty of *Christians* to marry only in the Lord. And therefore such as profess the true Reformed religion should not marry with infidels, papists, or *other* idolaters."

"Christians" and "such as profess the Reformed religion," are one and the same thing: the inference rests on the assumption of their identity. "Papists" are not "Christians," but are idolaters," lumped with the "other idolaters"—the major part of nominal Christendom being carried over to the general realm of Juggernaut and Mumbo Jumbo.

The same paragraph further forbids marrying "with such as . . . maintain damnable heresies," and of such Christendom unhappily holds not a few. As are the parents, so are

the children to be presumed to be; wrong-minded Christendom is out of the Church visible and invisible, so are their children as a class, and as a class presumed to be lost. All Pagandom, all Islam, all the Jews, Roman Christendom, Greek Christendom (by parity of reason), and a large part of the Protestant world, under the Calvinistic construction, moving out of the ordinary possibility of salvation, the children doomed as a class, without the possibility, not to say certainty of the salvation of a single one! Surely this is a sufficient liberal provision for damnation, but it is not open to the charge of being rather a parsimonious one for salvation?

§ 31. CALVINISM AND ROMANISM ON INFANT SALVATION.

In the controversies between Calvinists and Romanists, the attitude of the former on the question of infant damnation is decisive, if there were nothing else, on the question in which Dr. Hodge considers that we have made an assertion without due warrant. The Romanists assert that there is a *Limbus infantum*, a place in the other world in which the souls of unbaptized infants endure the penalty of loss (*damni*), but not of positive suffering (*sensus*). To this the attitude of the classic Calvinistic divines is invariable. It is 1: that elect infants are saved, though unbaptized. 2: that non-elect infants, whether baptized or not, enter not upon a Limbus of loss—a negative damnation, but on a hell of suffering, a positive and eternal damnation. 3: They charge it upon Rome as a Pelagian error, that she softens unduly the state of lost infants.

CALVIN AND PIGHIUS.—One of Calvin's most distinguished Romish opponents was ALBERT PIGHIUS (d. 1543), who wrote against him a work in two books, "Concerning free will and grace." Cologne, 1542. He maintained "that original sin in young children is nothing else but the actual sin of Adam that is imputed to them, and that, properly speaking, there is no blemish in them of inherent sin."^{*}

CALVIN†, in reply to Pighius, says: "If Pighius holds that original sin is not sufficient to damn men, and that the secret council of God is not to be admitted, what will he do with infant children, who, before

^{*} Du Pin's Ecclesiastical History of the Sixteenth Century. Lond., 1710. Fol. I. 427. Herzog, Real. En. XI. 662, XV. 216. † De Aeterna D. i Prædestinatione. Tom. VIII. 611.

they have reached an age at which they can give any such specimens . . . [as he demands], are snatched from this life . . . For inasmuch as the conditions of birth and death were alike to infants who died in Sodom and those who died in Jerusalem: and there were no difference in their works: why will Christ, at the last day, separate some to stand at His right hand, others at His left?"

Calvin assumes as granted, and as undisputed that the infants of Sodom were damned. He appeals to it as a known something to settle a contested point, and after the words we have cited goes on to say: "Who will not adore this wonderful judgment of God whereby it comes to pass that some are born at Jerusalem, whence soon they pass to a better life, while Sodom, the gates of the lower regions, receives others at their birth?"

Pighus assumed that children have no inherent sin, in order to prove that they ought not to be positively damned. Calvin assumed that children are damned, to strengthen the proof that they have inherent sin. The damnation of infants is the *Pou sto* from which Calvin proposes to move Pighius' world of error. The tone of assurance in the old Calvinistic divines in asserting infant damnation is very striking.

They not only do not doubt the doctrine, but they assume that no man in his senses *can* doubt it. Not only is an argument not weakened by involving infant perdition, but infant perdition stiffens up an argument otherwise weak. Never was error more effectually driven to bay, in their judgment, than when it was shown that if that error were granted, infant salvation, or even the middle state of Limbus, would follow. The doctrine of infant damnation virtually formed a part of the Calvinistic analogy of faith.

CHAMIER AGAINST THE ROMANISTS.—The name of CHAMIER (d. 1621) is one of the greatest, not only among Calvinistic divines, but in all theological literature. His *Panstratiæ Catholicæ* (1626) is the ablest work from a Calvinistic hand in the great Roman Catholic Controversy, and takes its general rank with books like Chemnitz's *Etamen* and Gerhard's *Confessio Catholica*. It was prepared at the request of the Synod of Larochele.* There is no difference of opinion among competent judges as to its distinguished merits, and it is justly

* Herzog's Real Encycl. II. 632. Bayle's Dict. Art. Chamier.

regarded among all Calvinists as one of the highest authorities. The word "Catholic," in the title of Chamier's book, and throughout, is used in its Protestant sense, as equivalent to "Christian," or "Orthodox," and by the "Catholics," Chamier means especially the "Calvinists." It is the "Catholics" against the "Papists," who appear in this book. In his discussion of the "penalty of original sin," * Chamier first states the views of the Papists, as three-fold: 1. "That infants (dying in original sin) are excluded from the kingdom of heaven; yet enjoy outside of it a certain natural blessedness." 2. "That those who die in original sin only, are not happy, yet endure no pain, or 'penalty of sense' (*pœnam sensus*), but are punished only with the penalty of loss (*pœna damni*), that is, are deprived of the vision of God." 3. "Others liberate them from that torment (Mark ix.) 'in which the worm dieth not,' but affirm that the loss of blessedness will be accompanied by internal pain, so that their penalty will be one both of loss and of sense." Bellarmine regards the third as the most probable, but the majority of the Roman Catholic divines accept the second.

In opposition to these mitigating constructions Chamier declares "the Catholics" (Calvinists) maintain that infants also, guilty of original sin, are by God's just sentence damned (*reos solius originalis peccati, justa Dei sententia damnari*): and that in that damnation they are not merely exiled from the kingdom of heaven, but in very deed suffer that eternal fire which is appointed for the devil and his angels ("*re veri pati ignem æternum, assignatum diabolo et Angelis ejus.*") * * "There is not merely a privation of eternal blessedness, but also real pains in hell, loss conjoined with sense." For the soundness of these positions Chamier argues at great length.

MARESIUS AGAINST THE ROMANISTS.—Another of the greatest names, in high renown for ability and Calvinistic orthodoxy, is that of MARESIUS (d. 1673). † He has been called

* Chamierus Contractus sive Panstratiæ Catholicæ. D. Chamieri theologi summi Epitome. Opera Fr. Spanheim. Genæ. 1643. Fol. 797, 798.

† Pfaff, etc. Herzog: Real-Encycl. Art. Maresius. Bayle's Dictionary: De Walch Einleit., in Rel. Str. auss. d. Ev. Luth. Kirchen. Th. 479.

the Calvinistic Calovius. His life was a life of contest against the errors outside of Calvinism, and errors which tried to shelter themselves within it. His greatest work is in his reply to Tirinus, the Jesuit, who had added to his Commentary (1632) an "Index of Controversies on Matters of Faith." Maresius first gives Tirinus in full, in his own words, and then adds his own strictures. Tirinus says, speaking of the "punishment of original sin:" "In the other life, original sin, for example, in the case of infants who by it are unfitted for that life, is punished eternally. First, by a mournful want of the society of the Saints, and of the vision and fruition of God. Second, by a want of natural blessedness * * they are in prison, light and pleasant indeed, yet of the nature of hell (*infernali*), in which, under the power of the devil, they dwell to eternity."

The completest answer to Tirinus, had it been possible on Calvinistic grounds, would have been a denial that infants are lost at all—there is no limbus for them—they pass, without exception, to heaven. But the answer of Maresius is exactly the opposite: there is no limbus for lost infants, nothing but hell. Maresius* says: "There are two rocks to be avoided here: For I. We do not think that the children of the faithful * * who die before baptism, are to be excluded from the kingdom of heaven." II.*The punishment of those (children) who are not received into the kingdom of heaven, we hold to be eternal death, not merely that of loss (in the Socinian or Papal sense), but also of sense; hence, we rightly reject that third place which our adversaries call the Limbus of children, for 1. Eternal death is the wages of every kind of sin, and therefore of original sin, and so ought to be the portion of those" (children) "who are shut out from heaven and eternal life. 2. There are two paths only—one goes to life and heaven, the other to perdition and hell. 3. Into the outer darkness where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth—not into a '*light and pleasant*' prison, as Tirinus feigns—are they cast who are not admitted to the joys of heaven. 4. They who are not wheat,

* Theologicæ Elencticæ Nova Synopsis. Groningæ, 1648. 2 V. 4to, I. 539.

are assigned to unquenchable fire. To feign a middle order, who are neither wheat nor chaff—neither elect nor reprobate—neither redeemed nor unredeemed by Christ—what is this but to rave? 5. If even the infants who are redeemed by Christ, and who are to be saved in heaven, are not free from temporal death and those pains and miseries which are penalties of nature, why should we exempt *from the pains of hell even as to sense, those* (infants) “whom Christ did not redeem, and of whom he sustained neither the persons nor penalties on the cross. 7. This view was the invention of Pelagius and the ancient Pelagians. 8. It is opposed to the view of Augustine and of his followers.”

Maresius then cites passages from Augustine and his disciples which teach that unbaptized infants, even those who are unbaptized because they die unborn, are to “be punished with the everlasting torment of eternal fire” (*ignus æterni sempiterno supplicio puniendos*). Maresius, after quoting these passages in his own behalf against Tirinus, says that “Augustine and his followers erred in seeming to bind the justifying, regenerating and sanctifying grace of Christ to the outward sacrament of Baptism,” and then adds: “but what they hold, that *infants*, the guilt of whose original sin God has not remitted for Christ’s sake, and whom he has not washed from the stain of it through the grace of regeneration, are, in common with other reprobates, to undergo the punishment of eternal death is most true” (*quod statuunt pœnam mortis æternæ cum aliis reprobis subituros infantes . . . est verissimum*).”

And even when Calvinism began to reveal a mitigating tendency, it still held for a long time firmly to the idea, over against the Pelagianism, as it considered it, of the Church of Rome, that non-elect infants are damned.

On the question: “Whether original sin of its own nature merits *eternal damnation*, or simply excludes from the kingdom of heaven, and deprives of the beatific vision unbaptized infants?” Lampe * asserts the former, over against the Roman Catholics who maintain the latter.

* Rudimenta Theolog. Elenchticæ, Bremæ, 1729, p. 55.

RESULT. We write it with sorrow, but truth compels us to say that on this point the Calvinistic doctrine is far more shocking than that of the Roman Catholic Church, for it casts upon the thousands even of baptized children the shadow of doubt, substituting in the best cases a mere charitable presumption, for a firm assurance, and outside of these, leaves to eternal privation and eternal misery, the great mass of dying infants who are *not* "children of the faithful."

§ 32. CALVINISM AND PELAGIANISM.

Calvinism constantly maintains the doctrine of infant damnation, as essential to a consistent position against Pelagianism. This point has already been made, in other connections, in a number of our quotations. It would be easy to add to them.

STAPPER.—Stapfer* states the ninth objection of the *Pelagians* in these terms: "To subject infants to eternal punishments because of Adam's sin would be to deal more severely with them than with the devil himself, or with Adam, who himself committed sin." In his reply to this, Stapfer says: "As to the children of unbelievers we believe that they will be separated from the communion of God, and hence in the very fact that as children of wrath and cursing, they are excluded from the beatific communion of God, *they will be damned.*"

CALVIN AGAINST SERVETUS.

The controversy with Servetus comes into the same general line of argument, and may therefore properly be introduced here.

The whole body of Genevan pastors, fifteen in number, with Calvin heading the list,† charge upon Servetus, as one of his errors—the errors which cost him his life—that he asserts that "he dare condemn none of the (infant) offspring of Ninevites or Barbarians to hell (*futurum gehennam*) because, in his opinion, a merciful Lord, who hath freely taken away the sins of the godless, would never so severely condemn those by whom no godless act has been committed, and who are most innocent images of God," and further he infers that "all who are taken from life as infants and children are exempt from eternal death, though they be elsewhere called accursed."‡

* Institut. Theolog. polemic. Tiguri, 1716, IV. 517.

† Refutatio Errorum Michaelis Serveti, Opera, Tom. VIII. 559. ‡ Do. do. 597.

§ 33. CALVINISM AND ARMINIANISM, ON THE ELECTION AND REPROBATION OF INFANTS, AND THE INSANE.
CASTALIO, THE FORERUNNER OF ARMINIANISM.

CALVIN AGAINST CASTALIO. CALVIN* wrote with great bitterness against CASTALIO, who had been his friend, but who speedily showed the working of the tendencies which matured at a later period unto Arminianism:

"You deny that it is lawful for God, except for misdeed, to condemn any human being. Nevertheless numberless infants are removed from life. Put forth now your virulence against God, who precipitates into eternal death harmless new-born children (*innocios factus*) torn from their mother's bosoms. Your masters, Servetus, Pighius, and such-like dogs (*similes canes*), say at least that before the world was created some were condemned whom God foreknew worthy of destruction. But you will not concede that He devotes to eternal death any except those who for perpetrated evil deeds would be exposed to penalty under earthly judges . . . You do not hesitate to overturn the whole order of divine justice."

It is in meeting objectors of the school of Castalio, CALVIN† says: "Whence hath it come that the fall of Adam hath involved in eternal death so many nations with their infant children without remedy, unless, because it so pleased God? Here the tongues that have been so voluble it becomes to be mute. That the decree is fearful, I confess: yet no man can deny that God foreknew before He created him what end man should have; and foreknew it because He had so ordained it by His decree." "There are those born among men, devoted from the womb to certain death, who by their destruction glorify God's name."‡

ARMINIUS.—When the element of opposition to Calvinism, which had smouldered in it from its beginning, broke into a light flame in Arminius (1560-1609), the damnation of infants was one of the first points of assault on the one side, of firm, repeated statements and defense on the other. The fiercer struggle which followed the death of Arminius, is full of illustrations of the unrelenting tenacity with which Calvinism held as essential to sound doctrine the reality of infant reprobation and of infant damnation. Arminius, the pupil of Beza,

* *De occulta Dei Providentia* (1558), Opera. Amstelodam. 1667. Tom. VIII. 644, 645.

† Institut. Lib. III. XXIII. 7. Opera; IX. 254. Compared with Fetherstone's Translation, Edinburgh, 1587. ‡ Do. do. § 6.

who was Calvin's greatest scholar, and of Grynæus, was high in repute in the Church of Holland, and in 1604 as successor of Junius, became Professor of Theology in the University of Leyden, and received from the hand of Gomarus the Doctorate. Chosen to defeat the system of Calvin and Beza, his more careful examination of the system led him to reject it. His learning and his mildness are beyond all dispute. His desire was not to magnify the points of difference between himself and the Calvinists, but to reduce them in bulk, and to soften them in tone as much as possible. In 1608 he was summoned before the Orders of Holland, and commanded explicitly to state his views on the doctrines in dispute. In stating the views of the Calvinistic divines, which he controverted "as they are embraced everywhere (*passim*) in their own writings," he notes that they hold that "the children of the faithful and holy, God leads to salvation by a shorter way (than this of adults), if they depart this life before they come to riper years; *that is to say, if so be (nimirum siquidem) they belong to the number of the elect (whom God alone knoweth).*"

"The means of the execution of reprobation to eternal death pertains in part to *all the rejected and reprobate* (whether they reach adult life or *die before they reach it*), partly to some only. The means common to the whole is *desertion*; the means peculiar to some is *hardening.*"*

THE CONTRA-REMONSTRANT (CALVINISTIC) RESPONSE. 1611.

The statement of Arminius as to the Calvinistic doctrine of infant reprobation was never denied—on the contrary every reference to it shows that there was no disposition to dispute its correctness. The doctrine might be palliated in the mode of statement, but as to the fact involved the Calvinists and Arminians do not differ. The Calvinists in their Response, 1611, say:

"As elect of God are also to be esteemed (*habendos*) . . . the children of the covenant, so long as they do not in fact (*reipsa*) demonstrate the

* The defense is given in full in Jagers: Hist. Eccles. Sec. dec. Sept. Tübingæ, 1691. Ann. 1608, pp. 301-323.

contrary, wherefore, faithful parents should not doubt concerning the salvation of their children, when they die in infancy."

This is the theory we constantly meet with: First, that it is to be *presumed* that all the children of the elect are elect; second, that the presumption is often shown to be groundless by the after life of these children; third, that this presumption, often fallacious and never certain, is the only refuge of parents who love their children—they are presumed to be elect, and as they die before they can "in fact demonstrate the contrary," the presumption, such as it is, is left in full force.

§ 34. THE SYNOD OF DORT.

The National Synod of Dort, 1618, 1619, was meant, if possible, to unite the entire Calvinistic Churches against the common foe. At the outstart it was not so much Arminians who charged Calvinists with teaching infant reprobation and damnation, as it was Calvinists, who charged on Arminians, as a deadly error, that their principles legitimately led to a denial of this doctrine, though the Arminians had not yet consistency or courage enough distinctly to make the denial in an unreserved form. For so strong was the current of Calvinism in regard to infant reprobation and infant damnation, that even the *Remonstrant Arminians* could not directly set themselves wholly against it. The Arminians at first acknowledged a sort of negative hell for some infants (the *pæna damni*), and the Calvinists, over against this, argue for a positive one (the *pæna sensus*). Over against this Arminian tendency, even with this softening and spirit of concession, the utterances of the divines at Dort were of the most decided kind. Infant reprobation, and the actual damnation of infants, were asserted in manifold shapes, and in all the public discussions of that body no Calvinist of any land uttered a word of doubt or of mitigation. There were points on which differences were expressed, there were feelings aroused which threatened the very continuance of the Synod, but there was a happy harmony in regard to infant reprobation.

THE SYNOD OF DORT ON THE BAPTISM OF PAGAN INFANTS.
—At the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions (Dec. 1, 3,

1619,) the question of the Baptism of the infants of heathen who came under Christian control was discussed. At the Twenty-first Session (Dec. 5) it was determined: "that they should by no means (*nullo modo*) be baptized before they attained years of discretion." *

THE OFFICIAL JUDGMENT SET FORTH BY THE ARMINIANS AT DORT.—At the Twenty-third Session, Dec. 23, 1619, the *Sententia*, or Official Judgment on Predestination signed by all the Remonstrant divines present, was read by Episcopus. Two articles in it ran thus;

IX.: "All the children of the faithful are sanctified in Christ, so that *not one* of them, dying before the use of reason, perishes; *in no wise*, on the contrary, are even *some* of the children of the faithful, dying in infancy, before any sin of act (*actuale*) committed in their own person, to be counted in the number of the reprobate, so that neither the holy laver of Baptism, nor the prayers of the Church can in any way profit them to salvation."

How sharp and clear is the antithesis. The Calvinists hold that *some* of the infants of the faithful, to wit, the elect children, are sanctified; the Arminians declare that *all* are; the Calvinists hold that *some* infants of the faithful perish; the Arminians declare that *none* do; the Calvinists taught that there were infants, to wit, reprobate infants, to whom neither Baptism nor the prayers of the Church brought saving blessing. The Arminians declare that there is no such class of infants.

But the Arminians saw that the constant hypothecating of the *death* of the *infants* left the vital centre of the question untouched. On the Calvinistic side such a hypothecating seemed to imply that the death of the infant in some influenced its election; whereas, in fact, on the Calvinistic theory the child's death has nothing to do with its election. An absolute election does not take into regard the death of the infant at all. If the *adult* life of the children of the elect shows, that many infants of the elect, who live, are among the reprobate, it equally shows, that many infants of the elect who die are among the

* Author Anon—qui interfuit Synodo. Given in Jäger, H. E. 1619, 314. Brandt, III. 37. In the *Acta Synodi* I. 49., the decision is given under Session XIX.

reprobate, for the two classes are exactly alike before an absolute decree. *All Calvinists*, even those of the gentle type of Dr. Hodge, are compelled to acknowledge that there are *non-elect or reprobate infants*; that is, that the non-elect or reprobate are such always; such though unborn; such at their birth; and through their whole infancy. Only the milder class hold, that such infants always grow up to the age of responsibility—no non-elect infants ever die, according to this new school of Calvinism. It has found out part of God's secret of fore-ordination. It is, that infant death is the seal of infant election; the death of the infant is the true sacrament of its adoption—Baptism is not. The Arminians met the fallacious hypothecating in their next article, which reads thus:

"No children of believers baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, while they are *living* in the state of infancy, are to be counted among those who have been reprobated by an absolute decree."*

It will be noticed, that the Arminians confine their statement to the "*children of the faithful*," but these, *when baptized, in no case*, equally if they *live*, as if they die, are to be counted among the reprobate. With the Word of God, with pure antiquity, and with an overwhelming majority of the Church of Christ in all ages, the Augustinian portion, no less heartily than the others, the Arminians, regarded Baptism in a light in which Calvinism completely anti-Augustinian here, cannot regard it, as the evidence in the infant of a present state of grace.

A recent writer † has praised Calvin for denying, that infants dying unbaptized are *ipso facto* lost. That was well in Calvin, so far, but that writer has failed to note that just in proportion as Calvin weakens the assumption that non-baptism proves that a child is lost, he weakens the faith that a baptized child is saved—that if non-baptism is no evidence of a child's damnation, baptism is no evidence of its salvation. Calvin's theory involves the certain damnation of the majority of the

* Acta Synodi, 113. Brandt, III. 84. † Lecky: Rationalism in Europe. Rev. Edit. New York, 1872, I. 367.

infants of the race, and does not claim that there is distinct evidence even in the most hopeful case that any particular child is saved. It does not widen the probability of infant salvation, as Lecky supposes, but narrows it. It does not exalt infant salvation, but simply lowers Baptism.

THE ARMINIAN CHALLENGE.—The Arminians urged an explicit reply: "It has been given out among the common people that we have . . . falsely represented the doctrines of the Contra-remonstrants. . . . If this be true, let them as plainly and flatly renounce those doctrines as we do."* "We especially (*unice*) desire to know from this venerable Synod, whether it acknowledges as its own doctrine and the doctrine of the Church, particularly (*nominatim*) what is asserted . . . concerning the creation of the larger part of mankind for destruction, the *reprobation of infants even though born of believing parents*." †

So simple and direct a challenge could properly allow of but two answers. One would have been "the views of infant reprobation, you reject, we reject also." The other would have been, "the views you reject, we maintain." The answers at Dort all rest on the second position, and are expressed in far stronger terms than the Arminians had employed. They state the views from which the Arminians dissent.

DORT IS POLITIC.—There is, however, a marked difference between two classes of utterance in the Synod of Dort. Those that were meant for the great public are cautious and illusive in the framing. The truth was too palpable to be denied, nor did the men of Dort desire to deny it, but they wished to avoid the odium of unmitigated statement. On the contrary, the statements meant for the Synod itself, and for its theologians, are clear, sharp, and cruel.

Of the former class, is its First Canon: ‡

"XVII. Inasmuch as we must judge of the will of God from His Word, which testifies that the children of the faithful are holy, not indeed by nature, but by benefit of the gracious covenant, wherein they,

* Acta, 119. Brandt, III. 190. † Acta, 121. Brandt, III. 93.

‡ Acta, 252. The Canons are given in Latin in Augusti. Corpus, Lib. Symb. Ecc. es. Reform. Elberfeld, 1827, 198-240. Niemeyer: Collect. Confess. Lipsiæ, 1840, 690-728. They are given in English in Hall's Harmony of Confessions. Lond. 1844, 539-573; in German in Beck's Sammlung Symb. Buecher. Neustadt. 1845, I. 344.

together with their parents, are comprised, *godly* parents ought not to doubt of the election and salvation of their children whom God calls out of this life in their infancy."

The impression produced by these words on a plain reader, divested of the key to their sense, is entirely illusive. He sees indeed that they imply that the infants of pagans, Jews and all non-Christians are lost; that they offer no hope to the infants of merely nominal Christians, and that within the Calvinistic Church itself they confine the hope to the children of the "faithful," of believers, of those "comprised within the gracious covenant," "the godly." They mean therefore that within the visible Church itself there is no hope in regard to the great mass of children. But the plain reader will perhaps need to be told that though we "*must* judge of the will of God from *His Word*," Calvinistic theology rests on a "will of God" which is not revealed in *His Word*, what the Westminster Confession (III. iv.) calls "the *secret* counsel and good pleasure of His will," and that this is the very will involved in the election of infants. The plain reader may need to be told that the "holiness of the children of the faithful, of which Dort speaks, is one which involves of necessity neither change of nature nor election, but exists equally in the cases in which the children of the faithful grow up into manifold reprobacy. If it meant more it would bring the Calvinistic system to the ground, for if *all* the children of believers are regenerate, all of them are elect; and as some of the children of believers die unregenerate, it would follow that some of the elect fell finally from grace, and with their fall, Calvinism itself would fall. It is the old theory over again—a presumption resting on a presumption, and begetting a presumption that some dying infants, nobody knows which, may be saved.

But the disingenuousness of Dort has gone yet further. After giving what it styles "the plain and simple explication of the Orthodox doctrine," it denounces certain allegations of the Remonstrants. One of the charges thus denounced is that Calvinists hold that "many innocent infants of believers are torn from the breasts of their mothers, and tyrannically plunged into hell."* The official paper of the Remonstrants.

* Acta, 275. Augusti: 239. Niemeyer, 722. Hall: 570. Beck: 393.

published in the acts of the Synod of Dort show that they did not make the charge that Calvinists held that "*many*" infants of believers are lost, but that they disavowed for themselves the doctrine that any are lost, and asked the Synod to express itself clearly on this point. The rhetorical flourish about "innocent infants torn from the breasts of their mothers," was not used by the Remonstrants at all before this Synod. When they used it they simply quoted Calvin. (See "Calvin against Castalio," already quoted).

The real meaning of the evasive words of Dort was at once pointed out by Episcopius as being this: "The reprobate infants of the faithful are not 'innocent,' but guilty, and God in casting them into hell, does not act 'tyrannically,' but exercises only the just rights of a ruler."*

DORT IS CANDID.—The official judgments of the theologians of the various States represented at Dort, fix with the greatest precision the meaning of its Canons, and of the various terms of Calvinistic orthodoxy.

The theologians of Great Britain, in addition to what we have quoted, say: "The thesis that there is no election of infants, in the sense that there is no election between one and the others, as if all were indiscriminately saved, is a hypothesis *without any foundation* whatever to rest on (*nec ullis fundamentis nititur*)." They quote with approval, and as authority, Prosper's words: "There is a distinction made in regard to infants by God's judgment; some are taken as heirs, and others passed by as debtors."† The Swiss theologians,‡ the Bremen theologians,§ as we have seen, wrote in the same vein, and need not be quoted a second time.

The Third Part of the Acts of the Synod of Dort embraces the judgments of the theologians of the provinces. We have given the judgment of the three Belgic Professors,|| and of Lubbert, and Lubbert signs the paper of the three, and the three sign the paper of Lubbert, as if they could not get enough of signing such delicious documents. We gave Lubbert's Thesis that "some are lost for original sin only." We add the sole proof, which he gives of the Thesis: "This Thesis is proved by the destruction (*interitus*) of *many infants* who die in infancy, out of the Church and out of Christ."—¶

We have also quoted Gomarus.** None of these judgments give an uncertain sound on infant damnation. But these are not all. THE DEPUTIES OF THE SYNOD OF SOUTH HOLLAND,†† mark the points very clearly: "*All infants are liable (obnoxius) to eternal damnation, on account of original sin, and that reprobation has a place in believers' children also, who live to adult years, is clearly proved by Holy Scripture*

* Examen Thesium.

|| Acta, III. 10, 11.

† Acta Judicia, 10.

‡ Do. 40, 41.

§ Do. 20.

** Do. 24, 26.

‡ Do. 63.

†† Do. 39.

and experience. But whether this same (reprobation) has a place also in the infants of believers, who die in infancy, without actual sins, is a question which they (the Deputies) think is not too nicely (*curiose*) to be examined into; but inasmuch as there exist in Holy Scriptures, testimonies which take away from believing parents all occasion (*causam*) of doubting concerning the election and salvation of their infants, they think that these (testimonies) are to be *acquiesced* in." Here comes up again that appalling feature of the old Calvinism—we are to *acquiesce* in the *testimony* of the Word, though the secret counsel may make that testimony an illusion.

THE THEOLOGIAN FROM DRENTHE * are no less explicit: "We are now to speak of *infants*, under which (*sub quibus*) we embrace also adults who have been insane from their birth (*adultos mente ab exordio vitæ alienatos*), that is to say, of those infants who die in infancy. We give our judgment (*statuimus*) that the *infants of unbelievers, dying in infancy, are reprobate*. . . . The *infants of believers*, though they die in infancy, could justly be reprobated by God and left in their misery, if God willed to use His right. *Notwithstanding* (*interim*) faithful parents can conceive a sure *hope* (*certainam spem possunt concipere*) concerning the salvation of such little infants (*infantium eorum*); for we do not read in Scripture that such were ever reprobated; on the contrary, the Scripture testifies of God's good affection to such "

The infants of the reprobates, dying in infancy, are reprobate, and those who are insane from their birth, are involved in the same principles. These men hold that a part of our race born in insanity, living in insanity, and dying in insanity, are damned, and to this view logical Calvinism can offer no reply.

§ 35. SEVERITY OF THE CALVINISTIC SPIRIT.

The terrible earnestness of the Calvinistic feeling against Arminianism, complicated and inflamed by political animosities, did not exhaust itself in theses, judgments, canons, condemnations and denunciations. The State was for the time a theocratic instrument of the divines. The Arminian congregations were forcibly scattered. They were forbidden to worship God in public. Their professors and pastors were deposed and banished. The banishment was so sudden that those at Dort were not allowed to return to their homes to bid farewell to their loved ones, or to arrange their private affairs. Grotius and

* Do. 91.

Hogerbeets were sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in the castle of Lovestein. Over the dead body of Ledenberg, who had committed suicide to avoid, as it was thought, the terrors of the rack (Sept. 28, 1618) sentence was pronounced May 15, 1619; the body was drawn upon a sledge to the gibbet and hung upon it. The aged statesman and patriot, Olden Barneveldt, one of the founders of the civil liberty of Holland, was beheaded. The awful severity of the character of God, as the Calvinistic system construed it, reflected itself in their conduct toward those whom they regarded as His enemies; the system which held that a babe unborn might justly be subject to eternal pains "without remedy," would not spare the blow which prostrated the men who made battle against the system which involved these views, which Calvinists of that day cherished as the very truth of God.

§ 36. THE CONFESSION AND APOLOGY OF THE ARMINIANS AND
THE CALVINISTIC CENSURE.

The "Confession" of the Remonstrants, written 1621, by Episcopius, appeared in 1622. It was answered by four of the Leyden Professors, in a "Censure." The "Censure" drew forth a defence (Apologia) of the Confession from the pen of Episcopius. The Arminian Confession says: "God has prepared in His beloved Son a free remedy for all." To this the Censure replies: "If they mean this, even of all them who *die without actual sin of their own*, we see not how they can deny that they are Pelagians."

In their reply to this the Remonstrants say: "This passage shows that our adversaries believe that *absolute reprobation* pertains not only to the infants of the Gentiles, but is to be extended to the infants of those who are in the covenant, and believers; and, however they may wish to seem in any case to think contrary to this, that is to be understood only of the judgment of charity, not of faith."*

THE APOLOGY OF THE ARMINIANS in another passage states

* Apologia pro Confessione—contra Censuram, 1630, 4to, 87, 6. (It is significant that neither the name of the printer nor of the place of publication is given.)

the position of the Calvinists as conveyed in this question: "Why shall it be thought absurd or wicked to say, that God not only wills of His good pleasure to destroy, but also to devote to the inner torments of hell the larger part of the human race, many myriads of infants torn from their mothers' breasts? for these are the horrid inferences which the school of Calvin rears on those foundations, which consequently the Remonstrants look upon with their whole soul full of aversion and abhorrence."*

The Apology of the Arminians was answered by Trigland (1652-1705) in his *Antapologia*.†

§ 37. THE GREAT CALVINISTIC DIVINES AGAINST THE ARMINIANS.

The great masters in polemic not only grant that Calvinism held the damnation of infants, but strive to overwhelm and defeat Arminianism for not holding the doctrine.

CLOPPENBURGH: "This dispute has drawn into the question in regard to *infants dying in infancy*; although the Remonstrants themselves do not dare to put into heaven the infants born outside the covenant of grace, of heathen and unbelieving parents, nor to admit them to the communion of grace and glory: because the Apostle too clearly pronounces that they are 'unclean' children. 1 Cor. vii. 14."‡

"Election embraces all the non reprobates, whether adults or infants: and it is an *impious exception* of the Remonstrants, who exempt the *infants* of the heathen from being subjects of reprobation * * * and prefer to put on an equality the *infants* of unbelieving heathen and of believing Christians." § "The nature of a gracious covenant is destroyed, when the infants of the heathen are put upon an equality with the infants of faithful Christians. They (the Remonstrants) themselves admit that the infants of heathen are left by God in a condition of nature, deprived of the good of grace and glory, to be condemned, at least to that eternal death which they define as the 'penalty of loss (*pœna damni*).'"

Here, as in other cases, Calvinism asserts a positive damnation of eternal pain for heathen infants, over against the modified and negative loss which Arminianism conceded.

THE DEAF AND DUMB AND INSANE.—But the ingenuity of

* 57, 6. † Maastricht: Theor. Pract. Theol. Trajecti ad Rhen. 1725, p. 1069. Walch: Bibl. Theol. Select. I. 428; II. 549, 550.

‡ Exerc. Sup. Loc. Comm. Theolog. Franck, 1653. De. Elec. grat. 1, § 24.

§ Do. Locus de electione. Disputat. II.

these terrible old logicians has not exhausted itself, with the mystery which puts the immensely larger part of infants into the ranks of the reprobate and damned. They go to a hapless part of the race, whose condition even beyond that of infants touches the heart with the saddest pathos. Cloppenburgh* further makes the charge against the Remonstrants:

"They also exempt *without exception*, all deaf and dumb persons, and the insane. (*Surdos atque Amentes*).

"For experience shows a distinction between one class of the deaf and dumb, who by signs and pious works manifest (*spirant*) an inward devotion, and another class, in whom sin reveals itself, reigning through the works of the flesh. * * These latter we believe are left dead in sins, under just damnation, through the law of nature."

It is well for the reader to recall the fact that when Cloppenburgh wrote, the possibility of reaching those born deaf, with the Word, was almost unknown. A few isolated attempts had succeeded in the long ages, but their success was regarded as miraculous, or treated as a fable, and whether as miracle or fable, soon forgotten. Jerome Cardan (1501—1576) had asserted the *possibility* of teaching the deaf and dumb. To Pedro Ponce, a Benedictine monk of Spain, belongs the honor of first attempting to actualize the possibility; to Juan Paulo Boret, another monk of the same order, belongs the honor of publishing the first book (1620) on the subject. Cloppenburgh's argument (1592—1652) implies that he knew nothing of this possibility.

Of the idiotic, insane, and mad, he says, "a distinction is to be made. There are those whom an evil conscience and reprobate mind, by God's just judgment, drives to madness, like mad dogs (*ut canes rabiosos*); who, unless God heals them, cannot be counted with the non-reprobate."

MOLINÆUS AGAINST THE ARMINIANS.—PETER MOLINÆUS (Dumoulin) 1568—1658, was one of the greatest divines of the French Calvinistic Church, and was deputed to attend the Synod of Dort. The prohibition of Louis XIII. prevented his attendance, but did not prevent his promulgating and defending the decrees of the Synod, and obtaining for them the sanction of the National Synods of Calvinistic France. In the theological chair at Sedan, he was the great opponent of Amyraud

* Locus de Electione. Disputat. II.

and the other professors of Saumur, who were charged with a kind of Semi-Arminianism. He has been regarded as "one of the greatest writers and the first polemic of his age." In his *Dissection of Arminianism*,* he opens with a defence of God's dealings with man, thoroughly characteristic of old Calvinism.

"If any one were to crush an ant with his foot, no one could charge him with injustice, though the ant never offended him, though he did not give life to the ant, though the ant belonged to another, and no restitution could be made, and though between the ant and man the inequality is not infinite, but a certain and finite proportion."

In all these aspects, he argues, the case is stronger for God, "if He should harden sinful men whom He might save." "The offspring of the pious and faithful are born with the infection of original sin."† "As the eggs of the asp are deservedly crushed, and serpents just born are deservedly killed, though they have not yet poisoned any one with their bite, so infants are justly obnoxious to penalties."‡ Molinæus answers the Arminian position that Christ by His death obtained reconciliation for all, by objecting that it would then follow "that all infants born outside of the covenant are reconciled, and have their sins forgiven, and that hence no greater blessing could be conferred on them than the merciful cruelty of cutting their throats in their cradles, (*quam si quis eos clementi crudelitate in cunis jugulaverit*)."[§] Molinæus' suggestion holds with equal force against Dr. Hodge's view that all dying infants are saved. The two together would imply that any man can make the election of an infant sure in the dreadful manner suggested in the bloody age in which Molinæus lived.

"To him, whom God hates from the womb, He does not give sufficient and saving grace. Hence there are those whom God rejects with a spiritual rejection, before they have done anything of good or evil. He does not therefore give them sufficient means to faith and salvation, for this cannot be harmonized with hatred." ||

The same views of infant reprobation are pressed over against the Arminians, by Molinæus¶ in other places.

* *Anatome Arminianismi*. Lugduni Batav. 1621, 4to, p. 2. † Do., p. 36.

‡ P. 48. § P. 181.

|| Do., 289. ¶ *Thesaurus Sedanensis* Genevæ, 1661.

2 Vols. 4to, I. 197.

BURMANN AGAINST THE ARMINIANS.

BURMANN.*—"The Remonstrants do evilly, who, though they do not dare, on account of 1 Cor. vii. 14, to put them in heaven, yet acknowledge no reprobation of them, * * but assign them rather a middle state and penalty of loss; as also other, both of the ancients and moderns, grant heaven to them, in the face of 1 Cor. vii. 14, and Rom. v. 14."

GUERTLER, AGAINST THE ARMINIANS.

GUERTLER (1654-1711) in arguing against the Arminians, says:

"Death comes even unto infants; for without reason, and contrary to Paul's decision, Episcopus exempts from the number of those who are to be punished, INFANTS and IDIOTS (*infantes et fatuos*)."[†]

That our readers may clearly see what it is that is condemned, we will quote the passage to which Guertler refers.

EPISCOPIUS: "The Scripture represents that misery (of death or damnation and sin) as universal, so as to involve the whole human race, that is all men and every man, to wit, in whom that misery can have just place as penalty. *Infants* therefore, as such, as also *idiots (fatuos)*, the *insane*, the *mad* or those destitute of the use of reason and free will we are unwilling to comprehend in that number. . . . They are liberated from that death by special Divine grace."[‡]

GUERTLER has been explicit enough, but he makes assurance doubly sure, by proceeding in the next paragraph to say:

"By 'death' is understood, death temporal and death eternal; and this latter is the unceasing (*perpetuus*) sense of dire tortures (*dirorum cruciatum*), inevitable to those who see not the face of God, so that the Scholastics, following Lombard, wrongly teach that *infants*, on account of sin, *pay the debt of loss only*, not of sense." The sentence of LOMBARD, which Guertler cites, is as follows: "Not, therefore, for the actual sins of their own parents, nor even for the actual sins of the first parent, but for original (sin) which is derived from the parents, infants will be damned; hence they will not endure the penalty, material fire, or that of the worm of conscience, but will be deprived forever of the vision of God." § This mitigation Guertler rejects, and closes the paragraph following, with the decisive words: "God hath ordained (*Statuit*), that we should be born corrupt, or that we should sin, because Adam hath sinned, and wills that we should die, because we sin" ||

* Synod. Theolog. Genev. 1678, I. 256. † Institut. Theolog. Amstelo. 1694, pp. 188, 189.

‡ Institut. Theolog. L. b. IV. Sect. V. ch. I. Opera Amstelo. 1650, p. 401.

§ LOMBARD, Sentat. L. II. Dist. 33, l. E. || See also Guertler do. do., p. 202, and the citations he gives from the Remonstrant's Confessions.

§ 38. THE ARMINIANS AGAINST THE CALVINISTS.

The Arminian defenses constantly urge against the Calvinists their doctrine of infant reprobation. It is one, they say, of which Calvinists make no secret, so far as the children of the non-elect, pagan or Christian, are concerned, and which the candid allow involves that some children even of the elect are lost.

EPISCOPIUS.—“Those who believe that absolute election and absolute reprobation pertain to infants dying in infancy, whether they be Gentiles or children of those who are in the covenant—to them the uncertainty (whether they shall grieve or rejoice over the death of their children) is very mournful, for the fear of reprobation far outweighs the hope of election, since the number of the reprobate is far greater than that of the elect: hence it is clear that an unutterable grief may readily arise from such a death.”*

GROTIUS shows that in certain aspects the Calvinists departed as completely from the “Catholic faith,” in regard to infants, as the Pelagians did in others. If the Calvinists did not hold, with Augustine, that unbaptized infants are lost, neither did they hold, as Augustine did most tenaciously, that all baptized infants are certainly saved. He states the Calvinistic doctrine thus: “That some infants, dying in infancy, and who, as children of believers and baptized, are delivered to the torments of hell on account of original sin.”†

“Calvin says that of those who have rested on the breasts of the same Christian mother some are borne to heaven, others thrust down to hell, without respect to their having or failing to have Baptism: to wit, by virtue of that decree, by which God hath decreed, not by permitting only, but also by willing, that Adam should necessarily fall, and that so many nations, with their infant children, should through that fall be brought to eternal death without remedy. When Calvin himself calls this decree ‘fearful’ (*horribile*), he gives it too soft a name (*minus quam res est dixit*)”‡

LIMBORCH (d. 1712).—“The Contra-remonstrants (the Calvinists) teach that original sin merits the eternal punishment of sense, or the eternal torments of the fire of hell, so that many infants dying in infancy are to be tortured forever in the fire of hell. Thus in common

* Responsio ad LXIV. Quest. 35. † Disquisitio de dogmat. Pelagian. Opera, Londini, 1689, IV. 376. ‡ Rivet. Apologet. D'scuss. Opera, IV. 694.

(*communiter*) the Contra remonstrant divines teach concerning the children of unbelievers who die in infancy. As regards the children of believers they do not openly set forth their judgment. Some say in express words, that the distinction of election and reprobation exists in their case also, and, therefore, some children of believers, dying in infancy, are to be cast into hell. Such is the view of Pareus, Zanchius, Perkins, and Donteklok. Arthur Hildersham, also on Psalm I. Lect. 55, says: "It is clear that God hath declared His wrath against the sins of infants by pursuing with His hatred *not their sins only, but also their persons*, (*non tantum . . . ipsorum peccata sed et personas*.) Rom. ix. 11, 13, nor merely by inflicting on them corporeal penalties, but also by casting them into hell. And to put beyond all doubt that he is speaking of the children of believers, in speaking, on Rom. ix., of the children of believers, he says: 'It is a damnable error that all who die in infancy shall certainly obtain the heavenly heritage; on the contrary, he (Paul) decides that *many infants are vessels of wrath and fire-brands of hell (titiones inferni)*.' Others, not daring to confess this openly, cover the hideousness (*foeditatem*) of their position with ambiguous words, by saying that we, in accordance with God's revealed will, expressed in this formula of the divine covenant, and in accordance with the judgment of charity, ought to regard as elect all the children of believers, as embraced in the same covenant with their parents. But as they hold that the secret will of God is often contrary to His revealed will, and that we are obliged sometimes to believe, according to the revealed will, what is false according to the secret will: and as many according to the judgment of charity are to be esteemed elect, who are in fact not elect, it is evident that there is here no certitude of faith, and that they have devised this, only to disguise their opinion, whose hideousness they desire, as far as they can, to conceal."*

§ 39. THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY. (1643—45.)

But perhaps the Westminster Assembly, which embraced in its Confession the particular type of Calvinism to which Dr. Hodge is bound, and of which he is, indisputably, one of the noblest representatives—perhaps this Assembly may have been marked by special mildness—and mitigating its logic by its gentleness, may have qualified the rigor of the older view? Such a supposition could only be made in ignorance and in irony. The Calvinism of the Westminster Assembly was in no respect milder than that of the Synod of Dort. Its pro-

* *Theologia Christiana*. Amsterdam, 1700. Lib. III. Ch. V. iii. p. 187.

locutor, Dr. Twiss, Dr. Thomas Goodwin, one of its very greatest members, and others, were of the extremest Supralapsarian school, that school of which distinguished Calvinists of a milder type have spoken so severely. Thomas Case, one of its most esteemed members, was so zealous for religion, as he understood it, that in a sermon before the Court Martial, 1644, he said: "Noble sirs, imitate God, and be merciful to none that have sinned of malicious wickedness," meaning the Royalists.*

Dr. Philip Schaff says of the Westminster Assembly: "The Presbyterians were opponents of all tolerance, and were as urgent for a general uniformity as the Episcopalians had been under Elizabeth and Charles II. They regarded freedom of conscience and tolerance as culpable indifference and treason toward revealed truth."† The writings of the Westminster divines, and of all the earlier school which followed in their footsteps, sustain the sense we have given to the Westminster Confession in regard to infant damnation. These writings are in English and easy of access, and we need not therefore swell our testimonies with them. The meaning of a Confession when it is made, remains its meaning forever—and hence the vital importance of the earliest writers, the authors of Confessions, and the original interpreters, expounders, and defenders of them. It is the meaning these writers put upon the Calvinistic Confessions, not one imagined by ourselves, which we have given them; and on the express language of the Confessions, and of these witnesses, we rest our case. C. P. K.

* Neal's History of the Puritans, II. 307.

† Hertzog: Art. Westminster Synods, Vol. XVIII. 56.

ART. VI.—KRAUTH'S BERKELEY.

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Berkeley's Principles of Knowledge, with Prolegomena and Annotations. By Charles P. Krauth, D. D. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, 1874. pp. 424.

It is with sincere pleasure that we hail this last volume from the pen of our much esteemed friend, Dr. Krauth. It is the first of a series of works on philosophy, which we hope the editor may live to add to our American literature. We have classical works in other departments of knowledge, and why should we not also have a course of Philosophical Classics, edited with care and ready for the use of the student at any time? This, as we infer, is the desideratum which Dr. Krauth wishes to meet and satisfy, in which we wish him God-speed with all our hearts. There are few persons in this country so well qualified as he for a work of this kind. Conversant as he is with the various branches of English literature, he is no less at home in that of Germany, the father-land. By the mastery which he wields over the English language, he is not only able to understand and appreciate German philosophy, but to render its profound and rugged thoughts into pure and intelligible English. In this respect, he has the advantage over some of our American scholars, to whom the German is a somewhat strange language, and who, like Dugald Stewart, are so prone to complain that German philosophy and theology are unintelligible to them. We have therefore watched the literary and theological career of Dr. Krauth with much interest and hope. He is a strong Lutheran, as the readers of the REVIEW know, but he is honest, a fine scholar and a Christian gentleman; he is moreover doing a good work not only for his own Church, but, indirectly, at least, for the German Reformed also. For it is an established fact that these two sister Churches of the Re-

formation are so vitally connected, that the prosperity of the one involves the prosperity of the other. As it is, it is difficult enough, for instance, for the Reformed Church to retain its original German spirit and life amidst the wide-spread Puritanism of the times; but it would be much more so if it were not sustained in its aspirations by those of our Lutheran brethren who show by their actions that they are determined to keep up their own Church. We differ of course in some things, but we all know that we agree in others.

All of Dr. Krauth's books, which have thus far come before the public, are evidences of his industry, his accurate and extensive learning, and his scholarly taste. The last one on the philosophy of Bishop Berkeley more than confirms the favorable opinion which his friends have formed of his abilities as an author. Its outward appearance happily harmonizes with its contents. There is something in it. It contains one of Berkeley's treatises, which embodies the gist of his peculiar philosophy, prefaced by what is called the Prolegomena, which takes up about one-third of the volume, giving an account of Berkeley's life and writings; his precursors in the idealistic line of philosophers; his successors, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi, Hegel and Schopenhauer down to the present time with a synopsis of the peculiar system of each; a summary of Berkeley's system, its friends and opponents; Idealism, its weakness and strength; and various other matters, all of which are necessary as a preparation to an intelligent understanding of an author so little known or understood by the generality of readers and students, as Berkeley. So also as an addendum to the treatise, we have an appendix, containing notes and numerous learned annotations, original and selected, illustrating, sustaining or controverting particular passages in the text and ending with a valuable index, all of which occupy another third part of the book.

From all this it would appear that the work is complete, affording the student all the necessary facilities for a speedy supply of just the kind of knowledge of Berkeley, which he would naturally be in quest of. It has in fact a German character and appearance about it; it is *vollständig* and *gründlich*.

As a literary production it is an accession of real value to our literature, of which we need not be ashamed; whilst, at the same time, it is creditable to our old State and the American German people generally, among whom the author occupies a deservedly high position. Thus far the sons of American Germans have distinguished themselves mostly in promoting the material interests of the country. They are our best farmers; they have the best farms, barns and horses perhaps in the world. But they have not been represented as largely in the higher departments of life as other classes of persons. It is therefore something of an event when an American German is found moving gracefully and freely in the higher walks of literature, of which we may all feel proud. We may also add that this new book also reflects honor upon the venerable University of Pennsylvania, which, whilst it has been renewing itself for the last few years past in the attention which it pays to the natural sciences, shows its appreciation of metaphysics by enrolling Dr. Krauth's name on the list of its faculty. Its Vice-Provost has already shown that he is one of its brightest ornaments.

But why should we have a new edition of Berkeley? And why should his curious speculations, which were supposed to have been long ago refuted and forgotten, be just at this time resurrected and recommended for our study and perusal? Such questions may be partially answered by the consideration that he was a remarkable personage in his day. He was a singularly pure and disinterested man. As a prelate of the Church of England, he exhibited a high and noble character. During his official residence in Ireland, he gained the confidence and esteem of all denominations alike, Catholic as well as Protestant. He was the friend of Ireland, a truly apostolic pastor and bishop. He also felt a deep interest in America, and laid aside the best preferment in Ireland in order to plant the seeds of learning and the arts in this country, by establishing a great university somewhere among the Bermuda Islands. During the year 1728 he spent several months in the backwoods of Rhode Island with this cherished object on his mind. In this he failed, and was

sadly disappointed; but he left to this westward world another priceless legacy in the immortal verse:

Westward the course of Empire takes its way.

So pure and exalted was his moral and Christian character that even Pope, the bitter satirist, admired him and honored himself by seeing some virtue in the world, and acknowledging that Providence had given

To Berkeley every virtue under heaven.

But nothing of this kind certainly could have given him such a standing position in the history of philosophy. The explanation of this must be sought for in his writings. He lived in an age, from 1685 to 1753, when materialism and infidelity were making rapid strides, stimulated and encouraged by the reigning philosophy of the day, under the influence of Hobbes, Locke and others. Berkeley thought the difficulty lay in the false system of metaphysics, which was prevailingly materialistic, and, accordingly, in his efforts to destroy its bad influence, he swung over into extreme idealism in the other direction. He seemed to think that the infidelity of the times had its roots in men's notions of matter and so ought to be attacked there in its source. He therefore denied its existence and with this, the existence of the phenomenal world outside of us altogether. The world, as a consequence, and all our knowledge of the world, are internal, subjective and notional; and God is the only existence or force on the outside of us that gives knowledge, perceptions and sensations.

Thus in philosophy, as well as elsewhere, one extreme begets another. But as it was in the days of Berkeley, so precisely it is in our day. Materialism abounds, and with it, infidelity and still worse, atheism. Serious and thoughtful men, accordingly, are looking around for the means of arresting the deluge of error which seems to be threatening to overwhelm the world. Under these circumstances, it is natural that the well-meant services of the good Bishop Berkeley should come up in kindly remembrance and that his image should again make its appearance in the philosophical world. In Germany, it seems, just at

this time, his works are sought out and studied with much interest. Dr. Ueberweg has done much by his translation of the "Principles" into German in satisfying the desire to know more about him in that country. His truly profound and admirable comments appear among the Annotations in the edition before us. Idealism is sure to assert its rights when materialism abounds.

Dr. Krauth is manifestly an admirer of idealism. But he knows its weakness as well as its strength, of which the volume before us supplies us with abundant evidence. In his mind, idealism by itself is an error or extreme as well as materialism. His idealism is a healthy one, and does not in fact exclude common sense, as the following passages go to show. "Idealism is not the last result of philosophical ripening. The philosophy of the future is one which will be neither *absolute* idealism nor *absolute* realism, but will accept the facts of both, and use them in a system, which, like man himself, shall blend two realities as distinct yet inseparable. The *duality* of natures, harmonized, yet not vanishing in the *monism* of person, a universe of *accordant* not of *discordant* matter and mind, held together and even developing under the plan and control of the one Supreme, who is neither *absolutely* immanent nor *absolutely* supramundane, but *relatively* both,—*immanent* in the sense in which Deism denies his presence, *supramundane* in the sense in which Pantheism ignores his relation,—not the mere maker of the universe, as Deism asserts, nor its matter, as Pantheism represents him, but its Preserver, Benefactor, Ruler, and Father, who, whether in matter or mind, reveals the perfect reason, the perfect love, the perfect will, the consummate power, in absolute and eternal personality." pp. 138, 139.

The question which a publication of Berkeley revives is a vital and practical one, although one of the deepest in metaphysics. Matter and mind, body and soul, God and nature, are in as fierce conflict in the thoughts of men as ever. God, nature and man have each its special adherents and champions, who seek to exalt one or the other of these great truths at the expense or denial of the other. Whilst then the historical or

der might have suggested that Dr. Krauth should have commenced his series of philosophic classics with some philosopher anterior to Berkeley, the wants of our times fully justify him in introducing us at once, *in medias res*, to the venerable form of one who stood amid the great life questions which come forward in all ages, when philosophy revives and shows some degree of real earnestness.

Under these circumstances the question arises whether it is possible to bring about a reconciliation between our conceptions of mind and matter. Must the conflict continue forever, and must philosophy, as it springs up in different nations with youthful vigor, be always confined to the same beaten track and never get out of the old dualistic rut? We think not. If there is progress in the way of real historical growth anywhere, it ought to be certainly in the domain of philosophy, for it is in this province the deepest thinkers of every age are wont to exert their strength, and it is here more than in any other department of knowledge that errors and all kinds of fantastic notions abound and call for removal. The problem is one certainly of the greatest importance. It lies in fact at the very foundation of all systems of philosophy; it has a vital connection with the science of theology at more points than one; and its gradual, or, at least, its partial solution seems to be necessary to throw light upon the great mystery of the universe, and that most fearful of all mysteries, the mystery of evil.

We may, or at least ought to, be able to take it for granted that there is in reality no such an irreconcilable antagonism, no such an impassable gulf or chasm, no such a formidable war between the world of mind and the world of matter as we find in all the old systems of philosophy. Wherever philosophy took its rise and flourished in ancient times, it became a fundamental principle, that matter was something base and foul, the kingdom of darkness at the farthest remove from God, a dismal, dreary region, the abode of evil spirits, and, in fact, the source of all the evil in the world. This was especially the case in the old oriental world, among the earnest and profound thinkers of India and Persia. But this style of thinking passed westward,

permeated the mind of ancient Greece, and showed itself in the lofty speculations of its various schools. It came out also very conspicuously in the various systems of Gnosticism, which flourished during the early ages of Christianity. Here the oriental modes of thinking came into contact with the science of the western world, and drawing fresh vigor and vitality from Christianity, united in forming one of the most wonderful and stupendous systems of thought the world has ever witnessed. In all these great intellectual creations, the source of evil, of our misery and woe, is found not in ourselves nor in the spiritual world, but somewhere else, outside of us, in matter itself. This deep-rooted prejudice, although not altogether, has, nevertheless in a great measure passed away in our times; the material world has been divested to a great extent of its terrors and it is coming to be regarded no longer as our enemy, but, in fact, an humble though potent friend to man and the higher spiritual interests of the world. Matter is not evil nor in any sense the source of evil to mankind. It is the creature of God, and like all His works, it is in its sphere something good. How then can this outward world, which has been coming to its present state of perfection after countless ages of development under the operation of divine laws and agencies, be evil, the source of evil or the work of the devil? The supposed malignant character of matter is purely subjective and imaginary. Evil and sin are in man, have their roots in the spiritual world, and from this source send forth their dark shadows over the natural world, causing it to wear the gloomy pall of sadness and woe. If it had not been for this moral eclipse, which has shut out the divine light from above, it would be, no doubt, just as it is, a Paradise, arrayed in festal robes and vocal with its own sublime harmonies.

The old antagonism, which we have said is disappearing amidst the light of our modern history, does not exist between matter and mind in themselves considered, but rather in men's own minds, in their own notions of these things, in the barren abstractions which they have formed of these creatures of God. The progress of Christianity has no doubt, directly or indirectly,

been the principal agency in bringing about this change for our comfort and benefit; because, the Bible nowhere encourages pantheistic views of nature; nowhere disparages even the least or most insignificant creature of God; and nowhere relieves man and Satan of the responsibility of the evil in the world by referring it to the material creation. It has no sympathy whatever with the morbid antipathy towards matter, characteristic of the old philosophies. Everywhere it presents to us a cheerful view of the aspect of nature, of the sun, moon and stars above us, and of all the various objects around us on the earth. In the presence of the moral blight which has fallen upon the human world, it points the finger towards each one of us and says with the most earnest emphasis, *Thou art the man!* But among the secondary causes, which have been especially active in producing this happy change for the better, in men's philosophy, we must refer to the progress of natural science, which though wayward and at times most irreverent and profane, has been of great service in the light which it has thrown upon the material world. It has done much in dissipating ignorance and superstition in regard to nature, on the one hand; and, on the other, in raising it up out of the bad reputation into which it had fallen by demonstrating its rational and intelligent character.

Among philosophers, probably no one has done more in bringing about this change than Bishop Berkeley himself. He imagined that he had driven matter out of the world, or, at least, shown that there was no necessity for its existence in the sphere of philosophy. He too, however, did not in fact wage war so much against matter itself, as against the barren notions which men had formed of the outward objective world. This latter makes certain impressions upon our senses, and through our senses upon our minds, such as color, sound, figure, light, heat or motion, and Berkeley was right in saying that these are internal and subjective. But he was not right in supposing that there was nothing back and beyond these qualities or accidents of matter except the divine power or will. He was too ready in accepting the opinion of the old philoso-

phers, and of Locke among the rest, that substance or the theoretical substratum, which stands under the qualities of matter, and gives them support, is an unknown quantity, and should be eliminated from the sphere of philosophy as a useless, cumbersome thing. He lived too much among the scholastics of the past, and not enough among the giants of his own period, the great shining lights of modern science. He does not seem to have felt the importance of the great discoveries of Galileo, Kepler or Newton. It is not unlikely he looked upon them with suspicion, and a pious fear, lest they might detract from the glory of God, and lead to skepticism and infidelity. So much was he captivated with the idea of one great cause, and so jealous was he that it might be continually present to the minds and thoughts of men, that without any remorse he swept away, not only all kinds of matter, but also all secondary causes, as the prolific sources of unbelief and infidelity. The motive was good and alike honorable to his head and heart, and so far as he attacked the empty abstractions of his times in regard to the outward world, the metaphysical wind-mills of the schoolmen, he was certainly a valorous knight. He was not altogether wrong, even in his war against the mathematicians of his day. In his celebrated crusade against the infinitesimal calculus, he attacked a false notion of the science, as scientific men now admit. The abstraction went overboard, but the science survived his ingenious assault and still flourishes with unabated vigor. In like manner the abstraction which men had been calling matter in old times, received most serious damage from his vigorous blows. But matter itself, the outward world, the heavens above us, and the earth beneath, still remained, poised upon their firm foundations, and revealing to men more and more every day their beneficent as well as their substantial character, in proportion as they were studied and investigated. Much is accomplished when errors are crushed or removed out of the way. They flourish with native, wild luxuriance everywhere, but no where so extensively as around the temple of Truth itself; they clutter up the different ways of access and bar all

entrance. This is so generally, and no where more so than in the case which we are here considering.

There has then been some progress made in our knowledge of the relation of the outward to the inward world, and this, although for the most part negative in its character, is a substantial and real progress. And this suggests the inquiry whether any further advance can be made in the solution of this question, which, whilst it is one of the most difficult in the range of our thinking powers, is also one of those that concern us most deeply in the longings of our souls after the light of truth.

The difficulty here, as well as elsewhere, is not so much, we may remark, a want of deep thinkers as a want of facts, or of a true knowledge of matter, upon which all true speculation or theory in this direction must be erected. "Metaphysics," says Dr. Krauth, "shall be perfect in all its theories so soon as physics shall be perfect in its collection of all its facts. The contempt which ignorant or arrogant physicists heap on metaphysics is really the disgrace or the misfortune of the physical sciences. Reach the demonstrably absolute in physics and we shall not demand in vain that the thinkers of the race shall give us a demonstrably absolute philosophy."*

It is plain therefore, that no progress can be made in ventilating this difficult subject, unless we first settle in our own minds what matter is. The demolition of the old scholastic view requires that we should have at least something to take its place. Else we are out at sea, without sail or helm, and it were better for us if we had never left port, or being out exposed to danger on all sides, to take refuge in extreme idealism as Berkeley did. Modern science, we think, has thrown some light upon matter and rescued it to some extent, at least, from the mystery in which it was formerly involved. Let us then see what it has to say on the subject.

A writer in one of our best scientific journals says, that it is

* See his Annotation on Matter and Mind, Soul and Body, p. 401 in his edition of Berkeley noticed at the head of this article. It is in itself a volume of profound striking and suggestive thoughts. The intelligent reader can only wish that the learned critic had prolonged his note into an *excursus*.

coming to be an axiom among scientific men generally that matter is *force*, or as he expresses it: "*matter consists of a force of resistance from a centre.*" This seems to be the conclusion at which both philosophy as well as science must eventually arrive. The best and most reliable investigation on the part of scientific men is certainly tending in this direction.*

All bodies are composed of atoms or parts. None are absolutely hard with their particles in actual contact. They are all compressible on the one hand, and expansible on the other. How far the process of expansion or contraction by heat or other agents might be carried, no body knows. The different gases in a vacuum seem to be indefinitely expansible, and experience goes to show, that compression may be continued as long as the pressure goes on increasing. All bodies, therefore are porous, that is, their ultimate particles or atoms are separated by interstices or vacant spaces, so as to admit of a certain degree of shrinkage when exposed to cold. Some philosophers suppose that as none of the atoms touch each other the pores occupy by far a much larger amount of space than the atoms themselves. How then can these latter come to maintain a position of equilibrium with respect to each other? We know that they all have a mutual attraction. If, however, this force were the only one with which they are endowed, there could be no equilibrium, and the atoms would either rush back again into non-entity or gather themselves up into a very small body indeed. There must therefore be one more force, at least, and one as potent as attraction, in order to account for the natural stability of bodies, and this is repulsion. This is just as necessary in order to explain the facts in the case as the force of attraction, and its existence seems to be demonstrated. Attraction is active at sensible distances, tending to collect the matter of all bodies around a given centre; but when the atoms come within certain insensible distances, which differ in different substances, a repulsive energy is excited counteracting the opposite force of attraction, and locating the atoms in their natural positions, just as necessarily as two op-

* Silliman's Journal, May No. 1872, p. 329.

posite forces confine the planets in fixed and unchangeable orbits as they revolve around the sun.

Philosophers differ in their opinions in regard to the nature of the ultimate atoms that go to constitute the various bodies of which we have any knowledge through our senses. It is admitted on all hands that they are extremely small, so minute as to elude forever the cognizance of any of the senses which we at present possess. According to Boscovich and his school, they are merely mathematical points, which have position but not magnitude, simply ideal centres or loci of the two forces, which by their joint action have built up this universe of bodies. Others from a natural love of something substantial and in accordance with an almost universal feeling that there ought to be some solid substratum somewhere, reject this feature of the Boscovichian theory and, in the place of mere imaginary points, substitute physical ones, which have at least some magnitude and occupy at least some measure of space, although very diminutive. Which of these two theories is the correct one we probably never will be able to determine with certainty, because these ultimate atoms lie beyond the region of our senses. If they are physical, they are too small to be seen with the eye, and being centres of repulsion, which stands as an impenetrable guard around them on all sides, they can never be felt or touched. It is well known that we cannot bring two hard bodies into actual contact. Much less can the hand or the finger come in absolute contact with the particles of any body. The sense of hardness or resistance which we experience when we lay our hand on any object, is produced by the repulsion of the atoms, not by the resistance of the atoms themselves when they are pressed, as is popularly supposed. These latter can neither be touched, tasted, seen, heard nor felt. Whatever they are, we know of their existence or non-existence, only by the forces of attraction or repulsion of which they are the central loci.

Fortunately it is not a matter of any practical account for us to know whether the ultimate atoms of matter are physical or mathematical. The materialist will naturally claim that

they have magnitude ; whilst the spiritualist will be naturally inclined to doubt or deny that they are at all extended, for which he will not be without some show of reason. For, it must be admitted that it were just as easy for the Creator in the beginning to localize his power at various unextended points in space, as it was for him to endow certain very diminutive solid particles with these powers ; and just because this was so, there is no violence done to reason in the supposition that He actually did pursue the former as the more direct and simple course in the formation of the outward universe. If this however should come to be admitted, then the old notion of solid matter would be ruled out of existence, much more effectually, because more truthfully, than was done in the scheme of Bishop Berkeley. But matter itself, in its real, substantive and dynamical character, would still remain, and maintain its existence against the attacks of its enemies with a more impregnable front than ever before.

As already said, for the purpose we here have in view, it is immaterial whether we believe that atoms have extension or not. Matter, in its vital essential character, such as we know it, and such as we experience it by the impressions which it makes upon our senses, and through these latter upon our intelligence and reason, is simply force or a system of forces, and nothing more. We have spoken of the two opposite forces of attraction and repulsion as being the vital element of every body or substance. We do not imply, however, that they are exclusive of all others. There are no doubt others more latent than these, but equally essential. Thus most, if not all bodies, under favorable conditions resolve themselves into crystals of definite form and shape, in which a new determining force, no doubt different from those already mentioned, comes in, marshalls the particles into line and gives particular substances their natural and legitimate forms. There is a magnetic force, active in all bodies as well as cohesion or repulsion, and there may be still others more subtile, of which our knowledge is even more limited ; or, as is not improbable, there is a single

force, of which all the others are only modifications.* But all this only goes to show the essentially etherial character of matter, and tends very much to lift it out of the dead sphere of mechanics into that of a living dynamics.

It is not strictly correct then to speak of matter as something dead, as we are wont to do when we speak of it relatively. All bodies are animated by living forces, actively at work in producing their forms and the qualities with which they impress our senses. These play into each other, so that by their joint action they become wonderfully conservative, and not only keep up appearances; but maintain all bodies in existence. This is already life, not as we see it, it is true, in its higher forms in the plant and animal, but life in its lowest and most rudimental forms. It is the beginning of organization, the dawn of that day-light which we witness in the higher and more perfect forms of life. When we examine a crystal, we are apt to suppose that it grew so and remains what it now is, by an act of formation which took place many ages back. But upon further reflection, it will be seen that the crystal is what it now is only by virtue of certain internal forces that have always been and are now active. These are continually giving it its beautiful shape, purity and transparency.

So too, it is not in accordance with facts to deprive matter of all rational character, or to make it as much as possible unlike mind or reason, as Berkeley does. The forces upon which it rests are not blind, arbitrary or unmeaning. They all bear the impress of rationality; they all act in accordance with law, or, rather, they are in fact laws with well prescribed boundaries; and are readily apprehended by the reason within us in proportion as they are studied and investigated. Berkeley,

* Attraction and repulsion, both active in all bodies present, it must be confessed, the appearance of a contradiction or of a disagreeable dualism, somewhat repulsive to reason, which everywhere seeks for unity. Hence some have imagined that repulsion is derived from attraction or the reverse. Prof. Norton, of Yale College, in several able articles in *Silliman's Journal* in the volume already referred to (1872) has endeavored to show that repulsion is the original force from which attraction is produced. The whole subject is still involved in much mystery.

with the great lights of modern science around him, made an egregious error, when he asserted that there was nothing in the outward world which was allied to the human mind, and that if it even did exist, we could not perceive its existence, because like can only perceive like. Nature, the outward objective world is a unity, a realm, a complicated system of laws or forces, organic in character and supremely rational. In the heavens above and in the depths below, in the humblest as well as the most ponderous orb, whilst our senses are regaled with many delightful impressions arising from color, light, sound or form, reason is continually confronted with reason, and challenged to make its loftiest flights. Nature, instead of antagonizing with reason is in fact nothing else but reason in an imperfect and rudimental form. The perfection of reason, it is true, implies personality, as we see in spiritual beings. This of course is something which nature does not possess. It has no soul. It is, therefore, impersonal reason, which, however, is not at all abstract, but something real and concrete. But this defect is just what we ought to expect. Nature, as the physical basis of a world of spiritual and intellectual beings, ought not to be perfect in degree. Whilst as a foundation it ought to be of the same nature as the superstructure, it ought at the same time to be incomplete in itself, so that it may best serve as a type or prophecy of what is to follow. Without personality, it has accordingly no soul, which the old Platonics and Gnostics so eagerly maintained it had. But then its undeniable rational character is no doubt the truth which lay at the foundation of this wide-spread opinion of the old heathen philosophers; it is perhaps all that they meant by the soul of the universe when divested of the glowing colors of the imagination.

The view of matter here advocated as a force, a system of forces or a congeries of rational laws, as already said, is the destination towards which all modern science seems to be tending. It is, however, not something new. Philosophy too, in order to help itself, has all along been drifting in the same direction, especially in Germany. Dr. Krauth, in one of his learned annotations, informs us that it was Leibnitz "who was

the first thoroughly to bring to scientific consciousness force or power as an essential element of matter." It is believed that this intellectual, or as we might say, spiritual aspect of nature is not only true, but that it will assist very materially in the end in removing out of the way the old antagonism between matter and mind, because it is false; and in reconciling the antithesis, which is true and legitimate.

The question, however, is not likely to be settled by removing the difficulties on the one side only, as Dr. Krauth seems to imagine when he reflects on physicists, because they have not as yet told us satisfactorily what matter is. There are other difficulties, just as great, yea, greater when we come to think of the spiritual world. There are errors there also to be removed, and work for the metaphysician to perform, before every thing can be made clear and transparent.

Without attempting to be wise above what is written or assuming to go beyond what it is possible for us to know of the spiritual world in our present state, it is proper for us to say that it must and should be regarded pre-eminently as something actual and real. Too often and too generally it is regarded as painfully unreal, a region of shadows, phantoms or fancies. All this arises, as we would take it, from a sort of metaphysical pride or superciliousness, which seeks to raise the spiritual world to the highest point of remove from the natural, with which, however, it stands in vital connection. In what has already been said, it seems to be established that matter in its essential character has much more of a rational and spiritual character than is ordinarily supposed; that it actually approximates to and touches the spiritual world; and that the chasm, which formerly was supposed to separate the one from the other, is purely fictitious and imaginary. So on the other hand, a truthful view of the world of spirit would, we believe, bring it, we would not say down, into actual, living relation with the system of nature. A spirit is a personality; it has reason; it has intelligence; it has feeling; and then it has self-consciousness, by which it sees itself and surveys, as in a mirror, its states and operations. It has indeed many other forms of ac-

tivity, none of which exist in the material world. But there is one activity immanent in all spiritual beings, which rules over them and is supreme, and that is the will, which gives them character and constitutes them just what they are. Now so far as our experience goes, as based on a knowledge of our own spirits, the essential character of will is energy, power or force. It moves, it is true, in the sphere of consciousness, intelligence and reason. Under one aspect, it is reason, personal reason; but with all these its necessary concomitants, it is the form of power which an individual wields over himself and over the world outside of himself, and the true measure of his existence. It is the activity of the will that produces motion in our bodies, activity in our thoughts and effects in the outside world. This much we know of our own spirits. They are sources or reservoirs of a determining power, not existing in solid atoms, not in a particular part of our bodies, but *existing* no less really as centres of activity than if they occupied space and magnitude. But what is true of our own spirits must be still more true of spirits angelic or human, that are no more localized within the boundaries of this, mundane sphere. In a still higher degree they have life and self-conscious power. They also are centres of forces, but the sphere of their activity is indefinitely enlarged. Their's is a true existence, self-poised, unchanged, indestructible and immortal. We read of angels that excel in strength, and also of principalities and powers.

From what has now been said, it follows that the universe, embracing the visible and invisible worlds, is a unity, not a mass of discordant and heterogeneous elements without any relation or connection. It is a grand and unspeakably glorious system of powers and activities, that differ, it is true, in character and quality, but all so shaped as to combine in producing one sublime result.

But having traced the forces of nature to invisible centres or points, and the activity of spirits to their still more mysterious sources in their wills, we involuntarily ask, are these centres the ultimate sources of all this activity and power? Science blinded would answer in the affirmative and say there is no-

thing beyond, or if there should be, it is unknowable and should therefore be dismissed from our thoughts. This, however, is not the answer of truthful philosophy, of the general intuitional reason of humanity, and much less, of divine revelation. We have already seen that finite human wills are not only powers in themselves, but also sources of many and diverse powers. They act upon, control and move the matter of our bodies. And this is further illustrated by an invisible determining power in the plant and the animal which adumbrates the activity of will-power or force in the higher world of intelligence. With these illustrations or analogies around us every day, the idea of one first supreme cause or will, given to us in our consciousness and confirmed by both natural and supernatural revelation, falls in naturally and necessarily. All forces, powers or activities imply the presence and activity of a will back and beyond them, just as necessarily as the movements of the human body. The forces of the natural and spiritual worlds have a certain kind of independence, a local habitation and name as we may say, but this is not absolute; it is in all cases only relative. The centres or loci of all spheres of activity in the universe, are the spheres of the operation of the supreme will. They are the strings upon which the great and august Creator strikes and evolves the multiplied harmonies of the grand creation.

Berkeley erred piously and innocently but egregiously, when he attempted to sweep away the outward universe and with it all secondary causes, maintaining that God and spirits alone exist, the one as the direct and active cause of all things and the other, as the passive receptacle of the divine activity. God might act exclusively in a direct way upon our spirits, if He saw proper. But He has not done so. Like a true sovereign and king, He delegates part of His power to His creatures according to their capacities, localizes it in its different degrees in all parts of His vast dominions, and carries forward His purposes through innumerable media, which like so many angels, perform the behests of His sovereign will. He breathed upon all the infinitesimal atoms which He created and they became

living active principles in evolving this stupendous outward universe of matter. He touches the hidden centres of action in His intelligent creatures, delegates to them His power, and they are swift to execute His purposes of goodness and love. Secondary causes or sources of power do not and cannot obscure the lustre of the First Cause. They only enhance its magnificence and glory. Whilst to the great majority of men, who in the nature of the case, have not the opportunity of studying the ways of God in nature and history, the simple announcement that He is the Creator and Upholder of all things, is sufficient to inspire reverence, faith, hope and love, the study of His works in detail, in secondary cause, is calculated in a still higher degree to cultivate such feelings and to elevate our ideas of His majesty and glory.

In conclusion, we might turn to account these reflections upon matter and spirit, and show what light they are capable of throwing upon various other topics which at one time or another perplex the thoughts of all earnest and thoughtful persons. It might be shown that they throw some comparative light upon the mysterious relation of body and soul, their separation at the hour of death, their reunion in the resurrection at the last day, the transformation of the present order of things into the new heavens and the new earth in which dwelleth righteousness, and kindred subjects. But space will not allow, and we prefer that the views here advanced should stand upon their own merits, without deriving any further support even from those higher interests which they might be supposed to favor and promote.

DR. KRAUTH'S ARTICLE.—It may hardly seem necessary to say that this REVIEW does not hold itself responsible for the positions taken in Dr. Krauth's article in the present number. Dr. Krauth is widely known as a Lutheran divine and theologian, and he alone is responsible for the historical argument he here produces.—ED. REVIEW.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A COMMENTARY UPON THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. By George Junkin, D. D., LL. D. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., No. 710 Arch street. New York; Robert Carter & Bros. 1873. Price \$2.

We knew Dr. Junkin well, and often listened to his stirring sermons. He filled many positions of honor and responsibility in the Presbyterian Church, among others the presidency of La Fayette College. He was its first president and is honored as its founder. He has never had a superior in the presidential chair of that institution. He was possessed of a more than ordinary degree of metaphysical talent, was a fine theologian, and an earnest Christian.

The present Commentary glows on every page with the earnestness of the Christian scholar. Yet it runs here and there in the Presbyterian mould, for Dr. Junkin was a most pronounced Presbyterian. We cannot agree with him when he so confidently asserts that St. Paul was the author of this epistle, nor with some of his interpretations of its contents. His caveat against what he calls "the seminal theory of representation; viz., that the germs of all his posterity were actually present in Adam when he sinned; and thus they, being present in a kind of infinitesimal seminal person, actually sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression" (page 263), betrays a gross misunderstanding of the true theory of our organic union with Adam. Moreover his representative theory, which to his mind was so clear and so clearly just, fails entirely, we think, to justify the ways of God to man. He says that we in this country understand well what the theory of representation is. But according to the American theory a representation without the knowledge or consent of the parties represented, would be unjust and absurd.

This posthumous work of a Christian scholar will be read with interest and profit, especially by those who knew him during his very earnest and active life.

PUBLIC WORSHIP. Partly Responsive. Designed for any Christian Congregation. With an Introduction, By Rev. Daniel March, D. D. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., 710 Arch street. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. Price \$1.25.

We quote a paragraph from the preface written by Dr. March. "I have not been accustomed to the use of written formulas in conducting public worship. But I have felt the need of more order, fulness, and propriety than ordinarily appear in extemporaneous prayers from the pulpit. And I have desired some simple, familiar, and accepted form of worship in which minister and people alike, can join with heart and voice. The preparation of this manual is a sign that many others have felt the same want, and it seems to me that the selections and the order of service set forth in the book, are well fitted to answer an increasing demand."

Recently the Congregationalists, through several of their leading ministers, took a step towards liturgical worship. The Presbyterians here follow. It cannot be denied that there is a general call for such worship, especially as opening the way for the people to join in the way of responses, in all directions. When it comes to be seen that our Reformed Church has not misinterpreted the wants of the Protestant Church, but rather anticipated them in the preparation of our Order of Worship, the opposition to it still lingering in certain quarters will cease.

GALAMA; OR, THE BEGGARS, (The Founders of the Dutch Republic.)
By J. B. De Liefde. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 654 Broadway, New York.

A historical fiction, giving the condition of things in the Netherlands three centuries ago—the story opens 1568. The Netherlands then included Holland and Belgium. They were under the dominion, at the time the story opens, of Philip II., King of Spain, who ruled over them as Count of the Netherlands. The picture of the relative position of Protestants and Catholics is no doubt substantially correct. The Catholics are bitter and blood thirsty, the Protestants are sometimes fanatical and given to retaliation. It was a bitter, cruel war. The Dutch contended for religious and civil rights, for fireside and home, and they conquered. Much of the time they lived, many of them, on the sea. Some turned pirates. The story gives some account of these. The picture given of the *Jesuit* is a sad one, making him die with a lie on his lips and an appeal to the Blessed Mother of God—but such fruit would naturally result from Jesuitical ethics.

The story is not over-strained. It is calm, and moves forward without any great intricacies of plan or plot, but it is all the better for that. It has been published in England under the name of *Les Gueux*, The Beggars.

THE BIBLE COMMENTARY. Vol. III. Kings II. Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther. New York, Scribner: Armstrong & Co., 654 Broadway. 1873.

This is another volume of this substantial Commentary noticed above. It is according to the authorized version (A. D. 1611), with an explanatory and critical commentary, and a revision of the translation by Bishops and other clergy of the Anglican Church. It gives the latest and best results of the Biblical learning of the age, and is well suited for use in families.

A GRAMMAR OF THE NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. By Alexander Buttmann. Authorized Translation, with numerous additions and corrections by the author. And over: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, Main street. 1873.

"This is confessedly the most important treatise on the subject, which has appeared since Winer's. The author makes generous acknowledgments of indebtedness to Winer; but a slight examination of the book will convince the reader that it has a valid claim to be regarded as an original work. In fact, the general attitude and drift of the two writers differ perceptibly. While Winer—owing, doubtless, to the lax views respecting the New Testament language, which prevailed when he began to write—seems loath to recognize incipient departures from classic usage, Prof. Buttmann, on the other hand, is quick to concede and to trace out the general tendency of the language to degenerate from the classical standard, is inclined to give greater prominence than Winer to the influence of the Septuagint, and even to detect traces of the Latin in the syntax of the New Testament."

This work is brought out in a good style. It forms a convenient volume for use, and is a very necessary help in the critical study of the New Testament.

LUTHER AND THE BIBLE. By T. Stork, D. D. Philadelphia: Lutheran Board of Publication, 42 North Ninth Street. 1873.

THE FOREIGNER IN FAR CATHAY. By W. H. Medhurst, H. B. M. Consul, Shanghai. New York; Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1873.